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Voorwoord
Tegenwoordig schrijf je een academisch proefschrift aan het begin 
van je wetenschappelijke carrière. Ruim dertig jaar geleden ben ik met 
mijn wetenschappelijke loopbaan bij het CBS begonnen en toen heb ik 
inderdaad een proefschrift geschreven. Het ging over de ontwikkeling van 
tijdreeksmodellen voor het voorspellen van geboortecijfers. Het manuscript 
werd goedgekeurd door mijn toenmalige promotoren, Dick van de Kaa 
en Jaap Hartog. Maar ik was zelf niet helemaal tevreden. Toen ik nog wat 
berekeningen overdeed met nieuwere cijfers ontdekte ik dat mijn model het 
toch niet zo goed deed als ik dacht. Daarom besloot ik het proefschrift aan 
te passen. Maar daar is het uiteindelijk niet meer van gekomen. Ik kreeg een 
andere baan bij het CBS, en vond het boeiender om onderzoek te doen naar 
nieuwe methoden. Een aantal jaren later benaderde Frans Willekens me met 
de vraag of ik niet alsnog wilde promoveren. Ik ben toen begonnen met een 
nieuw proefschrift, deze keer over de onzekerheid van bevolkingsprognoses. 
Ik heb er een aantal artikelen over geschreven, maar alweer door een 
verandering van baan kwam het niet tot een afronding. Zeven jaar geleden 
benaderde Frans Willekens me weer. Deze keer met de vraag of ik bij het 
NIDI afdelingshoofd wilde worden. Een voorwaarde was wel dat ik zou 
gaan promoveren. In eerste instantie was er bij het NIDI minder tijd voor 
onderzoek dan ik had verwacht en leek ook de derde poging om tot een 
proefschrift te komen te stranden. Maar Frans bleef me geduldig stimuleren 
om toch tijd vrij te maken voor het schrijven van een proefschrift. En 
uiteindelijk is dat gelukt. Hier ligt het resultaat.
Eén van de consequenties van het pas schrijven van een proefschrift wanneer 
je al ruim dertig jaar bezig bent met onderzoek, is dat het niet zo eenvoudig 
is om vast te stellen wie allemaal – direct of indirect – hebben bijgedragen 
aan het tot stand komen van het proefschrift en dus wie een dankwoord 
verdienen in het voorwoord. In de 25 jaar die ik bij het CBS heb gewerkt 
en de zeven jaar die ik inmiddels bij het NIDI werk, heb ik met heel veel 
collega’s met veel plezier samengewerkt. Daar heb ik heel veel van geleerd. 
Bij het CBS had ik het voorrecht om leiding te mogen geven aan een aantal 
XLWVWHNHQGHRQGHU]RHNHUVGLHRRNQRJHHQVKHHO¿MQHFROOHJD¶VZDUHQ'H
overgang naar het NIDI betekende dat ik een heel andere omgeving kwam 
te werken en dan bedoel ik niet alleen het gebouw. En ook al is de wijze van 
samenwerking met collega’s duidelijk anders dan bij het CBS, ook bij het 
NIDI ben ik me snel thuis gaan voelen. Als ik alle namen zou noemen van 
mensen met wie ik in de afgelopen 32 jaar prettig heb samengewerkt, zou 
dit voorwoord te lang worden. Daarom noem ik alleen de namen van enkele 
collega’s die heel direct bij dit proefschrift zijn betrokken. In de eerste plaats 
uiteraard die van mijn promotor, Frans Willekens. Al bij mijn eerste poging 
om een proefschrift te schrijven, dertig jaar geleden, was het de bedoeling dat 
Frans als co-promotor zou optreden, maar dat was helaas door de toenmalige 
regelgeving niet mogelijk. Maar dankzij zijn geduld en zijn voortdurende 
vertrouwen in mij is er uiteindelijk toch een proefschrift gekomen. Frans, 
onze wegen hebben elkaar de afgelopen dertig jaar vaak gekruist, en dat 
heeft mij steeds veel inspiratie gegeven. De drie mensen bij het NIDI die de 
meeste uren aan mijn proefschrift hebben gewerkt, zijn Jeannette van der 
Aar, Tonny Nieuwstraten en Jacqueline van der Helm. De vele formules, 
JUD¿HNHQHQWDEHOOHQHQGHRPVODJKHEEHQYRRUDO-HDQQHWWHHHQKRRSZHUN
bezorgd. Heel veel dank voor jullie enthousiasme bij het klaren van deze 
klus. Tot slot noem ik nog twee namen van collega’s bij het CBS en NIDI, 
Maarten Alders en Nicole van der Gaag, niet alleen omdat ze mijn paranimfen 
]LMQPDDUYRRUDORRNYRRUGHYHOHMDUHQYDQ¿MQHVDPHQZHUNLQJ9LDKHQZLO
ik ook alle collega’s danken die ik hier niet bij naam noem. 
De prijs die ik moet betalen voor het lang uitstellen van mijn promotie is dat 
mijn ouders dit helaas niet meer hebben kunnen meemaken. Zij hebben mij 
in mijn jeugd gestimuleerd om te gaan studeren. Toen ik vele jaren geleden 
voor het eerst van plan was te promoveren, hadden mijn zussen Ellie en 
Anneke en mijn broer Paul er zoveel vertrouwen in, dat ze me al een cadeau 
hebben gegeven. Dat getuigde van veel optimisme. Ik ben blij dat ik dat 
optimisme nu eindelijk heb kunnen waarmaken. Ingeborg zou ik kunnen 
danken als co-auteur van hoofdstuk 4. Maar hoewel de samenwerking wat 
mij betreft een succes was, dacht Ingeborg daar niet helemaal hetzelfde over. 
We hebben besloten ons werk en onze relatie te scheiden en het is bij één 
gezamenlijk artikel gebleven. Ingeborg en ik hebben elkaar bij het CBS leren 
kennen. Heel toepasselijk publiceerde datzelfde CBS op de dag waarop ik dit 
voorwoord aan het schrijven was, een artikel waaruit blijkt dat steeds meer 
mensen hun partner op het werk ontmoeten. Van de samenwoners die elkaar 
na 2000 hebben leren kennen, heeft één op de vijf de partner op het werk 
ontmoet. Ik weet niet of het percentage op het CBS hoger of lager ligt dan 
KHWJHPLGGHOGH:DWLNZHOZHHWLVGDWKRHZHOLNPHWYHHO¿MQHFROOHJD¶VRS
het CBS heb samengewerkt, mijn ontmoeting met Ingeborg het allerbeste is 
wat me daar is overkomen. Ingeborg verwacht dat ik hier zal schrijven dat 
het proefschrift niet dankzij haar, maar ondanks haar nu klaar is. Dankzij 
Ingeborg heb ik de afgelopen twee jaar lang niet al mijn tijd besteed aan 
mijn proefschrift. Uitstapjes, vakanties, etentjes, theater-, bioscoop- en 
museumbezoek waren steeds een goede aanleiding om met andere dingen 
dan mijn proefschrift bezig te zijn. Maar dit was een goede stimulans om 
HI¿FLsQWWHZHUNHQ+LHUGRRULVKHWZHUNHQDDQPLMQSURHIVFKULIWDOOHVEHKDOYH
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1. Introduction
1.1. Transparency of population projections, scenarios and forecasts
Population projections are widely used. Projections of future population 
growth and population ageing have an important impact in many policy 
areas. For example, population ageing may lead to an increase in the future 
costs of pensions, health care and long term care. The decline in the growth 
rate of the working age population may have an adverse effect on future 
economic growth. The ageing of the work force may reduce the future 
growth rate of labour productivity. The growth of population size may lead 
to an increase in the future demand of energy. These are only few examples 
of the effects of changes in the size and age structure of the population. Thus 
the usefulness of population projections is obvious. Projections of the future 
size and age structure of the population are based on assumptions about the 
future levels of fertility, mortality, and migration. Starting from the current 
population by age and sex, changes in the levels of fertility, mortality and 
migration determine future changes in the population size and age structure. 
If the forecaster makes assumptions about the most likely future development 
in fertility, mortality and migration, the results of his or her calculations 
of future population changes can be regarded as forecasts. Although it is 
not certain that these changes will occur, the forecaster considers these 
developments to be more likely than other developments, given the knowledge 
available at the moment that the forecasts are made. Alternatively, the 
forecaster may calculate future changes in population under the assumption 
that current trends in fertility, mortality, and migration will continue. If the 
forecaster does not indicate whether this should be considered as the most 
likely development, the results of these calculations can be regarded as 
projections. More generally, projections can be regarded as outcomes of any 
set of assumptions about future trends without a statement that this is expected 
to be the most likely future development. Thus publishing projections seems 
less risky than publishing forecasts. If the assumptions underlying the 
projections will not come true, e.g. if current trends in fertility, mortality 
and migration will not continue, the projections will not be accurate, but 
the forecaster cannot be blamed, because he or she has not claimed that 
this would actually happen. This may be one reason why many statistical 
agencies label the outcomes of their calculations as projections. However, 
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Keilman (2008) argues that unless the agency presents its assumptions as 
unrealistic, the projections published by statistical agencies can be viewed as 
forecasts, indicating a likely development. 
In order to emphasize the uncertainty of forecasts, it has become common 
practice to publish alternative scenarios. Scenarios are aimed to describe 
possible futures. Often one scenario is labelled as baseline, reference or 
business as usual scenario. Usually this scenario is a projection, assuming 
a continuation of trends. If this is assumed to be a likely development, this 
scenario can be viewed as a forecast. The other scenarios show possible 
DOWHUQDWLYHGHYHORSPHQWV7KHVFHQDULRVFDQEHEDVHGRQDQ LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ
of the main driving forces of changes in fertility, mortality and migration 
and on assumptions about possible future developments in these driving 
forces, e.g. economic, social, cultural, technological and political changes. 
$OWHUQDWLYHO\WKHVFHQDULRVFDQEHVSHFL¿HGRQWKHEDVLVRIDQDVVHVVPHQWRI
the size of forecast errors. If it is assumed that forecast errors will be large, 
the interval between scenarios should be large. For example, if the forecaster 
assumes that the future development of migration is very uncertain, the range 
between alternative scenarios of future migration should be wide, whereas if 
the future development of fertility is considered to be not that uncertain, the 
range between scenarios of future fertility may be relatively small.
The methods used for making projections and scenarios may differ. If 
projections are based on the assumption that trends will continue, time-series 
models can be used to estimate the trend and to extrapolate the trend into the 
future. If scenarios are based on assumptions about alternative developments 
in the driving forces of fertility, mortality and migration, explanatory models 
can be used to assess the size of the effects of these driving forces on the 
levels of fertility, mortality and migration. However, there is no dichotomy. 
Scenarios may be based on time-series models rather than on explanatory 
models, e.g. by assuming a deceleration of change in one scenario and an 
acceleration in another. Chapter 6 shows how alternative scenarios of future 
changes in life expectancy can be based on alternative assumptions about 
FKDQJHV LQ DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV:KHQPDNLQJ SURMHFWLRQV DQ
H[SODQDWRU\PRGHOFDQEHXVHGWRDVVHVVWKHHIIHFWRIVKRUWWHUPÀXFWXDWLRQV
This allows to identify long-term trends which can be the basis for long-term 
projections. Chapter 3 shows how an explanatory model can be used to 
HVWLPDWH WKH HIIHFW RI WKH EXVLQHVV F\FOH RQ VKRUWWHUP ÀXFWXDWLRQV LQ
immigration. Similarly Fokkema et al. (2008) show how the business cycle 
DIIHFWVVKRUWWHUPÀXFWXDWLRQVLQWKHWRWDOIHUWLOLW\UDWH
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Whether an extrapolation method is used to make projections or an 
explanatory model is used to make scenarios, the forecaster needs to make 
choices and assumptions. When making projections it may make a lot of 
difference which base period is chosen for estimating the trend. Chapter 
3 shows that in projecting emigration from the Netherlands a long base 
SHULRGVXJJHVWVWKDWPLJUDWLRQVKRZVUDQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQVDURXQGDFRQVWDQW
level, whereas a short base period suggests that there is an increasing trend. 
Another choice to be made by the forecaster is the type of time-series model. 
Deterministic time series models, such as a linear trend model, assume that 
WKHUHLVD¿[HGWUHQGWKDWLVQRWDIIHFWHGE\UDQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQV6WRFKDVWLF
time series models, such as the random walk with drift model, are based on 
the assumption that the trend is subject to random changes. This implies 
WKDWUHFHQWÀXFWXDWLRQVDIIHFW WKHOHYHORI WKHWUHQG7KHSURMHFWLRQVPDGH
by deterministic models do not react quickly to recent changes in the time 
series as these are viewed as short term deviations from the long term trend. 
Chapter 3 shows that the choice of the time series model may lead to quite 
different projections of migration. Chapter 6 shows that different time series 
PRGHOVIRUDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVOHDGWRGLIIHUHQWSURMHFWLRQVRIOLIH
expectancy. One additional choice to be made is the indicator to be projected. 
Chapter 3 shows that separate projections of immigration and emigration 
may lead to a different projection of net migration than directly projecting 
net migration. Projecting different types of immigration separately (such as 
labour, family and asylum migration) may result in a different projection 
of total immigration than projecting total immigration directly. Chapter 6 
VKRZVWKDWSURMHFWLQJDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVZLOOOHDGWRDGLIIHUHQW
projection of life expectancy than projecting life expectancy directly. 
When making scenarios on the basis of assumptions about future changes in 
the main driving forces of fertility, migration and mortality choices have to 
be made about the method that will be used to assess the effects of the driving 
forces. Assumptions can be based on explanatory models, disaggregation 
or expert opinions. Chapter 4 describes how an explanatory model can 
be used to assess the effects of demographic, socioeconomic and cultural 
explanatory variables on regional differences in the level of fertility. The 
results can be used to specify scenarios of future differences in fertility on 
the basis of assumptions about future changes in the explanatory variables. 
Chapter 3 shows how disaggregation of immigration numbers by migration 
motive can be used to identify explanations of changes in immigration and 
to make assumptions about future changes. Chapter 7 discusses a method 
proposed by Lutz (2009) to assess the effects of a set of driving forces on 
future changes in fertility, mortality and migration from a survey among 
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H[SHUWV2QHEHQH¿WRIWKLVDSSURDFKFRPSDUHGZLWKWKHVSHFL¿FDWLRQRID
quantitative explanatory model is that the choice of explanatory variables 
is not restricted by the availability of data which are needed for estimating 
WKH FRHI¿FLHQWVRI DQH[SODQDWRU\PRGHO2QH OLPLWDWLRQRI WKLV DSSURDFK
is that experts give qualitative judgements about the direction of changes, 
but that these qualitative arguments need to be translated into quantitative 
assumptions about future changes in fertility, mortality and migration. 
Chapter 7 discusses how Lutz (2009) deals with this problem. Since the 
number of explanatory variables included in Lutz’s argument-based approach 
is considerably larger than the number of variables that can be included in 
a quantitative explanatory model, the resulting assumptions about future 
changes in fertility, mortality and migration can be expected to differ.
Thus whether the forecaster makes a projection or alternative scenarios, he 
or she has to make choices about the type of method to be used, the base 
period, the selection of indicators and explanatory variables and to make 
assumptions about the continuation of past trends in the future and about 
future changes in driving forces. The arguments given for making these 
choices and assumptions determine whether a projection or a scenario can be 
regarded as a forecast. If the forecaster argues that a continuation of a trend is 
likely because the trend has been manifest for a long period, this projection 
can be viewed as a forecast. For example, Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) show 
that best practice life expectancy (i.e. the highest level of life expectancy in 
the world in each year) has followed a linear trend over a period of a century 
and a half and they argue that there is no reason to assume that this trend 
will not continue in the coming decades. This is a forecast rather than only 
an arbitrary projection. Chapter 3 argues that labour migration is affected 
by the situation on the labour market, that the future decline in the working 
age population will lead to shortages in the labour market and thus that it is 
plausible to assume that in the future labour migration will be higher than 
in the past. This is a forecast rather than only an arbitrary scenario. Chapter 
4 argues that the future effects of demographic, socioeconomic and cultural 
developments on fertility will counterbalance each other and thus that 
differences in fertility between small and large cities will not disappear. This 
can be viewed as a forecast rather than as an arbitrary scenario. Alternatively, 
Chapter 6 shows how the future rise in life expectancy may differ if trends 
are projected in a different way. If each of these trends is based on valid 
arguments and the forecaster does not give arguments why one projection is 
more likely than the others, these are scenarios rather than forecasts. 
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Thus whether a projection or a scenario can be viewed as a forecast does not 
depend on the method used but on the arguments underlying the choices and 
assumptions made by the forecaster. Since the terms projections, forecasts 
and scenarios are often used interchangeably, the label used by the forecaster 
WRGHVFULEHKLVRUKHUFDOFXODWLRQVGRHVQRWSURYLGHVXI¿FLHQWLQIRUPDWLRQ
Rather it is important that the forecaster makes decisions and assumptions 
underlying the choice and application of methods explicit as this will allow 
the user to determine how projections and scenarios can be used. Armstrong 
(2001) argues that users often cannot judge the quality of a forecast, but they 
can decide whether the forecasting process was reasonable. This requires that 
it is necessary for users to know which decisions are made by the forecaster. 
Therefore projections and scenarios should be transparent. Transparency 
requires that in addition to explaining which method is used, the forecaster 
should specify which underlying choices and assumptions are made, what the 
arguments for these choices and assumptions are, and what the consequences 
of these choices and arguments are, e.g. by means of sensitivity analyses 
or by presenting alternative scenarios. Transparency is not an aim in itself. 
The main aim of a forecast is accuracy: a forecast should give an accurate 
description of future developments. The aim of scenarios is to show possible 
future developments, so that the policy maker can take these into account 
when making plans. However, since the accuracy of forecasts and the 
plausibility of scenarios are not yet known at the moment that forecasts or 
scenarios are made, the user can only judge the way forecasts and scenarios 
are made and this requires that the forecasting process is made transparent.
The aim of this book is to present methods that can be used for making 
projections and scenarios in a transparent way. Chapters 2 to 6 will discuss 
choices that are to be made by forecasters and arguments that can be used to 
determine whether a projection or scenario can be regarded as a forecast. The 
aim is not to present one model that will outperform all other models and that 
will produce ‘objective’ forecasts, i.e. forecasts that do not depend on choices 
to be made by the forecaster. Models are very useful instruments for the 
forecaster, but they are not more than a tool. Forecasts do not automatically 
follow from a model. It is inevitable that the forecaster has to make choices 
and it is important that these choices are made explicitly on the basis of 
arguments and do not remain implicit. In order to improve transparency the 
methods described in the following chapters are kept as simple as possible. 
,IPRGHOVDUHFRPSOLFDWHGLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRDVVHVVWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIFKRLFHV
for the outcomes. Even though most chapters in this book include formulas, 
the basic underlying ideas are simple. 
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1.2. Outline of this book
7KLVERRNLQFOXGHV¿YHHPSLULFDOFKDSWHUV7KH¿UVWWZRFKDSWHUVGHDOZLWK
international migration, the subsequent two chapters discuss fertility, and the 
¿IWKFKDSWHULVDERXWPRUWDOLW\7KHQDWXUHRIFKDQJHVLQIHUWLOLW\PRUWDOLW\
and migration differs. Mortality tends to show gradual long-term trends, 
PLJUDWLRQ VKRZV ODUJH VKRUWWHUPÀXFWXDWLRQV DQG WKH OHYHO RI IHUWLOLW\ LV
affected by changes in the age pattern. Therefore different methods are 
needed to project future changes in migration, mortality, and fertility. Two 
chapters in this book are based on Dutch data. One reason is that good and 
detailed data are available for the Netherlands. The other three empirical 
chapters use data for several European countries.
7KH¿UVW VWHS LQPDNLQJ IRUHFDVWV LV WR DVVHVV WKHTXDOLW\RI GDWD ,I GDWD
have poor quality, forecast accuracy of methods using these data will be 
poor (Keilman, 2008). Most European countries have good data on fertility 
and mortality, but data on international migration tend to be less reliable or 
even lacking. One way of improving statistics on international migration is 
to compare data from different countries. For example, Germany reported 
that in the period 2002-2007 on average 136,000 immigrants per year arrived 
from Poland, whereas Poland reported that on average 14,000 emigrants 
moved to Germany. Obviously we cannot simply use such reported migration 
numbers to make projections, particularly if projections for several countries 
need to be made. Chapter 2 shows how migration data can be improved by 
using a simple model that compares data from different countries in order to 
estimate to what extent migration statistics may under- or overestimate the 
real numbers. 
Chapter 3 discusses methods for projecting international migration. It 
compares time series projections and argument-based forecasts. The 
analyses are based on Dutch data. Time series of international migration tend 
WRVKRZODUJHUÀXFWXDWLRQVRYHUWKH\HDUVWKDQIHUWLOLW\DQGPRUWDOLW\2QH
explanation is that the nature of migration has changed over time. Different 
types of migrants, such as labour migrants, family migrants and asylum 
seekers, react differently to economic, political and cultural developments. 
This implies that the projected direction of change may differ by type of 
migration. Chapter 3 argues that argument-based forecasts should be based 
on a distinction between the main categories of migrants. 
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with fertility. Chapter 4 discusses regional differences 
in fertility and chapter 5 focuses on international differences. Chapter 4 
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illustrates how an explanatory model can be used for making argument-based 
forecasts. In contrast with the other chapters this chapter uses regional data. 
The chapter examines how differences in the level of the total fertility rate 
(TFR) between small and large cities in the Netherlands can be explained. 
Large cities tend to have a lower TFR than small cities. Different types of 
explanatory variables are included. Whereas projections on the national level 
focus on projecting the future level of fertility, regional projections focus on 
projecting regional differences. The model described in chapter 4 is used to 
develop arguments to answer the question whether the differences in the TFR 
between large and small cities will be persistent or whether a converging 
development may be expected. Statistics Netherlands and the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency use this model for making assumptions 
about fertility for the Netherlands regional population forecasts.
Assumptions about future changes in the level of fertility are usually based 
on assumptions about the future level of the TFR. However changes in the 
level of the TFR are affected by changes in the age pattern of fertility. Since 
these effects have temporary effects on the level of the TFR, it is important 
to assess the size of these effects before making a projection for the long run. 
If these effects are ignored a temporary decline or increase in the TFR may 
be projected into the future as if it were a permanent decline or increase. 
For that reason projections of fertility should take into account changes in 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV6HSDUDWHSURMHFWLRQVRIDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV
for each age tend to result in irregular patterns. Therefore it is common 
SUDFWLFH WRVPRRWKDJHVSHFL¿F UDWHVEHIRUHPDNLQJDSURMHFWLRQ&KDSWHU
5 introduces the relational method TOPALS that produces a smooth age 
VFKHGXOHE\PHDQVRIFDOFXODWLQJWKHUDWLRVRIWKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV
to be projected and the rates described by a smooth standard age schedule. 
The age pattern of the ratios can be described by a linear spline. By making 
assumptions about the future values of the rate ratios at selected ages, the 
so-called knots, TOPALS can be used for making smooth projections of 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV,IWKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHLVDVRFDOOHGWDUJHW
age pattern, a partial adjustment model can be used to project the speed 
ZLWKZKLFKWKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVZLOOPRYHWRZDUGWKHWDUJHWOHYHO
In chapter 5 projections of fertility rates for six European countries are 
calculated under the assumption that the current Swedish fertility pattern can 
be regarded as the target pattern.
Life expectancy has been increasing in most European countries over a 
long period of time. There is general agreement among most experts that 
life expectancy will continue to grow, but there is less agreement about the 
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size of the increase. Some optimistic experts expect that life expectancy will 
continue to grow by 2.5 years per decade. Other experts assume that the 
rate of increase in life expectancy will slow down, since a linear increase 
in life expectancy could be achieved by an acceleration of the decrease in 
DJHVSHFL¿FGHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV RQO\&KDSWHU  VKRZVKRZ723$/6FDQ
EHXVHGIRUSURMHFWLQJDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV2HSSHQDQG9DXSHO
(2002) expect that the ‘best practice’ life expectancy of Japanese women 
ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRLQFUHDVHLQWKHFRPLQJGHFDGHV3URMHFWHGDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWK
probabilities that are consistent with that projection can be used as the target 
for other countries. A partial adjustment model is used to make projections 
RI DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV IRU  (XURSHDQ FRXQWULHV XQGHU WKH
assumption that they will move to that age pattern in the (very) long run. 
&KDSWHUVXPPDUL]HVWKHPDLQ¿QGLQJVDERXWWKHXVHRIPHWKRGVIRUPDNLQJ
projections and scenarios of future migration, fertility, and mortality and 
discusses the use of these methods for improving transparency of population 
projections and scenarios. 
2. Overcoming the problems of inconsistent  





Emigration numbers reported by sending countries tend to differ from the 
corresponding immigration numbers reported by receiving countries. In 
this chapter, a methodology is presented to achieve harmonised estimates 
RIPLJUDWLRQÀRZVEHQFKPDUNHG WRD VSHFL¿FGH¿QLWLRQRIGXUDWLRQ7KLV
PHWKRGRORJ\ DFFRXQWV IRU ERWK GLIIHUHQFHV LQ GH¿QLWLRQV DQG WKH HIIHFWV
of measurement error due to, for example, under reporting and sampling 
ÀXFWXDWLRQV 0RUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ WKH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ WKH WZR VHWV RI
reported data are overcome by estimating a set of adjustment factors for 
each country’s immigration and emigration data. The adjusted data take 
into account any special cases where the origin-destination patterns do not 
match the overall patterns. The new method for harmonising migration 
ÀRZV WKDWZHSUHVHQW LV EDVHGRQHDUOLHU HIIRUWVE\3RXODLQ 
and is illustrated for movements between 19 European countries from 2002 
to 2007. The results represent a reliable and consistent set of international 
PLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV WKDW FDQ EH XVHG IRU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ UHFHQW FKDQJHV LQ
migration patterns, as inputs into population projections and for developing 
evidence-based migration policies.
2.1. Introduction
Our understanding of the mechanisms and patterns of international migration 
over time are impeded both by the lack of data and by inconsistencies in 
the measurement and collection of the data that are available. In fact, it is 
ZHOONQRZQWKDWWKHSDWWHUQVRIPLJUDWLRQYDU\VLJQL¿FDQWO\GHSHQGLQJRQ
which country is reporting the data (Kupiszewska and Nowok, 2008; Nowok 
et al., 2006 and Zlotnik, 1987). Considering that international migration is 
the main factor contributing to population growth in Europe, this is very 
unfortunate. In response to the problem of inconsistent migration data, we 
have developed a methodology for harmonising the data available to us from 
FRXQWULHV LQ (XURSH 0RUH VSHFL¿FDOO\ ZH PDNH XVH RI GRXEO\FRXQWHG
information obtained from migrant sending and migrant receiving countries 
to estimate adjustment factors necessary for producing a consistent set of 
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PLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV 7KHVH HVWLPDWHG ÀRZV DUH EHQFKPDUNHG WR D SDUWLFXODU
GH¿QLWLRQ
Harmonisation of migration data is required for the development of policies 
on immigration (Kraier et al., 2006). Differences in both the concepts and 
techniques used to measure migration make any international comparison of 
PLJUDWLRQGLI¿FXOW7KHUHKDVEHHQDORWRIZRUNRQGDWDLVVXHVDQGPLJUDWLRQ
GH¿QLWLRQV IRU H[DPSOH VHH &KDPSLRQ  .HOO\  .UDO\ DQG
Gnanasekaran (1987), Poulain (1993), Raymer and Willekens (2008), 
United Nations (2002) and Willekens (1994, 1999). Several international 
institutes such as the International Labour Organization, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations and 
the European Commission have all invested heavily in the harmonisation 
of international migration data, but without much success or progression 
(Bilsborrow et al., 1997; Herm, 2006a and Fassmann, 2009). In fact, the 
VLWXDWLRQ WRGD\ LQ WHUPV RIPLJUDWLRQ GH¿QLWLRQV DQGPHDVXUHPHQW LV QRW
much better than it was, say, 20 years ago. 
Recently, some renewed efforts have been made to improve the migration 
data situation in Europe. In 2007, the European Parliament adopted a new 
UHJXODWLRQRQPLJUDWLRQVWDWLVWLFV7KLVUHJXODWLRQSURYLGHVFOHDUGH¿QLWLRQV
RI LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG HPLJUDWLRQ 2I¿FLDO -RXUQDO RI WKH (XURSHDQ8QLRQ
2007), and lists the migration data that must be supplied to Eurostat, the 
VWDWLVWLFDORI¿FHRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ(8E\0HPEHU6WDWHV+RZHYHU
this regulation leaves the Member States free to decide how they will provide 
these data, including the use of estimation methods (Fassmann, 2009). The 
PHWKRGRORJ\SUHVHQWHGLQWKLVSDSHUVKRXOGKHOSQDWLRQDOVWDWLVWLFDORI¿FHV
to improve and harmonize the data they currently provide to international 




or her usual residence for a period of at least a year.’ One problem affecting 
WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI WKLVGH¿QLWLRQ LV WKDW VRPHFRXQWULHV DUHXQDEOH WR
identify their nationals who have left (Fassmann, 2009). Furthermore, many 
European countries exclude the immigration of nationals from the published 
statistics, as they are not considered to be ‘migrants’. Another important 
obstacle has to do with the recommended duration of residence in the country 
of destination. It may take up to two years to identify all persons who have 
stayed at least one year, as they may arrive anytime during the annual time 
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period of interest. This means that the publication of migration statistics 
based on the actual duration of stay may be delayed for some time. To provide 
statistics to the user community in a quicker fashion, many countries simply 
count those migrants who have stayed for at least three months, which leads 
to higher numbers than if the one-year criterion was applied. Other countries 
use the intended duration of stay as the criterion (Fassmann, 2009). 
Many European countries do not have reliable statistics on emigration. This 
is mainly caused by the fact that migrants have little incentive to report 
their move to the administration of the country they have emigrated from. 
0RUHRYHULWLVGLI¿FXOWWRFRXQWSHUVRQVOHDYLQJWKHFRXQWU\EHFDXVHWKH\
are no longer present in the country collecting the data. In this situation, 
comparisons of sending country data with receiving country data provide 
important information on the degree of underestimation found in reported 
HPLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV 81(&(  ,Q IDFW WKH DQDO\VLV RI WKH VRFDOOHG
µGRXEOHHQWU\PDWUL[¶ RIPLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV SURGXFHG E\81(&( VLQFH WKH
early 1970s, and more recently by Eurostat, has been found to be very useful 
and informative. Kelly (1987) and Poulain (1999), for example, have used 
the information contained in this matrix to assess the degree of harmonisation 
amongst reported data. In doing so, the possibility that very narrow or loose 
GH¿QLWLRQVRIPLJUDWLRQPD\EHXVHGIRUUHSRUWHGLPPLJUDWLRQVWDWLVWLFVPXVW
be taken into account, which results in lower or higher levels of migration 
ÀRZV UHVSHFWLYHO\ LQ UHODWLRQ WR VD\ WKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶ UHFRPPHQGHG
RQH\HDUGH¿QLWLRQ81(&(
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate how reliable estimates of harmonized 
PLJUDWLRQVWDWLVWLFVPD\EHREWDLQHGIURPDVHWRIRULJLQGHVWLQDWLRQÀRZV
ZKHUHWZRUHSRUWHGÀRZVDUHDYDLODEOHIRUHDFKSDUWLFXODUÀRZ i.e., from 
receiving and sending countries. The new method that we present is based 
RQHDUOLHUHIIRUWVE\3RXODLQDQGLVDSSOLHGWRUHSRUWHGÀRZV
between 19 European countries from 2002 and 2007. Note, however, that 
WKLVFKDSWHUGRHVQRWFRQVLGHUÀRZVRXWVLGHWKHFRXQWU\V\VWHPRUWKRVH
that are missing. Raymer (2008) describes a method for estimating missing 
PLJUDWLRQÀRZGDWD
2.2. Comparability of international migration data
The reliability of migration statistics can be measured by how well they 
FRUUHVSRQG WR D SDUWLFXODU FRXQWU\¶V GH¿QLWLRQ RU FRQFHSW RI PLJUDWLRQ
+RZHYHUDVGH¿QLWLRQVGLIIHUDFURVVFRXQWULHVUHOLDELOLW\GRHVQRWJXDUDQWHH
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comparability. Moreover, under-registration, under-coverage and accuracy of 
the collection system also affect the measurement of migration (Bilsborrow 
et al., 1997 and Nowok et al., 2006). First, there may be under-registration 
of migrants. This may be the case if the data depend on declarations by 
the migrants themselves. The willingness to report changes in places of 
residence varies both between countries and between groups of migrants. 
In general, migrants have more incentive to report their arrival than their 
GHSDUWXUHDVWKHUHDUHXVXDOO\GLUHFWEHQH¿WVLQGRLQJVRe.g., access to social 
services). Therefore, immigration statistics are generally considered more 
reliable than emigration statistics (Thierry et al., 2005 and UNECE, 2009). 
Second, there may be under-coverage. This measurement category refers 
to the non-inclusion of particular migrant groups. Here, the differences are 
most often caused by the absence or inclusion of nationals, students, asylum 
seekers or irregular (illegal) migrants in the data. In general, asylum seekers 
are included only when they have been granted refugee status and received a 
temporary or permanent residence permit. However, in some instances, they 
are registered at an earlier stage of the asylum process. In other instances, 
even recognised refugees are not included. Irregular migrants are generally 
QRWLQFOXGHGLQPLJUDWLRQVWDWLVWLFVDVWKH\DUHHVSHFLDOO\GLI¿FXOWWRPHDVXUH
(for obvious reasons). In fact, Spain is the only EU country that includes 
LUUHJXODUPLJUDQWV LQ WKH RI¿FLDO VWDWLVWLFV )LQDOO\ GDWD EDVHG RQ VDPSOH
surveys may be unreliable due to sampling errors. Furthermore, unless the 
sample size is very large, the data are likely to show irregularities in the 
patterns across ages or in the distribution of origins or destinations over time, 
DVÀRZVRIPLJUDQWVUHSUHVHQWD UHODWLYHO\VPDOOSURSRUWLRQRI WKHRYHUDOO
population being surveyed. 
7KHPDLQVRXUFHVRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHGH¿QLWLRQVXVHGE\(8FRXQWULHV
to measure migration are the concepts of place of residence and duration of 
stay (Zlotnik, 1987; Bilsborrow et al., 1997 and Kupiszewska and Nowok, 
2008). The de jure (legal) approach to residence implies that in order to 
become a resident, a migrant must comply with certain regulations, which 
tend to differ between nationals and foreigners, and among foreigners, 
between EU- and non-EU-nationals. For example, it is not uncommon for 
emigrants to be registered in their country of citizenship (origin) even after 
several years of living abroad (Thierry et al., 2005). Thus, having a place of 
residence does not necessary imply a presence in that country. The de facto 
(actual) approach is connected with physical presence in a country, usually 
IRU D VSHFL¿HGPLQLPXPSHULRG RI WLPH7R SUHYHQW WKH GHOD\ FDXVHG E\
measuring actual duration of stay, most European countries use the intended 
duration of stay instead (Nowok et al., 2006). Alternatively, the intended 
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duration of stay may be used to provide provisional statistics, which are 
updated at a later point with the actual duration of stay statistics. Another 
group of countries measure ‘permanent’ change of residence only (e.g. 
3RODQGDQG6ORYDNLDZKLFKLVYHU\UHVWULFWLYHDQGWHQGVWRSURGXFHÀRZ
OHYHOVWKDWDUHPXFKORZHUUHODWLYHWRRWKHUGH¿QLWLRQV7KHGXUDWLRQRIVWD\
criterion used by the majority of EU countries is between three months and 
one year. Only three countries (Cyprus, Sweden and UK) apply strictly the 
one-year criterion for immigration, as well as for emigration and for both 
nationals and non-nationals (Thierry et al., 2005). In fact, some countries do 
not take duration of stay into account at all. Germany is such an example, 
where everybody taking up a residence is counted as a migrant. 
%HFDXVHRIGLIIHUHQFHVLQGH¿QLWLRQFRYHUDJHUHJLVWUDWLRQDQGDFFXUDF\RI
WKHFROOHFWLRQPHFKDQLVPWKHRULJLQGHVWLQDWLRQPDWUL[RIPLJUDWLRQÀRZV
between European countries based on immigration data reported by the 
countries of origin tends to differ from the matrix reported by the countries 
RIGHVWLQDWLRQ:LWK UHVSHFW WRGH¿QLWLRQV WKHGLIIHUHQFHVDUHH[SHFWHG WR
EHV\VWHPDWLFRYHUWLPH)RUH[DPSOHWKH*HUPDQGH¿QLWLRQLVZLGHUWKDQ
WKH'XWFKGH¿QLWLRQZKLFK LQWXUQ LVZLGHUWKDQWKDWRI6ZHGHQ,QIDFW
*HUPDQ\ UHSRUWV KLJKHU ¿JXUHV WKDQ WKH 1HWKHUODQGV DQG WKH ¿JXUHV RI
the Netherlands are higher than those reported by Sweden (Kupiszewska 
DQG 1RZRN  $ FRPSDULVRQ RI WKH VL]H RI WKHVH UHSRUWHG ÀRZV
SURYLGHVLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHHIIHFWVRIGLIIHUHQFHVLQGH¿QLWLRQRQWKHVL]H
RIPLJUDWLRQÀRZV%LOVERUURZet al., 1997 and UNECE, 2009). However, 
as mentioned above, not all differences can be explained by differences in 
GH¿QLWLRQ ,Q VRPH FDVHV FRXQWULHV UHSRUW UHODWLYHO\ ODUJH SHUFHQWDJHV RI
unknown countries of origin or destination. Furthermore, sudden jumps in 
REVHUYDWLRQVPD\EHFDXVHGE\FKDQJHVLQGH¿QLWLRQVRUE\FKDQJHVLQWKH
registration method.
'DWD RQ LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG HPLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV E\ FRXQWU\ RI RULJLQ DQG
destination are usually presented in an origin-destination matrix with off 
diagonal entries containing the number of people moving from any origin i 
to any destination j in a given calendar year. For this study, we have collected 
migration data for the 19 countries set out in table 2.1$VHDFKÀRZFDQEH
reported by both sending and receiving countries, two migration tables may 
be produced. Such data are set out in table 2.2. Here, the average 2002-2007 




there are large differences between the two sets of reported numbers (see, 
e.g., Spain to the United Kingdom or Poland to Germany).
2.3. Method
The differences between reported immigration and emigration numbers 
are useful for improving and harmonizing the migration data. If reported 
emigration numbers for a given country turn out to be systematically lower 
than the corresponding immigration numbers reported by the countries 
of destination, this suggests that the reported emigration numbers are too 
low. Adjusting these numbers in an upward direction moves them closer 
to the actual numbers. The same applies to reported immigration numbers. 
For each country we can estimate one adjustment factor for immigration 
and one for emigration in such a way that the adjusted immigration and 
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prevent arbitrary judgments biasing the results, we believe the estimation 
RI DGMXVWPHQW IDFWRUV IRU LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG HPLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV VKRXOG EH
estimated simultaneously. Moreover, it should be noted that immigration is 
not necessarily recorded more accurately than emigration. In some situations, 
sending country data may be considered better (Nowok et al., 2006).
3RXODLQZDVWKH¿UVW WRGHYHORSDPHWKRGWRDGMXVWUHSRUWHG
immigration and emigration numbers for the purpose of obtaining a consistent 
VHWRIPLJUDWLRQÀRZVµ&RUUHFWLRQIDFWRUV¶ZHUHHVWLPDWHGE\PLQLPL]LQJ




ijj EI βα∑ − , where Iij denotes migration from 
country i to country j reported by the receiving country j, Eij denotes the 
VDPHÀRZUHSRUWHGE\WKHVHQGLQJFRXQWU\LĮj is the adjustment factor for 
all immigration to country j and ȕi is the adjustment factor for all emigration 
from country i3RXODLQDQG'DOUH¿QHGWKLVPHWKRGE\GLYLGLQJWKH
squared differences by the sum of the reported numbers, i.e., 





ijj EIEI +−∑ βα  (1) 
      
7KLVUH¿QHPHQWSUHYHQWVÀRZVIURPRUWRODUJHFRXQWULHVIURPELDVLQJWKH
estimates. 
Various constraints have been tried by Poulain and colleagues (Abel, 2009). 
For instance, following the iterative approach to harmonizing migration 
ÀRZV VXJJHVWHG E\ 9DQ GHU (UI DQG 9DQ GHU *DDJ  3RXODLQ DQG
Dal (2008) proposed that the estimates should be normalized to Swedish 
immigration data, as they are generally considered to be highly reliable and 
in agreement with the UN recommended measure, as well as with the new 
EU regulation (Herm, 2006b). The parameters Įj and ȕi may be estimated 
by solving a system of linear equations, which result from applying the 
method of Lagrange multipliers. Multiplying Iij by jαˆ and Eij by iβˆ produces 
WZRVHWVRIPLJUDWLRQÀRZHVWLPDWHVIURPFRXQWU\ i to country j7KH¿QDO
set of estimates are obtained by simply taking the average of the two, i.e.,
2/)ˆˆ(ˆ ijiijjij EIn βα += , where  ijnˆ GHQRWHVWKHKDUPRQLVHGPLJUDWLRQÀRZV
1RWH 3RXODLQ DQG 'DO  DSSOLHG WKHLU FRUUHFWLRQ PHWKRG ¿UVW WR
countries with relatively reliable data to prevent countries with less reliable 
GDWDLQÀXHQFLQJWKHRYHUDOOSDWWHUQV+HUHWKHPDLQFRQFHUQLVWKDWWKHOHVV
reliable data have origin-destination patterns that are not consistent with 
WKHDFWXDOSDWWHUQV7KXVOHVVUHOLDEOHÀRZVZHUHDGMXVWHGLQDKLHUDUFKLFDO


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There are several limitations in the model described above. First, the 
reported numbers included in the denominator of Equation (1) are known 
to be incorrect (Abel, 2009). Second, the row and column totals of the two 
estimated matrices are not equal. As a result, the row and column totals of 
the average harmonised migration matrix do not correspond to the row and 
column totals estimated using the adjustment factors. Finally, the method 
can only be applied to a limited set of countries with reasonably reliable 
data. This implies that the estimates of the adjustment factors depend on the 
VHOHFWLRQRIFRXQWULHVZKLFKPD\QRWUHÀHFWWKHEURDGHUSDWWHUQVRILQWHUHVW
For these reasons, we have revised Poulain’s method in two important ways. 
First, the row-sums and column-sums of the two estimated matrices are set 
to be equal. Second, we introduce additional constraints on individual cells 
in the migration matrices, so that more countries (with less reliable data) may 
be included. 
The adjustment factors for our method can be estimated by solving a system 
of linear equations and imposing a constraint. If we have a N x N receiving 
country and an equivalent N x N sending country matrix, the adjustment factors 
for receiving country, Įj and the adjustment factors for sending country data, 






ijj EI βα ˆˆ  for i = 1,…, N;   i ≠ j  (2)
   
 (3) 
   
  
Equation (2) states that for each country the emigration total estimated on the 
EDVLVRIWKHDGMXVWHGPDWUL[RIÀRZVUHSRUWHGE\UHFHLYLQJFRXQWULHVHTXDOV
WKHHPLJUDWLRQWRWDOHVWLPDWHGRQWKHEDVLVRIWKHDGMXVWHGPDWUL[RIÀRZV
reported by sending countries. Equation (3) does the same for immigration 
totals.
Equations (2) and (3) can be written as a homogeneous system of 2N linear 





ijj EI βα ˆˆ  for j = 1, ..., N;   i ≠ j 
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 (4)
....




7KLVV\VWHPKDVDQLQ¿QLWHQXPEHURIVROXWLRQVIRUĮj and ȕi. For each set 
of values of jαˆ and iβˆ that solve this system, jkαˆ and ikβˆ are solutions as 
ZHOO,QRUGHUWR¿QGDXQLTXHVROXWLRQRQHUHVWULFWLRQQHHGVWREHLPSRVHG
In accordance with Poulain and Dal (2008), we assume that the adjustment 
IDFWRUIRU6ZHGLVKLPPLJUDWLRQLVHTXDOWRRQHVLQFH6ZHGHQXVHVDGH¿QLWLRQ
of migration that is consistent with the new EU regulation and the quality of 
Swedish immigration data is considered to be adequate. This also means 
that the resulting estimates are harmonised in line with the new European 
regulation. 
The basic assumption underlying our estimation procedure (as described 
above) is that the distributions of reported immigration by country of 
origin and reported emigration by country of destination correspond to the 
GLVWULEXWLRQRIDFWXDOPLJUDWLRQÀRZVXQGHUWKHKDUPRQLVHGGH¿QLWLRQ7KLV
implies that the reported emigration of country A is x% higher or lower 
WKDQWKHDFWXDOQXPEHUEDVHGRQWKHVWDQGDUGGH¿QLWLRQIRUDOOFRXQWULHV
of destination. The same assumption applies to receiving country numbers. 
+RZHYHUDVZH¿QGLQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQWKHHVWLPDWHGUHFHLYLQJFRXQWU\ÀRZV
E\FRXQWU\RIRULJLQDQGWKHHVWLPDWHGVHQGLQJFRXQWU\ÀRZVE\FRXQWU\RI
destination are not always consistent with each other. In a number of cases, 
VSHFL¿FRULJLQGHVWLQDWLRQÀRZVKDYHWREHFRQVLGHUHGVHSDUDWHO\)RUWKDW
reason, we introduce additional constraints, corresponding to particular 
RULJLQGHVWLQDWLRQÀRZVWKDWGLIIHUIURPWKHUHPDLQLQJÀRZV
/HW XV DVVXPH WKDW WKH HVWLPDWHG UHFHLYLQJ FRXQWU\PLJUDWLRQ ÀRZ IURP
country p to q,  pqq Iαˆ , differs substantially from the estimated sending 
FRXQWU\ ÀRZ pqp Eβˆ . To make them consistent, we can multiply  pqq Iαˆ  
0ˆ...ˆˆˆ 112211 =−−−− −−∑ NNNNN
i
iNN EEEI βββα
0ˆ...ˆˆˆ 131321211 =−−−−∑ NN
i
i EEEI βββα




by pqγˆ  or pqp Eβˆ by pqδˆ  so that both estimates of migration are equal. 
The question whether we should adjust the estimate based on the reported 
receiving country or the estimate based on the reported sending country 
depends on our knowledge of the data. 
Given the estimated values qαˆ and pβˆ and we can calculate the value of pqγˆ
easily from   pqqpqppq IE αβγ ˆ/ˆˆ = or the value of pqδˆ from pqppqqpq EI βαδ ˆ/ˆˆ =
However, introducing pqγˆ or pqδˆ changes the estimates of qαˆ or pβˆ . This also 
means that the row and column totals of both estimated migration matrices 
no longer tally. Therefore, we adjust the system of linear equations (2) and 
(3) by adding constraints on individual cells of the matrices. If we assume 
that the emigration number reported by country p needs to be adjusted, 






*δβα  for i = 1,…, N;   i ≠ j   (5) 
   
   
 
(6)
where Dij = 1 if i = p and j = q, Dij = 0 otherwise, and 
*ˆ
pqδ = pqδˆ  -1. 
The equations including Ipq and Epq in the system of equations (4) can be 
rewritten as follows: 
0ˆ...ˆˆ...ˆˆ...ˆ...ˆ 111 =−−−−−++++ pNppqppqpppNNpqqp EEEIII ββδβααα  (7)
 
0ˆ...ˆˆ...ˆˆ 11 =−−−−−∑ NqNpqppqq
i
iqq EEEI ββδβα
In contrast with Equation (4), these are non-linear equations, because they 
include the term pqppq Eβδ ˆˆ 7KHYDOXHVRIWKHFRHI¿FLHQWVFDQEHHVWLPDWHG
by an iterative procedure. The model can be extended in a straightforward 
way to include additional constraints. However, for any particular country, 
the number of constraints should not be too high, as this reduces the available 






*δβα  for j = 1, ..., N;   i ≠ j 
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2.4. Data
The sending and receiving country migration data have been provided by 
the national statistical institutes of the EU Member States in response to 
DQQXDO URXQGV RI GDWD FROOHFWLRQ FRQGXFWHG MRLQWO\ E\ ¿YH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
organizations and coordinated by Eurostat (Kupiszewska and Nowok, 
2008). As concerns Europe, Eurostat processes and disseminates data 
received from 37 countries on their website (epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). 
Data sources used by EU member states to produce migration statistics 
are very diverse (Kupiszewska and Nowok, 2008 and Nowok et al. 2006). 
The major types of sources are population registration systems, statistical 
forms, other administrative registers related to foreigners (such as alien 
registers, residence permit registers and registers of asylum seekers), sample 
surveys and censuses. Thirteen EU countries use a population register as 
the source of migration statistics. Alien registers and residence permit 
registers are used in seven countries, sometimes in addition to population 
registers. These registers only provide information on the migration of 
non-nationals. Cyprus and the UK rely on passenger surveys conducted at 
the borders, while Portugal and Ireland rely on household surveys. Greece, 
France and Portugal do not have any data on migration by nationals. Some 
countries derive their emigration statistics from data on residence permits 
by assuming a migrant has left the country when a residence permit has 
expired. Moreover, they often assume that the country of next residence is 
the country of their citizenship. The result, we believe, is an overestimation 
of actual emigration to those particular countries. Finally, several countries 
include in their so-called ‘administrative corrections’ emigration that has not 
been declared, which cannot be disaggregated by country of next residence.
Data on immigration by country of previous residence or emigration by 
country of next residence are not always available or complete (Nowok et 
al., 2006). Thus the sending country and receiving country matrices, when 
combined into a double-entry matrix may be incomplete. For some countries, 
a large share of emigrants have an unknown country of destination: Around 
75 percent in Slovenia, 40 percent in Luxembourg, 35 percent in Austria, 31 
percent in the Netherlands and 39 percent in Spain, for example. Fortunately, 
the estimation of adjustment factors takes this into account. 
In the next section we present our harmonised estimates of migration between 
19 European countries that provide data on both immigration by country 
of origin and emigration by country of destination for the calendar years 
2002-2007. The reported data contains both nationals and non-nationals. 
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Table 2.1 provides a list of the countries. Although there are some data for 
Ireland, Portugal and Romania, these have not been used because they cover 
RQO\DSDUWRI WKHPLJUDWLRQÀRZV e.g. only foreigners or nationals). For 
Iceland, Italy, and Luxembourg, data for one or more years in the period 
2002-2007 are missing. For these countries, the adjustment factors are 
estimated for averages over the available years.
2.5. Results
The results presented in this section are obtained by applying the estimation 
method described in section 2.3. Table 2.2a shows the average values of 
migration between 19 European countries reported by receiving countries 
for the years 2002-2007 and table 2.2b shows the corresponding numbers 
reported by the sending countries. The countries listed in the row headings 
refer to origins and those listed in the column headings refer to destinations. 
A comparison of tables 2.2a and 2.2b reveals large differences between 
numbers reported by sending and receiving countries. According to the 
numbers reported by receiving countries, 671,315 migrants per year moved 
between these 19 countries, whereas the numbers reported by sending 
countries total 499,105. For 11 countries, the reported receiving country 
immigration totals are higher than the corresponding sending country totals. 
For example, Germany reported that 256,221 immigrants arrived from 
the 18 countries in this study, whereas these countries reported that only 
66,905 emigrants moved to Germany. Poland reported that 22,306 persons 
emigrated to the other 18 countries which, for their part, reported receiving 
217,977 immigrants from Poland, suggesting that Polish emigration data 
are around 10 times too low. For 15 of the 19 countries, the emigration 
total reported by the sending country is lower than the corresponding totals 
reported by receiving countries. Keep in mind that receiving country data 
should not always be considered better than sending country data. Consider, 
IRUH[DPSOHWKHÀRZVIURP3RODQGWR*HUPDQ\LQWDEOHVDDQGE+HUH
Germany received an average of 136,927 migrants from Poland, whereas 
Poland reported that they only sent an average of 14,417. This difference 
could be explained by the duration criteria used by these countries, with 
*HUPDQ\KDYLQJDYHU\ORRVHGH¿QLWLRQLQVWDQWDQG3RODQGKDYLQJDYHU\
UHVWULFWLYHGH¿QLWLRQ SHUPDQHQW6R LQFRPSDULVRQZLWK WKHKDUPRQLVHG
GH¿QLWLRQRIDRQH\HDUSHULRG*HUPDQ\¶VUHSRUWHGQXPEHULVFRQVLGHUHGWRR
high and Poland’s too low. 
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The estimated adjustment factors are set out in table 2.3. We indicated above 
that in order to estimate the adjustment factors a restriction was introduced, 
i.e. the adjustment factor for Swedish immigration is set equal to one. For 
16 of the 19 countries, the Eij adjustment factor exceeds one, indicating that 
sending country numbers tend to be underestimated. However, table 2.3 also 
shows that Iij numbers seem to be underestimated in the majority of countries 
as well. This may seem contradictory since for 11 of the 19 countries the 
reported immigration totals exceed the corresponding emigration numbers 
reported by the sending countries. This is because the reported receiving 
country numbers should be compared with the adjusted sending country 
numbers rather than the reported numbers. For example, the immigration 
total reported by the UK (107,897) exceeds the reported emigration from 
sending countries to the UK (52,567). The reported emigration to the UK 
includes 5,219 emigrants from Poland to the UK. However, since the 
reported emigration from Poland is too low (the adjustment factor equals 




















United Kingdom 1.21 1.18
Table 2.3. Estimates of adjustment factors for immigration and emigration,  

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adjusted from 5,219 to 55,506. Moreover, the adjustment factor for Spanish 
emigration data equals 4.90, so the reported emigration from Spain to UK is 
adjusted from 3,430 to 16,792. For several other countries, emigration to the 
UK is adjusted upwards as well. As a consequence, the adjusted emigration 
numbers to the UK exceed the total of immigration reported by the UK 
and thus the reported immigration is adjusted upwards as well. Note that 
the adjustment factors for immigration for most countries are closer to one 
than the adjustment factors for emigration, which indicates that the reported 
immigration numbers are more accurate than the emigration numbers. 
Multiplying the reported numbers in table 2.2a by the adjustment factors 
for receiving country data and the reported numbers in table 2.2b by the 
adjustment factors for sending country data results in two tables for which 
the row and column totals are equal (not presented here for space reasons). 
The differences between the cells in these two matrices are considerably 
smaller than those in table 2.2. In fact, the root mean squared error (RMSE) 
is reduced from 8,966 to 2,131. In other words, the differences between the 
WZRUHSRUWHGPLJUDWLRQÀRZWDEOHVDUHUHGXFHGE\SHUFHQW+RZHYHUZH
VWLOOIRXQGVRPHVXEVWDQWLDOGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHWZRHVWLPDWHGPLJUDWLRQÀRZ
tables. For example, the migration from Poland to Germany estimated on 
the basis of German immigration data equals 141,035, whereas the estimate 
based on Polish emigration data is equal to 153,399. These differences 
UHÀHFWWKHIDFWWKDWWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIUHSRUWHG3ROLVKHPLJUDWLRQE\FRXQWU\
of destination is not consistent with the share of immigration from Poland 
in the total reported immigration numbers of other countries. As a result, 
WKHHVWLPDWHRIWKHPLJUDWLRQÀRZIURP3RODQGWR*HUPDQ\EDVHGRQ3ROLVK
data exceeds that based on German data, whereas for most other countries, 
the adjusted Polish emigration numbers are lower than the corresponding 
adjusted immigration numbers. This means that one substantial inconsistency 
LQWKHHVWLPDWHVLVOLNHO\WRLQÀXHQFHWKHHVWLPDWHVRIRWKHUPLJUDWLRQÀRZV
To prevent such inconsistencies from affecting the overall estimates, we 
KDYHDGGHGFRQVWUDLQWVWRLQGLYLGXDOFHOOVÀRZVLQWKHPRGHO




UK, Germany to Poland, Germany to UK, Czech Republic to Slovakia and 
8.WR3RODQG$IWHU LGHQWLI\LQJ WKHÀRZVZLWK ODUJHGLIIHUHQFHVZH WKHQ
had to decide whether the constraint should be applied to the numbers of the 
receiving country or of the sending country. Since we believe that reported 




















United Kingdom 1.09 0.91
&RHI¿FLHQWVIRUDGGLWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWV/DJUDQJHPXOWLSOLHUV
Immigration to Poland from Germany 1.74
Immigration to Poland from the UK 0.37
Emigration from Poland to Germany 0.42
Emigration from Poland to the UK 0.42
Emigration from Germany to the UK 1.70
Emigration from the Czech Republic to Slovakia 0.10
Table 2.4. Estimates of adjustment factors for immigration and emigration,  
LQFOXGLQJVL[DGGLWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWVRQLQGLYLGXDOÀRZV
emigration numbers are generally considered to be less reliable than reported 
immigration numbers, we apply the constraints to the sending country data, 
H[FHSWIRU WKH*HUPDQ\WR3RODQGDQG8.WR3RODQGÀRZVi.e., Poland’s 
immigration data is considered to be of lower quality than the corresponding 
emigration data reported by both Germany and the UK). 
The adjustment factors taking into account the six constraints on individual 
ÀRZVDUHVHWRXWLQtable 2.4.7KHFRHI¿FLHQWV/DJUDQJHPXOWLSOLHUVIRUWKH
3RODQG WR*HUPDQ\DQG3RODQG WR8.ÀRZVDUHERWKHTXDO WR7KLV
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raises the adjustment factor for emigration from Poland from 10.64 (table 
2.3.) to 18.31 (table 2.4), while at the same time, the adjustment factor for 
Polish emigration to Germany and the UK falls to 7.69 (i.e., 18.31 x 0.42). 
For Polish immigration, the adjustment factor becomes smaller. The high 




factor of 14.25 is multiplied by 1.74 to get 24.80). In contrast, the adjustment 
IDFWRUIRU3RODQG¶VUHSRUWHGÀRZIURPWKH8.IDOOVWRLH[ 
For the Czech Republic, the reported emigration numbers are considerably 
lower than the corresponding reported immigration numbers with one big 
exception: the number of emigrants reported to Slovakia is relatively large. 
&OHDUO\WKHHPLJUDWLRQÀRZVIURPWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFWRDOORWKHUFRXQWULHV
QHHGWREHDGMXVWHGE\DGLIIHUHQWIDFWRUWKDQWKHHPLJUDWLRQÀRZWR6ORYDNLD
The adjustment factors in table 2.4 illustrate how substantial improvements 
in the estimated adjustment factors can be made by introducing constraints 
RQVSHFL¿FµSUREOHP¶ÀRZVLQWKHPDWUL[)RUH[DPSOH WKHLQFOXVLRQRID
FRQVWUDLQWIRUWKHPLJUDWLRQÀRZIURPWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFWR6ORYDNLDORZHUHG
the adjustment factor for Slovakia’s receiving migration data from 18.90 to 
8.34. Another example is German’s receiving data. Here, the adjustment 
factor is reduced from 1.03 to 0.81. This is mainly explained by the reduction 
of the estimate of Polish emigration to Germany. Since Germany has a wide 
GH¿QLWLRQRIPLJUDWLRQRQHZRXOGH[SHFWWKHDGMXVWPHQWIDFWRUWREHEHORZ
one. Thus the adjustment factors in table 2.4 appear more plausible than 
those set out in table 2.3. 
The harmonised migration tables that used the additional constraints are set 
out in tables 2.5a and 2.5b. The introduction of these constraints led to a 
further strong reduction in the differences between both tables, as indicated 
by the RMSE, which fell from 2,131 to 952 or by a further 54 percent. To 
REWDLQD¿QDOVLQJOHVHWRIKDUPRQLVHGÀRZVZHEHOLHYHLWLVEHWWHUWRUHO\RQ
table 2.5a than on table 2.5b. This table gives more weight to the receiving 
country data, which we consider more reliable. Poulain, on the other hand, 
advocated taking the average of the two estimated matrices. This approach 
implies that the origin-destination patterns in the reported sending country 
data are as reliable as those in the reported receiving country data. 
The average adjustment factors estimated for the period 2002-2007 (table 
2.4) can be applied to the annual reported migration data to create a time 
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VHULHVRIKDUPRQLVHGÀRZV ,Q¿JXUH, the estimated total immigration 
DQGHPLJUDWLRQÀRZVIRU*HUPDQ\IURPDQGWRWKHRWKHUFRXQWULHVLQWKLV
study are compared. As expected, the estimated numbers are lower than the 
UHSRUWHGQXPEHUVEHFDXVH WKHGH¿QLWLRQIRU*HUPDQ\LVPXFKZLGHU WKDQ
WKHKDUPRQLVHGGH¿QLWLRQ7KH¿JXUHDOVRVKRZVWKDWHVWLPDWHGHPLJUDWLRQ
increases more gradually over time than the reported numbers. In ¿JXUH, 
WKHLPPLJUDWLRQDQGHPLJUDWLRQÀRZVIRUWKH8.DUHSUHVHQWHG+HUHWKH
average levels of the reported and estimated numbers do not differ much, but 
WKHHVWLPDWHGÀRZVVKRZDPRUHJUDGXDOSDWWHUQRYHUWLPHWKDQWKHUHSRUWHG
ÀRZV2QHUHDVRQIRUWKHVKDUSÀXFWXDWLRQVLQWKHUHSRUWHGQXPEHUVLVWKDW
they are based on sample surveys.
2.6. Discussion
The aim of this chapter has been to obtain a reasonable and consistent set 
of international migration statistics. For this purpose we have developed a 
model using statistical information from different countries. The method is 
based on an idea originally proposed by Poulain (1993, 1995). Our method 
differs from his in three important ways. First, we have estimated a set of 
adjustment factors for receiving and sending country data in a way that 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ensures consistency in the two sets of marginal totals. Second, we have 
introduced additional constraints on special origin-destination cases where 
the average adjustment factors do not apply. This allows us to include 
countries with less reliable data in our analysis. Third, instead of calculating 
the arithmetic average of the two estimated matrices, we believe it is better 
to use the matrix giving more weight to the reported immigration numbers 
(i.e. table 2.5a). In this way we take advantage of the fact that the information 
on countries of origin in receiving country data tend to be more reliable than 
the country of destination information in sending country data. Finally, our 
HVWLPDWHVDUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHKDUPRQLVHGPLJUDWLRQGH¿QLWLRQEDVHGRQ
an (intended) minimum duration of stay of 12 months.
'XH WR GLIIHUHQFHV LQ GH¿QLWLRQ FRYHUDJH DQG UHJLVWUDWLRQ WKH RULJLQ
GHVWLQDWLRQPDWUL[ RIPLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV EHWZHHQ (XURSHDQ FRXQWULHV EDVHG
on receiving country data tends to differ from the matrix based on sending 
FRXQWU\GDWD*HUPDQ\KDV DZLGHGH¿QLWLRQRIPLJUDWLRQ DV LW GRHV QRW
include a time constraint and thus the reported number may well include 
VKRUW WHUPPLJUDQWV ,Q FRQWUDVW 3RODQG KDV D YHU\ QDUURZ GH¿QLWLRQ RI
migration and, as a consequence, the reported numbers are very low. By 
FRPSDULQJ FRUUHVSRQGLQJ UHSRUWHG LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG HPLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV IRU
19 European countries, we have assessed to what extent German migration 
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VWDWLVWLFVDUHKLJKHUWKDQWKH\ZRXOGEHXQGHUDKDUPRQLVHGGH¿QLWLRQDQGWR
what extent Polish migration statistics are lower.
However, the large differences between European countries cannot be 
H[SODLQHGE\GLIIHUHQFHVLQGH¿QLWLRQVDORQH)LUVWWKHVHGLIIHUHQFHVFDQQRW
H[SODLQZK\ HPLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV DUHPRUH OLNHO\ WR EH XQGHUHVWLPDWHG WKDQ
LPPLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV 6HFRQG ZKHUHDV HOHYHQ FRXQWULHV HPSOR\ D GXUDWLRQ
OLPLWWKDWLVVKRUWHUWKDQWKDWRIWKHKDUPRQLVHGGH¿QLWLRQ.XSLV]HZVNDDQG
:LVQLRZVNLRQO\¿YHRIWKHVHFRXQWULHVKDYHDQDGMXVWPHQWIDFWRURI
immigration below one. The other six countries with durations of six months 
or shorter have adjustment factors for immigration greater than one. These 
include Austria, Czech Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia. Thus, to an important extent, the differences must also be caused 
E\SUREOHPVRIFRYHUDJH7KLVLVFRQ¿UPHGE\DVWXG\FRPSDULQJPLJUDWLRQ
statistics between Sweden, Denmark and Belgium which suggests that less 
than 25 percent of differences are due to differences in the duration criterion 
(Nowok et al7KHHIIHFWVRIGLIIHUHQFHVLQGH¿QLWLRQDQGFRYHUDJH
may offset each other to some extent. One would expect the under-registration 
RIVKRUWWHUPPLJUDQWVWRH[FHHGWKDWRIORQJWHUPPLJUDQWV$ZLGHGH¿QLWLRQ
of migration (i.e. a short duration of stay) would lead to a higher reported 
number of migrants than would be expected on the basis of the harmonised 
GH¿QLWLRQ 8QGHUUHJLVWUDWLRQ KRZHYHU ZRXOG OHDG WR D VPDOOHU QXPEHU
This may explain why the adjustment factors for Germany are not as low as 
RQHPLJKWH[SHFWIURPDSSO\LQJWKHYHU\ZLGHGH¿QLWLRQ
The main reason for the relatively low numbers reported by sending countries 
is that emigrants do not have strong incentives to report leaving a country. 
In particular, this applies to EU citizens who can live in another EU country 
without asking for a residence permit. One solution might be to introduce a 
removal card system (Nowok et al., 2006). Here, any person leaving country 
AZRXOGEHUHTXLUHGWR¿OOLQDIRUPWREHJLYHQWRWKHDXWKRULWLHVLQFRXQWU\
B at arrival. After country B has determined whether or not the person is an 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDQWXQGHUDKDUPRQLVHGGH¿QLWLRQ LWZRXOG WKHQ LQIRUP
country A of the arrival. The Nordic countries have such a system and their 
immigration and emigration statistics are mutually consistent (Herm, 2006a). 
However, policy makers tend to be more interested in migrants from outside 
Europe and asylum seekers than intra-European migrants, and therefore 
such a system is not likely to have a high priority in the future. As long as 
such a system is lacking, cross-country comparability of migration statistics 
can only be achieved by comparing statistics from different countries. To 
the extent that the differences between countries are caused by differences 
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LQ GH¿QLWLRQV DQG FRYHUDJH WKH GLIIHUHQFHV PD\ EH H[SHFWHG WR UHPDLQ
systematic over time. The method developed in this paper aims to assess 
the size of these systematic differences. Table 2.4 shows that for 10 out of 
the 19 countries in this study, the adjustment factor for sending country data 
exceeds two, meaning that reported emigration numbers are underestimated 
E\PRUHWKDQSHUFHQWLQUHODWLRQWRWKHRQH\HDUGXUDWLRQGH¿QLWLRQ$VD
consequence, reported net migration totals may be overstated. 
In addition to ‘correcting’ the reported receiving and sending country 
PLJUDWLRQ GDWD IRU GLIIHUHQFHV LQ GH¿QLWLRQ DQG FRYHUDJH RXU PHWKRG
FRQWULEXWHVWRSURGXFLQJHVWLPDWHVWKDWWHQGWRÀXFWXDWHOHVVVWURQJO\RYHU
time. One clear example concerns the UK. Since the UK uses a general 
SXUSRVH SDVVHQJHU VXUYH\ WKH UHSRUWHG ÀRZV ÀXFWXDWH FRQVLGHUDEO\ RYHU
WLPH0RUHRYHU ÀRZV WR VRPH VPDOOHU FRXQWULHVPD\ QRW EH REVHUYHG
in some years. We believe our method produces more stable estimates of 
PLJUDWLRQÀRZV IRU WKH8.DQGRWKHUFRXQWULHV UHO\LQJRQVDPSOHGDWD
Interestingly, the estimated adjustment factors for the UK are close to one. 
This implies that the sample survey used for estimating migration to and 
IURPWKH8.SURYLGHVDUHDVRQDEO\UHOLDEOHHVWLPDWHRIWRWDOPLJUDWLRQÀRZV
on average, but that the annual estimates are affected by sizeable random 
ÀXFWXDWLRQV
The adjustment factors shown in table 2.4 can be used to adjust migration 
numbers to and from countries not included in the matrix, so that total 
immigration and emigration numbers and total net migration can be 
HVWLPDWHGIRUWKHFRXQWULHVLQWKLVVWXG\%HIRUHGRLQJVRRQH¿UVWKDV
to make sure that the share of unknowns in the migration statistics can be 
distributed evenly across all origins or destinations. If so, the adjustment 
factors will take this into account. Thus, for estimating total immigration 
and emigration numbers, the adjustment factors should be applied to total 
migration numbers excluding unknowns.
7KHPDWUL[PD\EHH[WHQGHG WR LQFOXGHÀRZVZLWKPLVVLQJGDWD5D\PHU
(2008) developed a two-step estimation method for countries with missing 
data (see also De Beer et al., 2009 and Raymer and Abel, 2008). The 
¿UVW VWHS HVWLPDWHV PLVVLQJ LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG HPLJUDWLRQ WRWDOV EDVHG RQ
KDUPRQLVHGPLJUDWLRQÀRZVDQGFRYDULDWHLQIRUPDWLRQ7KHVHFRQGVWHSXVHV
WKHRULJLQGHVWLQDWLRQLQWHUDFWLRQSDWWHUQVRIWKHKDUPRQLVHGPLJUDWLRQÀRZV
and covariate information to estimate the missing interaction patterns. This 
estimation step takes into account the fact that migration is relatively high, 
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for example, between neighbouring countries and countries belonging to a 
similar language group.
Finally, work is currently being carried out to integrate harmonisation and 
estimation of missing data into a single (Bayesian) model that also includes 
measures of uncertainty and expert judgements. The Integrated Modelling of 
European Migration (IMEM) project recently funded by New Opportunities 
for Research Funding Agency Co-operation in Europe (NORFACE) is 
expected to develop such a model (see http://www.norface.org/migration12.
html) over the next couple of years. We hope this study will provide an 
important foundation for work such as this, and other projects aiming to 
improve our knowledge and understanding of the complexity of international 
migration. 

3. Forecasting international migration: Time series  
projections versus argument-based forecasts
Abstract
Forecasts of immigration and emigration can be based on extrapolations of 
changes observed in the past. Extrapolations can be based on different time 
series models, ranging from simple linear trends to stochastic time series 
models. Extrapolations of immigration, emigration and net migration for the 
Netherlands show that different methods can lead to very different outcomes. 
Thus it is useful to examine the explanations behind the changes in past 
migration, which can then be used to determine future changes. Different 
types of migration, such as labour migration, family migration, and asylum 
migration, are affected by various factors. Thus for assumptions about future 
changes in migration it is useful to distinguish the main types of migration.
3.1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, immigration to most European countries has increased 
substantially. As a consequence, migration has become the main source of 
population growth in Europe and, therefore, assumptions on the future size 
of migration are an important input to population projections. Howe and 
-DFNVRQ DUJXH WKDW³PRVWRI¿FLDO LPPLJUDWLRQSURMHFWLRQV «DUH
EDVHGRQOLWWOHWKHRU\DQGYLUWXDOO\QRGH¿QDEOHPHWKRGRORJ\´7KHSUHVHQW
chapter aims to demonstrate how migration projections may be improved by 
GLVWLQJXLVKLQJGLIIHUHQWPLJUDWLRQÀRZV7KHLOOXVWUDWLRQVFRPHIURP'XWFK
data, for which detailed migration data are available over time. 
Most national statistical institutes and international organizations, such as the 
European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), use the cohort-component 
model for making population projections. Typically, these organisations 
only incorporate assumptions on the future size of net migration by age 
and sex into their models. Those projections that incorporate the separate 
ÀRZV RI LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG HPLJUDWLRQ DUH SUHIHUUHG EHFDXVH WKH\ FDQ EH
readily associated with predictive variables and can be analysed according 
WRGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIÀRZV$OVRZLWKVRPHWLPHODJIRUHLJQHPLJUDWLRQFDQ
be linked with foreign immigration. The same is possible for emigration and 
LPPLJUDWLRQÀRZVRIQDWLRQDOV0RUHRYHULPPLJUDWLRQWHQGVWREHSRVLWLYHO\
related with the business cycle and emigration negatively. Thus, there are 
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many advantages in making separate assumptions on future changes in 
LPPLJUDWLRQDQGHPLJUDWLRQZKLFKLVPRUHGLI¿FXOWZLWKQHWPLJUDWLRQ
The availability of accurate data on immigration and emigration is a problem 
in many countries. For some countries, information on net migration 
PD\ RQO\ EH DYDLODEOH$V LPPLJUDWLRQ WHQGV WR ÀXFWXDWH PRUH VWURQJO\
than emigration, changes in net migration are mainly due to changes in 
immigration. Hence, assumptions on changes in net migration tend to be 
mainly based on assumptions on the future direction of immigration. 
However, in making assumptions on future changes in net migration, one 
should take into account that after a period of increase in immigration, there 
may be an increase in emigration and, thus, a reduction in net migration. The 
age structure of emigration may also differ from that of immigration. This 
implies that if the size of emigration changes in a different way than that of 
immigration, the age structure of net migration will change. 
Projections of immigration and emigration can be based on extrapolations of 
changes observed in the past. Extrapolations may be based on different time 
series methods, ranging from simple linear trends to sophisticated stochastic 
time series models. One special case is to assume that net migration is zero. 
,IQHWPLJUDWLRQÀXFWXDWHGDURXQG]HURLQWKHSDVWWKLVPD\ZHOOEHDYDOLG
assumption. However, even if total net migration is zero, this usually does 
not apply to separate age groups. Since emigrants are older than immigrants 
on average, net migration for young people will be positive and for older 
people negative. Thus assuming net migration to be zero for all ages may 
lead to some bias in the population projections. 
The use of time series models for projecting immigration, emigration and 
net migration on the basis of Dutch data is illustrated in section 3.2. As 
PLJUDWLRQWHQGVWRÀXFWXDWHUDWKHUVWURQJO\GLIIHUHQWH[WUDSRODWLRQPHWKRGV
may produce a wide range of projected outcomes. For making forecasts of 
future changes in migration, one has to decide to what extent past changes 
found in immigration and emigration patterns will continue in the future. 
7KLVUHTXLUHVDQLGHQWL¿FDWLRQRIWKHPDLQIDFWRUVH[SODLQLQJSDVWFKDQJHVLQ
PLJUDWLRQÀRZV$GLVFXVVLRQRIKRZIRUHFDVWVRIPLJUDWLRQPD\EHEDVHGRQ
explanations or migration theories is presented in section 3.3. 
Different types of immigration and emigration are affected by various factors. 
For example, while labour migration is primarily affected by the situation in 
the labour market, marriage migration is affected by the size and composition 
of the resident migrant population and asylum migration is affected by 
asylum policies. For assumptions made on future changes in migration, it 
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is useful to distinguish migrants according to their primary motives, such as 
labour, family or asylum. This allows one to make argument-based forecasts, 
rather than simply extrapolating changes observed in the past. As Howe and 
-DFNVRQSRLQWRXWRQHLPSRUWDQWEHQH¿WRIH[SODQDWRU\DUJXPHQWVRI
forecasts is that these can be objectively evaluated and tested against historical 
evidence. In many countries, data on different categories of migrants are 
lacking. In these situations, the population characteristics of age, sex and 
country of origin may be used as proxies. The main factors affecting the 
future size of different types of immigration and emigration are discussed in 
sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. A discussion of how migration categories 
can be used for making argument-based forecasts is included in section 3.6.
$VWLPHVHULHVRIQHWPLJUDWLRQWHQGWRH[KLELWODUJHÀXFWXDWLRQVSURMHFWLRQV
of migration are rather uncertain, even in the short run. The degree of 
uncertainty of migration forecasts can be assessed on the basis of historic 
forecast errors or on stochastic time series models. However, different types 
of immigration and emigration may be assumed to change in different ways 
in the future. For example, labour migration may be assumed to increase due 
to the ageing of the labour force, whereas asylum migration may be assumed 
to decrease due to more strict policies. This raises the question to what extent 
SDVW GHYHORSPHQWV LQPLJUDWLRQ SURYLGH VXI¿FLHQW EDVLV IRU DVVHVVLQJ WKH
uncertainty of future migration. Therefore, the argument-based approach set 
out in section 3.7 may be used for both making assumptions about future 
FKDQJHVLQPLJUDWLRQÀRZVDVZHOODVWKHGHJUHHVRIXQFHUWDLQW\
3.2. Extrapolations
In this section, the applications of different extrapolation methods are 
illustrated with data from the Netherlands. The data represent annual 
immigration, emigration and net migration totals for the period 1950-2004, 
which were obtained from the Statistics Netherlands StatLine data base 
(www.cbs.nl). Extrapolations of these data can be made by applying 
time-series models, which include both deterministic and stochastic models. 
$ZHOONQRZQH[DPSOHRIDGHWHUPLQLVWLFPRGHOLV¿WWLQJDVWUDLJKWOLQHWRD
time series of data. Deterministic models are based on the assumption that 
WKHUHLVD¿[HGWUHQG5DQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQVGRQRWDIIHFWWKLVWUHQG6WRFKDVWLF
time-series models are based on the assumption that the direction of the trend 
of the time series is subject to random changes. For this, the ARIMA-models 
introduced by Box and Jenkins (1970) are widely applied. 
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Linear trends for immigration and emigration in the Netherlands were 
estimated from 1950 to 2010 (see ¿JXUH). The predicted 2004 values 
differs substantially from the observed values. Immigration in 2004 dropped 
sharply below the trend, whereas emigration was well above the trend. 
Accepting the long-run linear trend implies that the decrease in immigration 
or the increase in emigration in 2003 and 2004 are assumed to be temporarily 
occurrences. 
Stochastic time-series models focus on the short run. ARIMA-models are 
LGHQWL¿HG RQ WKH EDVLV RI DXWRFRUUHODWLRQ FRHI¿FLHQWV 7KHVH LQGLFDWH WKH
correlation of a time series with the same time series lagged 1 or 2 or more 
years. The autocorrelations for immigration, emigration and net migration 
IRUERWKWKHWLPHVHULHVRIREVHUYDWLRQVDQGWKHWLPHVHULHVRI¿UVWGLIIHUHQFHV
are shown in table 3.1. 
For immigration and emigration, the patterns of the autocorrelation 
FRHI¿FLHQWVVXJJHVW WZRPRGHOV$¿UVWRUGHUDXWRUHJUHVVLYHPRGHODQGD
UDQGRPZDONPRGHO7KHSDUDPHWHUVRIWKH¿UVWRUGHUDXWRUHJUHVVLYHPRGHO
estimated for immigration are:
)LJXUH0LJUDWLRQIURPDQGWRWKH1HWKHUODQGV2EVHUYDWLRQV



















IMt = .86 IMt-1 + 12363 + et, (1)
    (.07)       (6258)
where IMt = immigration in year t and et = random term, which is serially 
uncorrelated and has an expected value of zero. The numbers between 
parentheses are the standard errors. This model implies that, in the long run, 
the projection tends to a level of 86445 (i.e., 12363 / (1 - 0.86)). The random 
ZDONPRGHOIRULPPLJUDWLRQLVVSHFL¿HGDV
IMt – IMt-1 = c + et,  (2)
where the constant term c (usually labelled as ‘drift’) does not differ 
VLJQL¿FDQWO\IURP]HUR,Ic is excluded from the model, the projections are 
equal to the last observed value, i.e., IMt+1 = IMt (because the expected value 
of et+1 is zero). The autoregressive model and the random walk projections 
IRULPPLJUDWLRQGLIIHURQO\VOLJKWO\DVLOOXVWUDWHGLQ¿JXUH
)RUHPLJUDWLRQWKHHVWLPDWHGDXWRUHJUHVVLYHFRHI¿FLHQWIRUWKHDXWRUHJUHVVLYH









1 0.86 -0.07 0.89 0.13 0.72
2 0.74 -0.15 0.75 -0.17 0.43
3 0.68 -0.25 0.68 -0.22 0.30
4 0.69 0.06 0.66 -0.08 0.32
5 0.69 0.16 0.67 0.02 0.36
6 0.61 -0.15 0.66 -0.05 0.27
7 0.58 -0.11 0.66 0.06 0.29
8 0.58 0.00 0.63 0.09 0.32
9 0.58 0.07 0.53 -0.09 0.26




GRHV QRW GLIIHU VLJQL¿FDQWO\ IURP ]HUR WKH IROORZLQJ PRGHO LV XVHG IRU
projecting emigration:
EMt – EMt-1 = et  (3)
where EMt is emigration in year t.
Net migration totals can be projected on the basis of outputs from the 
projections of immigration and emigration or from a time series model applied 
WR WKHQHWPLJUDWLRQ WRWDOV WKHPVHOYHV7KH DXWRFRUUHODWLRQ FRHI¿FLHQWV LQ
WDEOHLQGLFDWHWKDWD¿UVWRUGHUDXWRUHJUHVVLYHPRGHOLVDSSURSULDWHIRU
net migration:
NMt = .82 NMt-1 + et,  (4)
(.08)      
where NMt is net migration in year t. As the constant term does not differ 
VLJQL¿FDQWO\IURP]HURLWLVQRWLQFOXGHGLQWKHPRGHOFigure 3.2 shows that 
the projection based on this model tends to zero in the long run, whereas the 
projection of net migration based on separate projections of immigration and 
emigration is equal to around negative 20 thousand. Note, since immigration 
and emigration have been modelled as random walk models without drift, 
the projection of net migration based on these models remains at a constant 
level. 
If the model is estimated for the 1950-2004 period, the random walk model 
projects a constant level of immigration and emigration, since the constant 
WHUPLQWKHPRGHOGRHVQRWGLIIHUVLJQL¿FDQWO\IURP]HUR+RZHYHU LI WKH
model is estimated for the 1980-2004 period, the drift parameter turns out to 
be positive for the emigration time series (but not for the immigration series). 
Similar to the linear trend model, the random walk model with drift projects 
a straight line. The main difference is that the projections from the random 
walk model start from the last observed value. The projections of the linear 
trend model and the random walk model with drift are compared in ¿JXUH 
for the observation period 1980 to 2004. The trend directions are similar, but 
the levels are considerably different.
One conclusion that can be made from the extrapolations above is that 
different methods can lead to very different outcomes. As shown in table 
3.2, the projection of immigration and emigration for the year 2010 ranges 



























random walk with drift
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respectively. The projection of net migration ranges from -35 thousand to 44 
thousand. Clearly, these are considerable differences.
The results of the extrapolations depend on various choices made by the 
researcher. First, one has to choose between a deterministic or stochastic 
trend. The deterministic trend emphasises long-run developments. 
Projections based on this model tend to react slowly to recent changes in 
the time series. In contrast, projections based on a stochastic model tend to 
react very quickly, which may result in widely varying projections made in 
successive years. For example, with a start point of 2001, the random walk 
model projects emigration in 2010 to be 82 thousand, whereas with a start 
point of 2004, emigration is projected to be 112 thousand. The deterministic 
model resulted in 2010 emigration levels that changed much less: From 
80 thousand with a start point of 2001 to 87 thousand with a start point 
of 2004. Second, the choice of the base period makes a difference. For 
example, on the basis of the 1950-2004 period, it appears that the random 
walk model does not require a constant term, whereas on the basis of the 
1980-2004 period, it appears that a positive constant term is needed. Third, 
extrapolations of the time series of net migration totals may differ from the 
difference between separate extrapolations of immigration and emigration. 
Finally, there is no single extrapolation method that outperforms all other 
methods under all circumstances. Each one has its pros and cons. One way 
to decide on a particular model is to examine how the methods performed in 
the past. However, even this does not lead to a clear solution, as the results 
tend to vary depending on the choice of the period for which the methods are 
tested. The logical way to improve projections is to examine the explanations 
Immigration Emigration Net migration
Base period 1950-2004
Linear deterministic model 131 87 44
Random walk model 90 112 -23
Base period 1980-2004
Linear deterministic model 133 105 28




behind the changes in past migration, which can then be used to determine 
future changes.
3.3. Explanations
Extrapolations are based on the assumption that changes in the past can 
be projected into the future. However, without knowing the mechanisms 
DIIHFWLQJSDVWWUHQGVLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRDVVHVVWRZKDWH[WHQWWKLVDVVXPSWLRQLV
valid. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, different extrapolation 
methods may lead to widely different projections. Therefore, it is useful 
to look for explanations of changes in migration by identifying the main 
factors affecting changes in immigration and emigration. These factors can 
be assessed on the basis of migration theories. Massey et al. (1993) and 
Howe and Jackson (2005) give overviews of various theoretical frameworks. 
Most theories focus on push factors creating migration pressure in sending 
countries (e.g., poverty, unemployment and political turmoil) and pull factors 
emphasizing the importance of the attractiveness of receiving countries 
ZKLFK JLYH GLUHFWLRQ WR PLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV %H\RQG WKLV WKH IUDPHZRUNV
focus aspects, such as differentials in wage levels between countries, social 
networks or the role of policies. 
7KHODFNRIDQRYHUDOOPLJUDWLRQWKHRU\PDNHVLWGLI¿FXOWWRIRUHFDVWPLJUDWLRQ
In fact, it is questionable whether one theory is capable of explaining all 
NLQGVRIFKDQJHVLQPLJUDWLRQÀRZVWKURXJKWLPH1RWRQO\KDYHWKHOHYHOV
of migration changed over time, but the types and mechanisms of migration 
have changed as well. In the 1960s, there existed shortages in the Western 
European labour market. This created opportunities for large numbers of 
persons from Southern European countries to migrate in search for jobs. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the origins of labour migrants shifted to 
Turkey and the Maghreb area. After the rise of unemployment caused by the 
HFRQRPLFUHFHVVLRQRIDQGWKHLQÀX[RISRVWZDUEDE\ERRPHUVLQ
the labour market, most Western European countries imposed immigration 
restrictions (Jennissen, 2004). As a result, many Southern European migrants 
returned home. The other labour migrants who stayed brought their families 
RYHUZKLFKOHDGWRDQLQFUHDVHRIIDPLO\UHXQL¿FDWLRQ:KLOHLPPLJUDWLRQ
ZDVUHODWLYHO\ORZLQWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIWKHVDQGWKH¿UVWKDOIRIWKH
1980s, immigration rose sharply during the second half of the 1980s. One of 
the main factors for this was the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. 
A large number of ethnic Germans from Poland, the Soviet Union and 
Romania entered West Germany. Another cause of the rise in immigration 
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was the increase in the number of asylum seekers. In the second half of 
the 1990s, asylum migration decreased because of the end of the war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and stricter asylum policies. In short, different types of 
migration were predominant in different periods.
Rather than selecting one theory, one could instead focus on the main types 
of immigration and emigration, as they tend to be affected by different factors 
and change in different ways in successive periods. Here, the discussion 
focuses on labour migration, family-related migration and asylum seekers. 
Labour migration is primarily affected by the situation in the labour market 
(e.g. wage rates and unemployment rate). Marriage migration is affected 
by the choice of partners of the resident migrant population and, thus, by 
networks. Migration of asylum seekers is affected by political turmoil in 
sending countries and asylum policies in receiving countries. 
Forecasts of migration can be based on explanations by identifying 
quantitative explanatory models for different types of migration. One 
problem in estimating quantitative explanatory models is the lack of time 
series data on different categories of migration. One way of dealing with this 
SUREOHPLVWRLGHQWLI\VSHFL¿FPLJUDWLRQÀRZVGLVWLQJXLVKHGE\e.g., country 
of origin or country of birth for which data are available and which can be 
considered to represent a particular type of migration. For example, the 
LPPLJUDWLRQÀRZRI(8FLWL]HQVWRWKH1HWKHUODQGVLVFRPSULVHGPRVWO\RI
ODERXUPLJUDQWVZKHUHDVWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJÀRZIURP7XUNH\DQG0RURFFR
is comprised mostly of family migrants. Thus, one may expect the size of 
immigration of EU citizens to the Netherlands to depend on the situation of 
the labour market in the Netherlands. 
The annual number of EU immigrants to the Netherlands during the 
1977-2003 period can be explained by a regression model that includes the 
QXPEHURIXQHPSOR\HGSHUVRQVDQGDOLQHDUWUHQG'H%HHUVSHFL¿HG
as:
IMEUt = -0.020 UNt + 599 Tt + 17309 + et  R
2 =0.92 (5)
         (0.007)      (36)    (577)
where IMEUt is the number of EU immigrants in year t, UNt is the number of 
unemployed persons and Tt is a linear trend term. According to this model, a 
decrease in the number of unemployed persons by 100 thousand leads to an 
increase in the number of EU immigrants by two thousand. As shown in ¿JXUH
3.4WKHPRGHOLVFDSDEOHRIDFFXUDWHO\FDSWXULQJÀXFWXDWLRQVLQWKHQXPEHU
of immigrants. This model suggests that the decline in immigration in the 
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last years of the observation period is temporary and should, therefore, not 
be projected into the future. The estimated model indicates that, apart from 
VKRUWUXQÀXFWXDWLRQVGXHWRWKHEXVLQHVVF\FOHWKHUHLVDSRVLWLYHORQJUXQ
trend. Brunborg and Cappelen (2010) use a similar model for projecting 
migration to Norway. Their model includes income and unemployment in 
Norway as explanatory variables as well as lagged immigration.
Since time series data for different types of migration are often lacking, 
expert opinions may be included in the forecasting model to obtain more 
accurate results. The next three sections discuss how different factors affect 
the main types of immigration and emigration and how they may be used to 
HVWLPDWHIXWXUHFKDQJHVLQPLJUDWLRQÀRZV
3.4. Types of immigration
In identifying categories of immigration, it is useful to distinguish between 
nationals and foreigners. The size of national immigration is related to the 
size of national emigration in previous years. This relationship depends on 
the percentage of nationals who return after a stay abroad for, say, at least 













it has been estimated that one-half of all nationals who emigrated in 1995 
had returned within eight years and that 60 percent return in the long run 
(Nicolaas, 2004). Thus, long-run forecasts of national immigration levels are 
equal to 60 percent of the projected national emigration levels.
In the Netherlands, the levels of labour migration, family migration and 
asylum seekers have changed in different ways (see ¿JXUH). Students, 
retired persons and other types of immigrants are not included here. Their 
numbers tend to be considerably smaller than the above categories (i.e., for 
the Netherlands). Methods for assessing and projecting the size of illegal 
migration are beyond the scope of this chapter.
3.4.1. Labour migration
In making assumptions about changes in the size of labour migration, one 
should distinguish short- and long-run developments and skill levels. In 
the short run, changes in the size of labour migration depend largely on the 
business cycle. In the previous section, it was shown that the number of EU 
immigrants to the Netherlands can be explained by the size of unemployment 
LQWKH1HWKHUODQGV6LQFHLWLVYHU\GLI¿FXOWWRSURMHFWWKHFRXUVHRIEXVLQHVV
cycles in the future, this type of immigration cannot be projected with 



















long run. For projections, the business cycle can be used to assess recent 
changes in the size of immigration. For example, if immigration declined in 
recent years, and this decline was due to an economic downturn, it may be 
expected that the future level of immigration will be higher than the current 
level. 
For long-run forecasts of labour migration, the main question is whether 
the ageing of the labour force in Europe will lead to shortages in the labour 
market and whether these shortages will lead to ‘replacement migration’. 
The ageing process, caused by low levels of fertility and mortality, can be 
partially offset by increases in labour force participation rates or immigration. 
In 2000, the UN Population Division published a report which contained 
calculations on the levels of immigration needed to counteract the process 
of ageing (United Nations, 2000). The estimates depend on a number of 
assumptions, such as the rate of growth in productivity and the rate of growth 
in GDP. Johansson and Rauhut (2005) present various calculations on the 
total number of migrants in the EU in the period 2000-2050 that would be 
needed to stabilise (1) the size of the population, (2) the number of persons 
in the working ages and (3) the ratio of the working population to elderly 
population. In addition, they assess the effect of different rates of growth 
in productivity. Their calculations are based on net migration numbers. As 
shown in table 3.3, in order to stabilise the number of people in the working 
ages (15-64 years) in the EU25, the annual size of net migration would need 
to be around 2.5 million. If the rate of growth of productivity would be 






2000 2025 2050 2000 2025 2050
Constant 
population size
747 1 934 2 706 452 452 452
Constant population 
15-64 years
747 2 677 2 422 452 467 480
Constant ratio 
population 15-64 yrs/65 yrs
747 10 412 15 040 452 650 940
Source: Johansson and Rauhut (2005).
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one percent higher, the annual number of immigrants would be about 100 
thousand less. Thus, the effect of the rate of productivity is relatively small. 
The table also shows that stabilisation of the elderly dependency ratio would 
require unrealistically high numbers of migrants, e.g., 15 million immigrants 
per year around 2050. This would lead to a doubling of total population size 
by 2050. 
Obviously, these kinds of calculations only give a general sense of the 
possible sizes of future migration. They do not take into account, e.g., 
changes in the demand for labour, changes in the labour force participation 
RUGLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKHTXDOL¿FDWLRQVWUXFWXUHRI ODERXU VXSSO\DQGGHPDQG
Moreover, the calculations cannot be directly used for making forecasts of 
labour immigration, as they refer to total net migration. Only if labour force 
participation rates of other types of immigrants would be the same as those 
of labour migrants, these calculations can be applied to total immigration. 
Otherwise, total immigration would need to be higher in order to achieve the 
same effect on the size of the labour force. Furthermore, since the emigration 
rate of labour migrants tends to be relatively high, the total number of 
immigrants will have to be considerably higher than the size of net migration. 
For example, if 50 percent of the labour migrants will return after some time, 
the total number of immigrants will have to be twice the size of net migration 
in order to have the same effect on the size of the labour force in the longer 
UXQ1HYHUWKHOHVVGHVSLWH WKHVHGLI¿FXOWLHV LQDVVHVVLQJ WKH IXWXUH VL]HRI
labour migration, it seems plausible to assume that the ageing of the labour 
force will cause the structural level of future labour migration to be higher 
than it used to be in the last decades.
3.4.2. Family related migration 
)RXU W\SHV RI IDPLO\UHODWHG PLJUDWLRQ FDQ EH LGHQWL¿HG )LUVW D ODERXU
migrant may enter a country with family. Second, a labour migrant may 
bring in family some time after entering a country, Similarly, a refugee 
may be allowed to bring in family if the asylum request is granted. Third, 
migrants may marry a partner living abroad. And, fourth, nationals may 
marry a partner from abroad. Generally, family-related migration is only 
allowed under certain conditions and the rules differ by country. 
)RUPLJUDWLRQIRUHFDVWVDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHIXWXUHVL]HRI WKH¿UVW WZR
categories can be related to forecasts of labour and asylum migration. In 
the Netherlands, about one fourth the size of total labour migration are 
family members accompanying labour migrants. During the last decade, the 
QXPEHURIPLJUDQWVWKDWDUULYHGEHFDXVHRIIDPLO\UHXQL¿FDWLRQZDVDERXW
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one third of the total number of labour and asylum migrants, taking into 
account some time lag between the arrival of the labour or asylum migrant 
and corresponding family members.
The number of marriage migrants can be forecasted based on assumptions 
about the choice of partners by migrants. This may differ strongly between 
origins of migrants. For example, in the Netherlands, about two thirds of the 
Turkish and Moroccan migrants tend to marry a partner from the country of 
origin. Even a large proportion of their children born in the Netherlands (the 
so-called ‘second generation’) tend to marry a partner from their parents’ 
country of origin. For example, over 50 percent of second generation 
Moroccans and over 60 percent of second generation Turks marry someone 
from Morocco and Turkey, respectively. 
Alders (2005) developed a model for projecting the number of young 
Moroccans and Turks without a partner residing in the Netherlands on the 
basis of the current population structure (by age, sex and household position). 
Assuming that 95 percent of all Moroccans and Turks will eventually have a 
SDUWQHUWKHQXPEHURISHUVRQVZKRZLOO¿QGDSDUWQHUFDQEHFDOFXODWHG2Q
the basis of assumptions about the percentage of these young Moroccans and 
Turks who will marry with a partner from the country of origin and at what 
age, he calculates the number of marriage migrants that can be expected in 
the next decades. If it is assumed that the rates of marriages with partners 
from abroad will remain constant, the annual number of marriage migrants 
would grow for some 20 years (see ¿JXUH). If, however, it is assumed 
that this rate will decline gradually (a more realistic assumption), the annual 
QXPEHURIPDUULDJHPLJUDQWVLVH[SHFWHGWRGHFOLQH$VLOOXVWUDWHGLQ¿JXUH
3.6, if it is assumed that the percentage of young (mostly second generation) 
migrants marry a partner from the country of origin will halve, the annual 
number of marriage migrants will be considerably lower.
In addition to the marriage behaviour of migrants, one should also take into 
account marriages of nationals to foreigners. These numbers are considerably 
lower than those of migrants. In the Netherlands, they consist of about ten 
percent of the total number of marriage migrants. This type of migration is so 
small that it hardly affects changes in the total size of migration. Therefore, 
for migration forecasts, one can simply assume constant rates of these 
migrants over time. 
3.4.3. Asylum seekers
For making forecasts of the total number of asylum seekers in each European 
FRXQWU\ LW LV XVHIXO WR GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ FKDQJHV LQ WKH WRWDO ÀRZ RI
54 Chapter 3
asylum seekers to Europe and changes in the distribution of asylum seekers 
within Europe. Whereas the total number of asylum seekers to Europe is 
mainly determined by the situation in the countries of origin, the distribution 
among European countries is, to an important extent, affected by differences 
LQDV\OXPSROLFLHVDFURVV(XURSHDQFRXQWULHV,QWKH¿UVWKDOIRIWKHV
the total number of asylum seekers entering the EU-countries rose sharply 
from 400 thousand in 1990 to 675 thousand in 1992, and then fell back to 
WKRXVDQGLQ6LQFHWKHÀXFWXDWLRQVKDYHEHHQFRQVLGHUDEO\
smaller, increasing from 234 thousand in 1996 to 391 thousand in 2000 and 
subsequently declining to around 250 thousand in 2004. The average annual 
change declined from 135 thousand in the years 1991-1995 to 38 thousand 
in the years 1996-2004. 
The effect of changes in the distribution of asylum seekers over the EU 
countries can be estimated by calculating how much the number of asylum 
seekers in country i in year t would have changed if the total number of 
asylum seekers entering the EU would not have changed compared with year 
t-1. This is the distribution effect. One alternative method is described in Van 
Wissen and Jennissen (2008), in which the substitution effects are estimated 



















7KH HIIHFW RI FKDQJHV LQ WKH WRWDO LQÀRZ RI DV\OXP VHHNHUV HQWHULQJ WKH
EU on the number of asylum seekers moving to country i in year t (i.e., 
‘generation effect’) can be estimated by calculating how much the number 
of asylum seekers in country i in year t would have changed if the fraction 
RIWKHWRWDOLQÀRZRIDV\OXPVHHNHUVPRYLQJWRFRXQWU\i would not have 
changed compared with year t-1. 
In formulas:
Di,t = At-1¨fi,t (6)
Gi,t = fi,t-1¨At  (7)
where Di,t is the distribution effect for country i in year t, At-1 is the total 
number of asylum seekers moving to the EU in year t-1, fi,t is the fraction of 
the total number of asylum seekers moving to country iDQG¨xt = xt - xt-1. It 
should be noted that these effects added together do not explain the change 
in the number of asylum seekers between year t-1 and t completely. There 
LVDOVRDQLQWHUDFWLRQHIIHFWFKDQJHVLQWKHWRWDOLQÀRZDQGWKHGLVWULEXWLRQ
can either reinforce each other or offset each other. However, the interaction 
effects are relatively small; they accounted for only three percent of the 
annual changes in the number of asylum seekers in the EU15 countries 
during the 1991-2004 period.
The average generation and distribution effects for the EU15 countries during 
the 1991-2004 years are set out in table 3.4. These estimates differ from 
those by Van Wissen and Jennissen (2008), as they estimated substitution 
HIIHFWV UDWKHU WKDQ GLVWULEXWLRQ HIIHFWV 2QH EHQH¿W RI WKHLU DSSURDFK LV
that it provides more detailed estimates, i.e., substitution between all pairs 
of countries. Their estimates, however, are based on assumptions about 
unobserved patterns. Table 3.4 shows that in most countries the distribution 
effects exceeded the generation effects. The exception is Germany. As more 
than half of the total number of asylum seekers in the early 1990s moved to 
*HUPDQ\WKHVKDUSFKDQJHVLQWKHWRWDOLQÀRZLQWKLVSHULRGVWURQJO\DIIHFWHG
changes in the number of asylum seekers in Germany. In the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK the distribution effects are considerably higher than 
the generation effect. Increases in the number of asylum seekers in these 
countries went together with decreases in other countries. This suggests a 
substitution effect, which can be caused by the fact that the asylum procedure 
in a certain country becomes stricter than in another country. For example, 
a decrease in the recognition rate in one country may lead asylum seekers 
to prefer to submit an asylum request in another country. There is a strong 
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negative correlation between the distribution effects of Germany and the UK 
(-0.75) and Germany and the Netherlands (-0.74). This suggests that there 
are substitution effects between these countries.
For making assumptions about the future number of asylum seekers, 
VHSDUDWHDVVXPSWLRQVFDQEHPDGHDERXWWKHWRWDOLQÀRZWRWKH(8DQGWKH
distribution between EU countries. If one assumes that there will be more 
co-ordination of asylum procedures in the EU, one would expect that in the 
VKRUWWHUPWKHGLVWULEXWLRQHIIHFWVZLOOFKDQJHLQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKHÀRZV
of asylum seekers will be distributed more evenly among EU countries 
according to some criterion, such as the number of asylum seekers per one 
thousand inhabitants, and that, in the longer run, the distribution effects will 
become smaller when the distribution has become more even. If changes in 
WKHWRWDOÀRZWRWKH(8ZLOOQRWH[FHHGWKRVHLQWKHSDVWRQHPD\H[SHFW
ÀXFWXDWLRQV LQ WKH QXPEHU RI DV\OXP VHHNHUV LQ VHSDUDWH FRXQWULHV LQ WKH
long run to be smaller than in the period after 1990. The development in the 
period since 1990 clearly exhibited the effect of stricter asylum procedures 
LQ VSHFL¿F FRXQWULHV +RZHYHU DV SROLFLHV LQ RWKHU FRXQWULHV ZHUH OHVV
Generation Distribution
Austria 3 023 4 911
Belgium 3 135 3 942
Denmark 1 425 2 419
Finaland 375 519
France 6 215 10 295
Germany 34 729 33 242
Greece 589 1 176
Ireland 459 345
Italy 1 391 5 166
Luxembourg 97 129
Netherlands 5 033 15 213
Portugal 109 461
Spain 1 489 2 925
Sweden 5 272 12 853
UK 9 173 20 150
Average EU15 4 834 7 583
Table 3.4. Average annual change in asylum seekers due to generation and 
GLVWULEXWLRQHIIHFWVLQ(8
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VWULFW WKHGLUHFWLRQRI WKHÀRZFKDQJHG,ISROLFLHVEHFDPHPRUHVWULFW LQ
DOOFRXQWULHVRQHFRXOGH[SHFWWKHWRWDOLQÀRZWRWKH(8WREHFRPHVPDOOHU
As discussed above, the ageing of the work force may lead to an increase of 
immigration. However, it seems likely that the EU countries will try to direct 
WKHLPPLJUDWLRQÀRZLQRUGHUWRDFKLHYHWKDWWKRVHPLJUDQWVZLOODUULYHWKDW
DUHTXDOL¿HGWRRFFXS\WKHMREVIRUZKLFKWKHUHDUHYDFDQFLHV+HQFHVRPH
selection procedure seems likely. This means that even when the total level 
of migration increases, the number of asylum seekers could still decline.
3.5. Types of emigration
In making forecasts of the total size of emigration, it is useful to distinguish 
between return migration of foreigners and emigration of nationals. Return 
(e)migration of foreigners is related to foreign immigration in previous years. 
Thus projections of foreign emigration can be based on the immigration that 
occurred in preceding years. Since the patterns of foreigners emigrating to 
their home country differs between different types of migrants, it is again 
useful to distinguish between labour migrants, family-related migrants and 
asylum seekers. 
3.5.1. Foreigners
The tendency of foreigners to return to their country of origin differs strongly 
between categories of migrants. Both the motive of immigration (such as 
labour, marriage or asylum) and the country of origin (industrialised or 
developing country) are important determinants. A much larger proportion 
of labour migrants tend to return to their home country than do marriage 
migrants or asylum seekers (if granted a residence permit). Immigrants from 
industrialised countries are more inclined to return than immigrants from 
developing countries. The return migration rate is higher for males than for 
females. The return migration rate of immigrants in adult ages are higher than 
those of children and older immigrants. Finally, the return migration rates 
of Western immigrants are higher than of non-Western immigrants. In the 
Netherlands, around 70 percent of male immigrants from Western countries, 
which are mainly labour migrants and students, return to their home country 
(De Jong and Nicolaas, 2005). In contrast, only about 15 percent of female 
immigrants from Morocco, which are mainly marriage migrants, return. 
The differences imply that there are strong relationships between the size of 
immigration and net migration for different types of migration. For labour 
migration the size of immigration may be more than twice the size of net 
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migration, whereas for marriage migration the difference between the size 
of immigration and net migration may be considerably smaller. Because of 
the rather strong relationship between the type of migrants distinguished 
by immigration motive (labour, asylum or family) and their demographic 
characteristics, forecasts of emigration can be based on distinctions by age, 
sex and country of origin í if data on the types of migrants are lacking. 
The emigration rate of foreigners decreases with duration of stay. About one 
half of all emigrants leave within three years of entry. This implies that the 
number of emigrants is related to the number of immigrants in preceding 
years. For example, in the Netherlands the annual number of Western 
emigrants equals about two thirds of the number of immigrants three years 
earlier, whereas the number of non-Western emigrants equals 40 percent of the 
number of immigrants. Hence, if an increase in some immigration category 
is projected, one would expect the number of emigrants to increase with 
some time lag. In the long run, one could expect immigration and emigration 
to move in the same direction. In the short run, however, immigration and 
emigration may change in opposite directions, as their relationship with the 
business cycle differs. An economic downturn tends to lead to a decrease of 
immigration and an increase of emigration. 
Return migration of foreigners is not always voluntary. Emigration of asylum 
migrants depends to an important extent on the question whether the asylum 
request is granted. As asylum procedures in one country become more strict, 
this may have an effect on both immigration and emigration numbers. First, 
the number of asylum seekers that are not allowed to stay and have to leave 
the country will increase. Secondly, the number of asylum seekers coming 
to that country will decline, as they will appeal for a request in another 
country. The migration from Africa to the Netherlands is illustrated in ¿JXUH
 Moroccan migration is excluded because the main motives are marriage 
migration and family reunion. For other African migrants, the main motive is 
asylum. In recent years, the emigration of Africans has risen for two reasons. 
First, the number of immigrants has risen in previous years. Second, the vast 
majority of asylum seekers is not allowed to stay. Forecasts of emigration of 
Africans can be based on the assumption that emigration will remain high in 
the short run as a considerable number of asylum migrants did not yet leave 
the country. If it is assumed that the decline of immigration of Africans will 
be permanent because of stricter asylum procedures, then it can be assumed 
that emigration will decline also in the longer run. 
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Finally, the age pattern of emigration of foreigners differs from that of 
immigration, as illustrated in ¿JXUH  On average, emigrants are three 
years older than immigrants. 
3.5.2. Nationals
)LYH PDLQ FDWHJRULHV RI HPLJUDWLQJ QDWLRQDOV FDQ EH LGHQWL¿HG EDVHG RQ
a distinction made between temporary and permanent migration. Of the 
temporary emigrants, there are two subcategories: students and labour 
migrants. Students tend to be slightly younger than labour migrants. These 
emigrants mainly move to other EU countries. Labour migration is inversely 
related to the business cycle in the home country. 
Of the permanent emigrants, that is, those expecting to move for a long, 
LQGH¿QLWH SHULRG WKHUH DUH WKUHH VXEFDWHJRULHV 7KH ¿UVW DUH QDWLRQDOV
marrying a partner from abroad, who choose to move to the country of their 
partner (those that do, tend to move to other EU countries). This category 
does not appear to be very large in most Western European countries. Most 
nationals marrying a foreign partner tend to bring their partner in to their 
country, particularly if they have found a partner in a non-Western country. 
The second category are emigrants who want to leave their country because 
WKH\DUHQRWVDWLV¿HGZLWKWKHJHQHUDOVLWXDWLRQLQWKHLUKRPHFRXQWU\0RVW
of these emigrants move to countries like Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. This category represents a relatively small share of the total number 
of emigrants. A recent NIDI-survey shows that only two percent of the Dutch 
population aged 15 or over wants to emigrate (Ter Bekke et al., 2005). 
However, only one tenth of these people have actual plans. This implies that 
in 2004, 20 thousand persons had serious plans and 250 thousand persons 
were thinking about emigrating. On the basis of these results, one would 
not expect a considerable increase in the annual number of emigrants. The 
third subcategory represents retired people who move to Southern European 
countries because of the warmer climate and other amenities. France, Spain 
and Italy are particularly popular countries of destination for these migrants. 
This category is as yet not very large, but may increase in the future due to 
the ageing of the population.
Forecasts of number of emigrants can be based on assumptions about the 
IXWXUHYDOXHVRIDJHDQGVH[VSHFL¿FHPLJUDWLRQUDWHVFigure 3.9 shows that 
emigration rates are relatively high for young children (who move together 


































rates of women are considerably lower than those of men. If these rates 
are held constant over time, the changes in the number of emigrants are 
determined by changes in the population structure. As elderly people tend 
to emigrate considerably less than younger persons, ageing may be expected 
to have a downward effect on the size of emigration in the long run, even 
though there may be some increase in the number of retirement emigrants. 
3.6. Assumptions on future changes in immigration and emigration
7KH LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ RI WKH PDLQ W\SHV RI LPPLJUDWLRQ DQG HPLJUDWLRQ DQG
their determinants can be the basis for assumptions made on future changes. 
Even if no quantitative data on the separate categories of immigration and 
emigration are available, the distinction of types of migration is useful as a 
basis for argument-based forecasts of migration. In specifying assumptions 
on future changes in migration, it is important to take into account inter 
dependencies between various categories of immigration and emigration. 
Therefore the sequence of specifying assumptions about the separate 



















One may start with assumptions on future changes in emigration of nationals. 
7KHVHFDQEHEDVHGRQDVVXPSWLRQVRQ WKH OHYHORI DJH DQG VH[VSHFL¿F
emigration rates. In the absence of data to estimate these rates, it could 
be assumed that the numbers of emigrants decline in the long run due to 
the ageing of the population, since emigration rates at older ages tend to 
be considerably lower than emigration rates of persons in their twenties or 
thirties. Subsequently, a forecast of the immigration of nationals can be based 
on an assumption about the percentage of emigrating nationals who return 
after some time. For example, as mentioned above, 60 percent of emigrating 
nationals from the Netherlands are expected to return. In formulas: 
EN,t = eN,t PN,t  (8)
IN,t = rN,t EN,t-k (9)
where EN,t is the number of nationals emigrating in year t, PN,t is the number 
of nationals in the population, IN,t is the number of returning nationals, 
eN,t and rN,t are emigration and return migration rates of nationals. To the 
extent that more detailed data are available, emigration of nationals may be 
related to the size of separate age groups (distinguishing different emigration 
rates) and immigration of nationals may be related to emigration numbers 
in successive years (distinguishing different immigration rates by duration 
since emigration).
As for making assumptions about future changes in foreign labour migration, 
it is useful to start with an analysis of the business cycle effect on the most 
recent immigration patterns. As labour immigration tends to be positively 
associated with the business cycle, if there is an economic upturn (downturn) 
at the moment the projection is made, recent immigration numbers may be 
higher (lower) than the structural level. Consequently, to the extent that a 
recent rise (fall) in immigration can be explained by the business cycle, 
it should not be projected linearly in the long run. Assumptions about the 
future development of labour migration in the long run can be based on 
an assessment of future shortages in the labour market caused by ageing, 
which may lead to an increase in labour migration. As asylum policies in 
an increasing number of European countries are becoming more restrictive, 
it can be expected that generation effects will outweigh distribution effects 
DQGWKDWWKHWRWDOÀRZVRIDV\OXPVHHNHUVWR(XURSHZLOOGHFOLQH7KHIXWXUH
levels of family migration are related to the choices of marriage partners in 
the resident population. The longer they live in a particular country in Europe, 
the more they will choose a partner already residing in that country. Family 
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migration is also related to the future size of labour and asylum migration. If 
it is assumed that a large part of labour migrants stay only temporarily, this 
will have a limiting effect on the size of family related migration. Moreover, 
the assumed decline in the number of asylum seekers could have a downward 
effect on family migration. In formulas:
It = IN,t + INN,t,  (10)
INN,t = IL,t + IA,t + IF,t  (11)
IL,t = ptVt  (12)
IA,t = atPt  (13)
IF,t = mL,tIL,t-j + mA,tIA,t-j  (14)
where INN,t is number of immigrating non-nationals, IL,t is number of labour 
migrants, IA,t is number of asylum migrants, IF,t is number of family migrants, 
Vt is number of vacancies and Pt is population size. It is assumed that the 
number of labour migrants is related to the number of vacancies, the number 
of asylum seekers is related to population size and the number of family 
migrants is related to the numbers of labour and family migration j years 
earlier.
Foreign emigration rates differ between categories of immigrants. As a 
larger part of labour migrants tend to return to their home country within 
a particular time period than family and asylum migrants, the assumption 
is that the share of labour migrants in total immigration increases and that 
family and asylum migration decreases. This leads to the expectation that the 
number of emigrants will decline in the long run. In formulas:
ENN,t = eL,tIL,t-i + eA,tIA,t-i + eF,tIF,t-i (15)
Et = EN,t + ENN,t, (16)
Finally, the purpose of this discussion has been to demonstrate how categories 




There are various reasons why forecasts of migration are uncertain. First, 
the quality of migration data in many countries of Europe is poor. If only 
net migration totals are available, forecasts based on these patterns contain 
less information about the causes of observed changes. Second, migration 
SDWWHUQVWHQGWRH[KLELWODUJHÀXFWXDWLRQVHYHQLQWKHVKRUWUXQ)RUH[DPSOH
the size of labour migration tends to change heavily over the course of the 
business cycle, whereas the number of asylum seekers may change quickly 
due to changes in policies. Net migration of the EU25 decreased from 1.3 
million in 1992 to 0.6 million in 1997 and subsequently rose to 1.9 million 
LQ0LJUDWLRQ WHQGV WR VKRZPXFK VWURQJHUÀXFWXDWLRQV WKDQDQQXDO
numbers of births and deaths. As a result, for the short run, migration is the 
most uncertain component of population growth. Finally, migration depends 
on policy changes in both the country of destination and in other countries. 
&KDQJHVLQWKHVHSROLFLHVDUHSDUWLFXODUO\GLI¿FXOWWRIRUHFDVW
The degree of uncertainty of migration projections can be addressed with 
alternative scenarios. Usually, scenarios include a high net migration variant 
(i.e., combining high immigration with low emigration) and a low net 
migration variant (i.e., low immigration and high emigration), ignoring the 
fact that there are usually positive relationships between immigration and 
emigration patterns. Equation (15) shows that an increase in the number of 
immigrants in a given year can be expected to result in an increase in the 
number of emigrants in succeeding years. If these relationships are strong, the 
degree of uncertainty in net migration will be smaller than for immigration 
and emigration separately. Keep in mind that, in the short run, there may be 
a negative relationship between immigration and emigration, due to business 
cycle effects.
In general, there are three ways for assessing the degree of uncertainty of 
migration forecasts. First, one may look at historic forecast errors (e.g., De 
Beer, 1997 and Keilman and Pham, 2002). Secondly, stochastic time-series 
models (such as discussed in section 2.2) produce forecast intervals (e.g., 
'H%HHU7KHSUREOHPZLWKWKHVH¿UVWWZRRSWLRQVLVWKDWIRUPDQ\
countries in Europe, the available time series on immigration and emigration 
are short. The third approach uses expert judgements to determine the 
width of the forecast intervals by including subjective probabilities. This 
DSSURDFKLQFRUSRUDWHVSRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQVIRUZK\PLJUDWLRQÀRZVFRXOG
be higher or lower than expected and whether these high and low values 
can be thought to be permanent or temporary. Assumptions regarding upper 
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and lower boundaries for forecast intervals of immigration and emigration 
can be based on the same explanations that are underlying the central or 
baseline projections. For example, the upper boundary of, say, the 90 percent 
forecast interval of immigration can be based on the assumption that (1) the 
number of labour migrants will equal the number that would be required 
to stabilize the number of people in the working ages, (2) the percentage 
of young foreigners marrying a partner from abroad will not decline and 
(3) the recent decline in the number of asylum migrants is only temporary 
and will rise again to the levels observed several years ago. Accordingly, 
DVVXPSWLRQVFDQEHVSHFL¿HGDERXWWKHORZHUERXQGDU\RILPPLJUDWLRQDQG
about the upper and lower boundaries of emigration. These upper and lower 
ERXQGDULHVGH¿QHWKHZLGWKRIWKHIRUHFDVWLQWHUYDOLQDJLYHQIRUHFDVW\HDU
For earlier years the width of the interval will be smaller, for later years the 
interval will be wider.
3.8. Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the usefulness of distinguishing different types 
of immigration and emigration, as they are affected by different factors and 
hence may change in different ways. This allows one to make argument-based 
forecasts rather than simply extrapolating changes observed in the past. First, 
one may distinguish migration of nationals and foreigners. Emigration of 
nationals can be projected on the basis of assumptions on the future values 
RIDJHDQGVH[VSHFL¿FHPLJUDWLRQUDWHV,PPLJUDWLRQRIQDWLRQDOVFDQEH
projected on the basis of an assumption about the percentage of emigrants 
who will return. Second, for projections of immigration of foreigners, three 
main categories of migrants can be distinguished: labour, asylum and family 
migration. For each of these categories, assumptions on future changes can 
be formulated. The future size of labour migration depends on the effect 
of ageing on the labour market. The number of asylum seekers depends 
on the question to what extent policies within the European Union will be 
co-ordinated. This is particularly important, because a larger part of changes 
in the number of asylum seekers in individual European countries were due 
to changes in the distribution of asylum seekers over European countries 
UDWKHUWKDQWRFKDQJHVLQWKHWRWDOLQÀRZWRWKH(87KHQXPEHURIIDPLO\
migrants depends on the tendency of labour and asylum migrants to marry a 
partner from the country of origin. 
Foreign emigration rates differ between the three main categories of 
immigrants. A relatively high proportion of labour migrants tend to return to 
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the country of origin within a limited number of years. As a relatively large 
proportion of asylum requests are not granted, many asylum migrants are 
required to leave. However, those who are allowed to stay tend to remain for 
a relatively long period. Marriage migrants also tend to stay for a long time.
)LQDOO\ EHFDXVH RI WKH SRRU TXDOLW\ RI GDWD DQG WKH VKDUSÀXFWXDWLRQV LQ
migration time series, forecasts of net migration tend to be rather uncertain. 
The degree of uncertainty can be assessed by looking at the size of errors 
of forecasts made in the past. Another approach is to estimate the width of 
the forecast interval on the basis of a time-series model. Both approaches 
assume that the uncertainty of future migration can be assessed on the basis 
of past developments. However, as the size of the various categories of 
migrants tends to change in different ways, one may question the validity of 
this assumption. Hence it is useful to follow an argument-based approach in 
which the uncertainty of future migration is assessed by looking for reasons 
why immigration and emigration could be higher or lower than expected.
4. An explanatory model for projecting regional  
fertility differences in the Netherlands
Abstract 
Current differences in the level of the total fertility rate (TFR) between 
Dutch municipalities are smaller than they were in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Nevertheless there are still considerable differences. Small municipalities 
have higher TFRs than large cities. This  chapter aims to answer the question 
whether these differences will decline further until differences between 
large and small cities will have disappeared. For that purpose we develop a 
regression model of regional differences in the TFR including demographic, 
socioeconomic and cultural variables. Using the estimation results we 
decompose differences in fertility between large and small cities into the 
contribution of differences in levels of the determinants versus differences 
in the relationships between the determinants and fertility. The results show 
that differences in the cultural variables have a larger effect on differences 
in the TFR than the demographic and socioeconomic variables. As cultural 
differences do not tend to change quickly, they will not lead to quick changes 
in regional differences in the TFR. The demographic differences are not 
expected to lead to strong changes either, as the two demographic variables 
(the household structure and the ethnic structure) have opposite effects. 
As the effect of the socioeconomic variable is caused by differences in the 
PDJQLWXGHRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWUDWKHUWKDQE\GLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHYDOXH
of this variable, even if the differences in this variable would disappear, this 
would still not lead to convergence of the TFR. Thus the  chapter concludes 
that differences in the TFR between large and small cities are not likely to 
diminish quickly. 
4.1. Introduction
Despite the small size of the Netherlands there are considerable regional 
differences in fertility rates. Whereas the average value of the Total Fertility 
Rate (TFR) equals 1.8, the levels of the TFR of the almost 500 municipalities 
range from 1.3 to 3.2. For making regional population forecasts assumptions 
need to be made about the future regional differences in the level of fertility, 
in addition to assumptions about migration and mortality. These assumptions 
may be based on projections based on observed differences. However, 
ZLWKRXWKDYLQJDQH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHUHJLRQDOGLIIHUHQFHVLWLVGLI¿FXOWWR
decide whether changes observed in the past are likely to continue in the 
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future and, if so, to what extent. In order to assess whether or not differences 
may be persistent, this chapter examines which factors explain regional 
differences in fertility in the Netherlands. The  chapter focuses on differences 
in the level of TFR between small and large cities. 
Three types of explanations are examined. First, differences in the TFR 
between municipalities may be explained by differences in the demographic 
structure of the population as well as by socioeconomic and cultural 
differences. Second, the relationship between these determinants and fertility 
may differ across municipalities. Third, the level of fertility of municipalities 
LQ VSHFL¿F UHJLRQV PD\ V\VWHPDWLFDOO\ GLIIHU IURP WKDW RI PXQLFLSDOLWLHV
in other regions, apart from the differences that can be attributed to these 
determinants. The relative importance of each of these three types of 
explanations is assessed by means of specifying a regression model. The 
model is estimated on the basis of data that are obtained from Statline, the 
electronic database of Statistics Netherlands. By means of estimating the 
model both for all municipalities and for small and large cities separately, 
the model can be used to decompose differences in fertility between large 
and small cities into differences in the values of the explanatory variables 
DQG GLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKH YDOXHV RI WKH UHJUHVVLRQ FRHI¿FLHQWV2Q WKH EDVLV
of assumptions on possible future changes in the determinants of regional 
fertility differences we will discuss whether the three types of explanations 
are likely to lead to a decline of fertility differences between large and small 
cities or whether differences may be expected to be persistent.
4.2. Explanations of regional fertility differences
Most studies of regional differences in fertility focus on the total fertility rate 
(TFR). One important reason for using this indicator is that it is not affected 
by differences in the age and sex structure. One problem in using the TFR as a 
measure of fertility is that it is affected by changes in the age at childbearing. 
Hence for analyzing changes in fertility on the national level an indicator of 
cohort fertility may be used. However, for an analysis of the level of fertility 
in small regional areas cohort fertility is a less useful measure than at the 
national level, since a relatively large part of the population moves between 
different municipalities during the reproductive ages. Thus a cohort fertility 
indicator for a given municipality does not measure the fertility behavior 
of ‘real’ cohorts living in that municipality. It would be affected heavily by 
PLJUDWLRQÀRZVLQWKHSDVW+HQFHFRKRUWPHDVXUHVRIIHUWLOLW\GRQRWVHHP
to be very useful for analyzing fertility differences between municipalities.
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In explaining and interpreting differences in fertility between regions one 
should be careful because of the danger of ecological fallacy. Regional 
differences cannot simply be interpreted as differences between individuals 
living in different regions. Differences across regions can be caused by 
differences in the composition of the population. Duchêne et al. (2004) 
make a distinction between differences in the structure of the population 
and differences due to different characteristics of the regions. The structure 
of the population affects the level of fertility, because the level of fertility 
differs between subcategories of the population. For example, fertility rates 
for married women aged around 25 of ethnic origin are higher than fertility 
rates for young, native women living alone. Hence a municipality in which 
the former group is relatively large and the latter group is relatively small 
will have a higher TFR than other municipalities. Since the level of the TFR 
is not affected by the age and sex structure, age and sex do not have to be 
included in an explanatory model for the TFR. Obviously other effects of the 
structure of the population on fertility, such as marital status and ethnicity, 
might also be accounted for by means of standardizing, but that would 
require very detailed data on both fertility and the structure of the population 
which are usually not available at a low regional level. 
Boyle (2003) and Sandberg and Westerberg (2005) note that there are only 
few recent studies on regional differences in fertility and that most studies 
focus on cross-country comparisons. One notable exception is Hank (2001, 
2002), who distinguishes two categories of regional characteristics that affect 
fertility behavior: economic opportunities and constraints on the one hand and 
social structure and culture on the other. First, fertility behavior is affected 
by constraints imposed by the regional living conditions (e.g. Courgeau and 
%DFFDLQL+DQNPHQWLRQVWKHGHJUHHRIXUEDQL]DWLRQUHÀHFWLQJ
WKH ³JHQHUDO RSSRUWXQLW\ RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V UHVLGHQFH´ WKH ORFDO ODERU
market, the availability of child care, the occupational structure and regional 
unemployment. Duchêne et al. (2004) add the housing market. Second, the 
social environment affects fertility behavior because of regional differences 
in attitudes towards the family and children. 
Most economic studies on fertility refer to the ‘new home economics’ theory 
of Becker (e.g. Becker, 1960, 1991). Becker argues, that as raising children 
costs relatively much time, the costs of children are determined to an important 
extent by the price of time. Since women tend to spend more time on raising 
the children than men, the income that a woman could earn if she participated 
in the labour market has an impact on fertility. Fahey and Spéder (2004) note 
that when Becker formulated his theory on the economics of fertility, there 
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was a negative relationship between female employment and fertility across 
OECD countries. However since the 1980s the relationship has turned the 
other way around and become strongly positive. Engelhardt et al. (2004) 
and Del Boca (2002) argue that the change of the sign in the cross-country 
correlation can be explained by the fact that the ‘costs’ of children do not 
only depend on the female wage level, but on institutions determining 
the ability of women to combine children and work, e.g. opportunities 
for part-time employment and availability of child care. Sandberg and 
Westerberg (2005) conclude that high labor income in a region may imply 
good economic conditions which in turn may encourage young people to 
start a family. This is in line with the results shown by Hoem (2000), that 
there is a positive relationship between employment at the municipal level 
and fertility in Sweden. Sandberg and Westerberg (2005) assume that poor 
economic conditions are discouraging. Hence they expect that high local 
unemployment has a negative impact on fertility. Kravdal (2002) argues that 
unemployment does not only affect the level of fertility of those currently 
unemployed but that high local unemployment rates may depress wages 
generally. Moreover, high unemployment in the neighbourhood strengthens 
people’s doubts about having another child as people may consider the risk 
of experiencing unemployment in the future as relatively high. Gauthier and 
Hatzius (1997) state that high unemployment has a discouraging effect on 
women in permanent jobs, since the risk of not being re-employed on the 
same terms as before childbirth will be too high. Several empirical studies on 
regional fertility show a negative relationship between unemployment and 
fertility: Naz (2000) and Kravdal (2002) for Norway, Johansson (2000) for 
Sweden and Del Bono (2002) for Great Britain and Italy. 
Whereas economic explanations of differences in fertility are based on the 
DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW IHUWLOLW\EHKDYLRUGHSHQGVRQZHLJKLQJFRVWVDQGEHQH¿WV
of having children, cultural explanations emphasise the role of values and 
norms as to the ‘ideal’ family size. In analyzng the decline of fertility to 
below-replacement levels in many European countries, Lesthaeghe and 
Van de Kaa introduced the concept of the ‘second demographic transition’ 
(Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 1986 and Van de Kaa, 1987). They explain 
the decline of fertility by the rise of values fostering individual autonomy, 
secularism, postmaterialism and emancipation in addition to economic 
factors, such as female labour force participation and housing conditions 
(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 2002 and Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004). The 
concept of the second demographic transition is based on the assumption 
that shifts in values are similar across countries: ‘Post-material’ values 
emphasizing individualism are gaining ground at the expense of more 
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conservative values emphasizng duty (Van de Kaa, 2001). Coleman (2004) 
questions, however, whether liberating forces would lead to convergence, 
as people may not necessarily be liberated in the same direction. Billari 
and Wilson (2001) show that preferences regarding family formation differ 
according to cultural context and differences between European countries are 
stable. Hofstede (1981) claims that cultural differences between countries are 
YHU\VWDEOHWKURXJKWLPH7KHUHLVRQO\DFRQYHUJHQFHRIVXSHU¿FLDODVSHFWVRI
culture (e.g. consumption patterns, amusement), but not of the fundamental 
values. Accordingly one may expect regional cultural differences within the 
same country to be persistent. Reher (1998) shows that differences in norms 
on family size between European countries have been persistent. They have 
deep historical roots and they are not diminishing in any fundamental way.
From this discussion of the literature we conclude that a model for explaining 
regional differences in fertility should include demographic variables 
UHÀHFWLQJ GLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKH VWUXFWXUH RI WKH SRSXODWLRQ VRFLRHFRQRPLF
YDULDEOHVUHÀHFWLQJGLIIHUHQFHVLQRSSRUWXQLWLHVDQGFRQVWUDLQWVDQGFXOWXUDO
YDULDEOHV WKDW UHÀHFW GLIIHUHQFHV LQ YDOXHV 7KH TXHVWLRQ WR ZKDW H[WHQW
differences in fertility between large and small municipalities are likely to 
change in the future depends on the question whether the differences in the 
determinants are likely to change and on the magnitude of the effect of the 
separate determinants on fertility differences. 
4.3.  Method
For making assumptions about future differences in regional fertility 
it is important to assess which causes of differences in fertility tend to 
be permanent and which causes may be temporary. First, differences in 
the TFR are caused by differences in the demographic structure between 
municipalities, particularly differences in the proportions of women of ethnic 
origin and of married women in the childbearing ages. These differences 
may change due to migration. Secondly, differences in the TFR can be 
explained by socioeconomic and cultural differences between municipalities. 
Billari and Wilson (2001) state that whereas economic forces have led to 
converging trends in Europe, cultural factors have generated diverse family 
WUHQGV7KLUGO\WKHOHYHORIWKH7)5RIPXQLFLSDOLWLHVLQVSHFL¿FUHJLRQVPD\
differ from that in other regions, even if differences due to demographic, 
socioeconomic and cultural variables are accounted for. By means of 
examining whether these differences were also observed in the past one may 
conclude whether these differences are likely to be persistent. 
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In order to assess the size of the effects of these sources of variation a model 
is developed in which regional differences in the TFR are explained in two 
VWHSV )LUVW DQ H[SODQDWRU\ PRGHO LV VSHFL¿HG ZKLFK LQFOXGHV YDULDEOHV
WKDW UHÀHFWGHPRJUDSKLF VRFLRHFRQRPLFDQGFXOWXUDOGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ
municipalities. In the second step systematic regional patterns in the TFR 
WKDWFDQQRWEHH[SODLQHGE\WKHVHYDULDEOHVDUHLGHQWL¿HGRQWKHEDVLVRIDQ
DQDO\VLVRIWKHUHVLGXDOVRIWKHPRGHOVSHFL¿HGLQWKH¿UVWVWHSDQGUHJLRQDO
GXPP\ YDULDEOHV DUH DGGHG WR WKHPRGHO ,Q WKH ¿UVW VWHS WKH IROORZLQJ
PRGHOLVVSHFL¿HG
TFRi = b + j bj xi,j + ri  (1)
where TFRi is the total fertility rate in municipality i, xi,j are the explanatory 
variables and ri are regional differences in the TFR that cannot be explained 
by the variables included in the model, with EUi  = 0. TFR, x and r refer to 
year t; a subscript indicating the year t is left out for the sake of readability. 
It can be expected that r exhibits spatial autocorrelation, as municipalities 
within the same region may show similar differences in fertility that 
cannot be explained fully by the variables included in model (1). Moran’s I 
FRHI¿FLHQWLVWKHPRVWFRPPRQO\XVHGFRHI¿FLHQWLQVSDWLDODXWRFRUUHODWLRQ
analyses (e.g. Diniz-Filho et al., 2003). If there is spatial autocorrelation (i.e. 
LI0RUDQ¶V,LVFORVHWR±RUHVWLPDWLRQRIWKHFRHI¿FLHQWVb and bj of 
(1) by OLS would lead to underestimating the standard errors. Moran’s I 
measures the overall pattern of spatial autocorrelation within a given distance 
class. However, even if the value of Moran’s I is close to zero, there still may 
EHV\VWHPDWLFSDWWHUQVLQWKHUHVLGXDOVLQVRPHVSHFL¿FUHJLRQVZKLFKGRQRW
lead to a high absolute value of Moran’s I if there are no systematic patterns 
in other regions. Therefore it is useful to examine whether there are regions 
in which the residuals ri indicate that the TFRs of the municipalities within 
that region are systematically lower or higher than would be expected on the 
basis of the values of the explanatory variables. These systematic differences 
can be modeled by: 
ri = k ck Di,k + İi, (2)
where Di,k = 1 if municipality i belongs to region k and Di,k = 0 otherwise and 
İi is an error term with E(İiİk) = 0 for LN and E(İi)
2 = ıİ
2. 
The term k ck Di,k describes the systematic regional differences in the TFR 
that cannot be explained by model (1), whereas the error term describes the 
random variations.
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Combining (1) and (2) yields:
TFRi = b + j bj xi,j + k ck Di,k + İi,  (3)
If the error term is serially uncorrelated, the parameters can be estimated 
E\2/62QHEHQH¿WRIPRGHOLQJVSDWLDOFRUUHODWLRQE\PHDQVRILQFOXGLQJ
dummy variables rather than introducing a spatial lag or error model is 
that the dummy variables allow to account for differences in the degree of 
autocorrelation across regions. Even if over-all autocorrelation is relatively 
VPDOO DXWRFRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQPXQLFLSDOLWLHV LQ VSHFL¿F UHJLRQV PD\ EH
relatively high. Introducing dummy variables for the latter regions provides 
information on deviations in the TFR that can be attributed to characteristics 
RI VSHFL¿F UHJLRQV WKDW FDQQRW EH DFFRXQWHG IRU E\ WKH GHPRJUDSKLF
socioeconomic and cultural variables included in the model. 
By means of estimating equation (3) both for all municipalities and for large 
and small cities separately, the regression model can be used to decompose 
differences in fertility into the effect of differences in the values of the 
determinants and the effect of differences in the values of the regression 
FRHI¿FLHQWV 7KH FRQWULEXWLRQ RI GLIIHUHQFHV LQ GHWHUPLQDQWV FDQ EH
FDOFXODWHGE\PXOWLSO\LQJWKHHVWLPDWHGYDOXHVRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWV
in the model estimated for all municipalities by the average values of the 
explanatory variables in large and small cities respectively and calculating the 
difference of both products for each explanatory variable. The contribution 
RIWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHYDOXHVRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWVLVFDOFXODWHGE\
multiplying the average value of the explanatory variables for all cities by 
WKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWVHVWLPDWHGIRUVPDOODQGODUJHFLWLHVUHVSHFWLYHO\
and calculating the differences.
4.4. Data
As discussed in the previous section, for the explanatory model (1) three 
FDWHJRULHVRIYDULDEOHVDUHVSHFL¿HG$VWKHGDWDDUHREWDLQHGIURP6WDWOLQH
the electronic database of Statistics Netherlands that can be found on http://
statline.cbs.nl, the choice of variables depends on the availability of data 
in this database. Statline contains regional data on population, households, 
labour, income, social security, housing and elections. 
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Demographic variables 
7KHVH YDULDEOHV UHÀHFW GLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKH KRXVHKROG DQG HWKQLF VWUXFWXUH
of the population. As noted in the previous section changes in the age and 
sex structure do not have to be included in the model as the TFR is not 
affected by those changes. It can be expected that the level of the TFR is 
affected by the household structure, since the level of fertility of couples is 
considerably higher than that of people living alone. In addition, the level of 
the TFR is expected to depend on the size of ethnic groups, as women from 
a non-Western origin tend to have more children than native women. Thus 
two demographic variables are included in the model:
 Household structure: This variable is measured by the percentage of 
women aged 20-40 years living alone. This age group is selected because 
the major part of fertility is realized within this age group.
 Ethnic structure: Measured by the percentage of women aged 15-30 
\HDUVZLWKDIRUHLJQQRQ:HVWHUQEDFNJURXQGPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\ZRPHQ
with a Turkish or Moroccan background. The age group is younger than 
that of the household variable, because Turkish and Moroccan women 
tend to have their children at a younger age than native women. Turks 
and Moroccans make up two of the largest four ethnic groups in the 
Netherlands. As the other two large groups, Surinamese and Antilleans, 
do not have higher fertility than the average Dutch level, this variable is 
restricted to Turkish and Moroccan women.
Socioeconomic variables 
6RFLRHFRQRPLFYDULDEOHVDUH LQFOXGHG LQ WKHPRGHO LQRUGHU WR UHÀHFW WKH
assumption that the level of fertility depends on economic constraints 
and opportunities. The housing market may have an effect on couples’ 
childbearing decisions. The availability of houses may attract couples from 
other municipalities, thus leading to selective migration of couples who want 
to have children. In particular, areas in which relatively many new houses are 
built tend to attract couples in the family building stage of life. In addition 
the level of fertility is assumed to be related to wealth. As raising children 
is expensive it is assumed that couples with a low income and especially 
couples in which one or both partners do not have a job, tend to have less 
children than the ideal family size. This assumption corresponds with the 
HPSLULFDO¿QGLQJGLVFXVVHGLQWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQWKDWFURVVFRXQWU\VWXGLHV
show a positive relationship between income and the TFR and various 
regional studies show a negative relationship between unemployment and 
fertility. Thus it is expected that the TFR is low in municipalities in which a 
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relatively large proportion of the population does not have paid work. Hence 
the following variables are included in the model:
 New houses: The number of newly built houses as a percentage of the 
VWRFNRIKRXVHV$VLWLVDVVXPHGWKDW\RXQJFRXSOHV¿UVWPRYHWRWKHLU
new house and then have children, the percentage of new houses in the 
two years preceding the year for which the TFR is to be explained is 
included in the model.
 The percentage of the population with a low income. This is measured by 
the percentage of persons receiving the minimum wage.
 7KHSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQUHFHLYLQJVRFLDOEHQH¿WVHLWKHUEHFDXVH
of unemployment, disability or absence of other means of income.
Cultural variables 
One problem in identifying cultural differences between municipalities is 
WKDWWKH\DUHGLI¿FXOWWRPHDVXUHGLUHFWO\6XUYH\VZKLFKLQFOXGHTXHVWLRQV
on values do not have enough observations for analyses at the level of 
PXQLFLSDOLWLHV)RUWKDWUHDVRQWKHLPSDFWRIFXOWXUDOLQÀXHQFHVLVDVVHVVHG
LQGLUHFWO\E\PHDQVRIVSHFLI\LQJLQGLFDWRUVDVVXPHGWRUHÀHFWWKHHIIHFWVRI
cultural differences on fertility. In the Netherlands, as in most other Western 
countries, the effect of religion on the level of fertility nowadays is much 
smaller than it used to be some decades ago. Nevertheless, there is still some 
effect, as orthodox Calvinist couples tend to have much higher fertility than 
the average population (Sobotka and Adigüzel, 2002). This leads to relatively 
high values of the TFR in the so-called Bible Belt, which extends from the 
South  and Western part of the Netherlands in a North and Eastern direction. 
In addition, many studies have shown that in rural areas the level of fertility 
tends to be higher than in urban areas. Norms have a stronger impact in rural 
DUHDVDVVRFLDOFRQWURODQGGLUHFWVRFLDOLQÀXHQFHSOD\DPRUHLPSRUWDQWUROH
in rural than in urban areas. As cultural differences tend to be persistent over 
a long period of time, the effect of unobserved cultural differences on the 
TFR can be assessed by examining to what extent differences in the TFR 
have been long lasting. For that reason, the differences in the TFR between 
each municipality and the average level some decades ago is included in the 
model. Hence the following three variables assumed to represent cultural 
differences are included in the model:
 Religion: Since there are no accurate data for small municipalities of the 
SHUFHQWDJHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQDI¿OLDWHGZLWKRUWKRGR[&DOYLQLVWFKXUFKHV
an indirect measure is used, viz. the percentage of persons who voted for 
orthodox Calvinist parties during the elections of the Dutch Lower House 
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in 2002. Similarly, Brunetta and Rotondi (1989) use election results of 
the Christian Democrats as an indicator of the importance of Catholic 
culture in a province. 
 Urbanization rate: The degree of urbanization is measured by the number 
of addresses per squared kilometer. Five classes of urbanization rate 
are distinguished ranging from very low urbanization rate (less than 
500 addresses per km2) to very high urbanization rate (more than 2,500 
addresses per km2). Four dummy variables are included in the model 
representing the levels of urbanization, ranging from very low to high 
urbanization rates.
 1RQVSHFL¿HG FXOWXUDO GLIIHUHQFHV 'LIIHUHQFHV RI WKH 7)5 IURP WKH
average level in 1969 are regarded as a proxy for long-lasting differences 
in fertility. In the Netherlands the TFR changed dramatically in the years 
1969-1975. On the national level the TFR dropped from 2.75 in 1969 to 
1.66 in 1975. One major cause of this fall was the strong decline in the age 
at childbearing. As the change in the timing of fertility also affected the 
level of the TFR in subsequent years, it was decided to include the TFR 
in the last year preceding this unstable period in the model rather than the 
TFR in 1975. Thus the difference between the TFR of each municipality 
in 1969 and the average level is included in the model.
2QWKHEDVLVRIWKHH[SHFWHGVLJQVRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWVLWLVDVVXPHG
that the TFR is high in municipalities where a high percentage of women is 
living with a partner, a high percentage of women in the reproductive ages 
has a non-Western background, the percentage of new houses is high, there 
are low percentages of persons with a low income and persons receiving 
VRFLDOEHQH¿WVDKLJKSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQEHORQJVWRWKHRUWKRGR[
Calvinists, the urbanisation rate is low, and the level of fertility has been high 
in the past. 
An analysis of the residuals of model (1) shows to what extent there are 
systematic regional patterns that cannot be accounted for by the explanatory 
YDULDEOHVLQFOXGHGLQWKHPRGHO2QWKHEDVLVRIWKHFODVVL¿FDWLRQGHYHORSHG
by Eurostat, three levels of regional aggregations of municipalities are 
examined: 
a. NUTS I level: The Netherlands is divided into four parts: North 
(consisting of 68 municipalities), East (103 municipalities), West (207 
municipalities), and South (118 municipalities). These regions are 
separated by geographical boundaries.
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b. NUTS II level: The Netherlands consists of 12 provinces. These regions 
have political boundaries. The number of municipalities per province 
ranges from 6 to 92.
c. NUTS III level: 40 so-called COROP regions are distinguished. These are 
socioeconomic regions. Each region is part of one province. The number 
of municipalities per COROP region ranges from 2 to 33. 
After assessing in which regions there are systematic differences in the TFR 
of the municipalities belonging to that region which cannot be accounted for 
E\WKHH[SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHVGXPP\YDULDEOHVIRUPRGHODUHVSHFL¿HG,Q




The analyses are based on data for all 496 municipalities of the Netherlands 
(this was the number of municipalities on 1 January 2002). Population size of 
the municipalities ranges from 1000 inhabitants to over 700,000 inhabitants. 
The model is estimated on the basis of data for the year 2002. As the TFR for 
PDQ\VPDOOPXQLFLSDOLWLHVVKRZVUHODWLYHO\ODUJHUDQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQVIURP
one year to the other, it was decided to calculate the average value of the 
TFR for three successive years (2000, 2001 and 2002). Whereas for almost 
60 percent of the municipalities the TFR ranges from 1.6 to 2.0, 15 percent 
of municipalities has a level of the TFR above replacement level (2.1) and 
6 percent has a TFR lower than 1.5. The (unweighed) average value of the 
TFR equals 1.8, and the standard deviation equals .26. The TFR is low in 
both the most Southern and most Northern provinces (1.6 on average), which 
are characterized by rather poor economic conditions, and in the urbanized 
Western provinces (1.7). The TFR is high in the new province of Flevoland 
(2.0) and also in the rural Eastern provinces (1.9). A large part of Flevoland 
was reclaimed from the IJsselmeer lake. It consists of three polders, the last 
RIZKLFKZDVFUHDWHGLQWKHV,WVELJJHVWFLW\$OPHUHUHFHLYHGLWV¿UVW
inhabitants in 1976. Now it has 170 thousand inhabitants. 
Table 4.1 shows the mean values and standard deviations of the TFR and 
the explanatory variables, separately for small and large municipalities. The 
table shows that the TFR is higher in small municipalities than in larger ones. 
2Q WKHEDVLV RI WKH K\SRWKHVHV RQ WKH VLJQV RI WKH FRHI¿FLHQWV GLVFXVVHG
above it can be assumed that the relatively high level of the TFR in small 
municipalities can be explained by the relatively low percentage of women 
living alone, the high percentage of orthodox Calvinists and the high level 
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of fertility in the past. However, these effects are counterbalanced by the 
low percentage of people with a non-Western foreign background, the low 
percentage of new houses and the low percentage of persons receiving social 
EHQH¿WV7KXVDPXOWLYDULDWHDQDO\VLVLVQHHGHGWRTXDQWLI\WKHVL]HRIWKHVH




RI WKH LQFRPHYDULDEOHGRHVQRWGLIIHUVLJQL¿FDQWO\ IURP]HUR+HQFH WKLV
variable is not included in the model. Furthermore, three of the four dummies 
UHSUHVHQWLQJ GLIIHUHQW GHJUHHV RI XUEDQL]DWLRQ GR QRW GLIIHU VLJQL¿FDQWO\
<25 000 inhabitants >25 000 inhabitants all municipalities
mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
TFR 1.88 .23 1.78 .19 1.84 .22
% Women living alone 7.21 3.10 11.63 6.92 8.83 5.31
% Moroccan and 
Turkish women
1.31 2.01 4.53 4.14 2.49 3.35
% New houses 4.51 3.43 5.50 4.71 4.87 3.97
% Persons with low 
income
7.17 1.86 8.27 2.38 7.58 2.13
% Persons receiving 
VRFLDOEHQH¿WV
11.96 3.15 14.58 3.37 12.92 3.47
% Orthodox Calvinists 5.26 8.21 4.38 5.52 4.94 7.34
Very low urbanisation 
(dummy)1
.47 .10 .33
TFR in the past 
(deviation from 
average)
.12 .60 -.21 .42 0.00 .56
N 314 182 496
Table 4.1. Descriptive sample statistics
1 Standard deviation is not given, as this is a binary variable.
Source: Statline (www.cbs.nl).
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IURP]HUR7KXVRQO\ WKHFRHI¿FLHQWRI WKHGXPP\UHSUHVHQWLQJYHU\ORZ
urbanization is included in the model. Moran’s I is calculated by estimating 
the spatial autocorrelation of the values of the TFRs and the residuals of 
municipalities within the same regions at the NUTS III level. Moran’s I 
of the TFR equals .24 and that of the residuals of the model including the 
demographic, socioeconomic and cultural variables equals .14. Thus there 
is no strong spatial autocorrelation. However, for two regions at the NUTS 
II and six at the NUTS III level the residuals turn out to be systematically 
positive or negative. For that reason eight regional dummies are added to 
the model. After including the regional dummies Moran’s I equals .05, 
LQGLFDWLQJWKDWWKHUHLVQRDXWRFRUUHODWLRQOHIWLQWKHUHVLGXDOV,Q¿YHUHJLRQV
the TFR is higher than would be expected on the basis of the demographic, 
socioeconomic and cultural explanatory variables, whereas three regions 
turn out to have a relatively low TFR. The TFR is especially high in the 
relatively new province of Flevoland. This province attracts relatively many 
young couples who move from Amsterdam, as this province provides many 
dwellings with gardens which are considered to be attractive for rearing 
children. Moreover, this province includes one ‘old’ municipality belonging 
to the Bible Belt, Urk, with very high fertility which cannot be completely 
accounted for by the explanatory variables (we will come back to this later). 
The model is estimated separately for the 182 municipalities with 25 
thousand and more inhabitants and the 314 municipalities with less than 25 
thousand inhabitants. Table 4.2VKRZVWKHHVWLPDWHGUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWV
their standard errors and the t-statistics. The model turns out to explain 
78 percent of the variance of the TFR for the large municipalities and 61 
percent of that for small municipalities. Taking all municipalities together 
the model explains 67 percent of the variance. The main part of the explained 
variance can be attributed to the demographic, cultural and socioeconomic 
explanatory variables. These variables explain 62 percent of the variance of 
the TFR for all municipalities.
By means of combining information from table 4.1 on the mean values 
RI WKH H[SODQDWRU\ YDULDEOHV DQG WKH YDOXHV RI WKH UHJUHVVLRQ FRHI¿FLHQWV
shown in table 4.2 one can explain the higher value of the TFR in the small 
cities. In cities with less than 25,000 inhabitants the average value of the 
TFR equals 1.88 and in the larger cities the TFR equals 1.78. This difference 
can be decomposed into the contribution of differences in the values of the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































shown in table 4.3.
Looking at the differences in the explanatory variables between small and 
large cities it turns out that the two demographic variables have opposite 
effects. The percentage of women living alone accounts for a difference in 
the TFR of .06. This can be calculated as follows. In small municipalities 
7.2 percent of women aged between 20 and 40 years live alone compared 
Contribution of 
differences in 








tion to difference 
in TFR between 
small and large 
cities
Demographic variables
% Women living alone .06 .02 .08
% Moroccan and Turkish 
women
-.03 .01 -.02
Total effect .03 .03 .06
Socioeconomic variables
% New houses .00 .00 .00
% Persons receiving social 
EHQH¿WV
.02 -.09 -.07
Total effect .02 -.09 -.07
Cultural variables
% Orthodox Calvinists .01 .00 .01
Very low urbanisation 
(dummy)
.02 -.01 .01
TFR in the past 
(deviation from average)
.03 .00 .03
Total effect .06 -.01 .05
Intercept .00 .07 .07
Total .11 -.01 .10
Table 4.3. Difference in TFR between small and large cities
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ZLWKSHUFHQWLQODUJHFLWLHVVHHWDEOH$VWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQW
of this variable in the model estimated for all municipalities equals -.013 
this variable accounts for a difference of -.013 x (7.2 – 11.6) = .06 in the 
TFR between small and large cities. The percentage of women with a 
non-Western background has an opposite effect. As the percentage of 
women with a Turkish or Moroccan background is lower in small cities than 
in large cities, whereas this variable has a positive effect on the level of the 
TFR, this variable has a downward effect on the TFR for small cities. The 
size of this effect on the difference between small and large municipalities 
equals -.03. Thus taken together, the two demographic variables explain .03 
of the total difference in the TFR. Similarly the effects of the different values 
of the cultural and socioeconomic variables can be calculated. The two 
socioeconomic variables explain a difference in the TFR of .02 (.00 by new 
KRXVHVDQGE\SHUVRQVUHFHLYLQJVRFLDOEHQH¿WVDQGWKHWKUHHYDULDEOHV
representing cultural differences explain a difference of .06 of the TFR (.01 
by religion, .02 by urbanization and .03 by past differences in the TFR).
$VWRWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHHVWLPDWHGYDOXHVRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWV
the main difference between small and large cities concerns the percentage 
RI SHUVRQV UHFHLYLQJ VRFLDO EHQH¿WV 7KH SHUFHQWDJH RI SHRSOH UHFHLYLQJ
VRFLDOEHQH¿WVLVKLJKHULQODUJHFLWLHVWKDQLQVPDOOFLWLHV$VWKHUHJUHVVLRQ
FRHI¿FLHQWLVQHJDWLYHWKLVSDUWO\VHHPVWRH[SODLQWKHORZHUIHUWLOLW\LQODUJH
cities. However, this effect is offset by the fact that the (absolute) value of the 
FRHI¿FLHQWLVODUJHULQVPDOOFLWLHVWKDQLQODUJHFLWLHV7KXVHYHQWKRXJKLQ
VPDOOFLWLHVWKHSHUFHQWDJHRISHRSOHUHFHLYLQJVRFLDOEHQH¿WVLVORZHUWKDQ
in large cities, this variable has a larger impact on the TFR in small cities. 
7KXVLQVPDOOFLWLHVZLWKPDQ\SHRSOHUHFHLYLQJVRFLDOEHQH¿WVWKH7)5LV
relatively low compared with other small cities. As to the difference between 
VPDOODQGODUJHFLWLHVWKHODUJHDEVROXWHYDOXHRIWKHFRHI¿FLHQWLQVPDOO
cities implies that this variable has a negative impact on the level of the TFR 
in small cities. This negative effect exceeds the positive effect due to the 
ORZHU SHUFHQWDJHRI SHUVRQV UHFHLYLQJ VRFLDO EHQH¿WV LQ VPDOO FLWLHV7KH
opposite is true for the percentage of women living alone. As the (absolute) 
YDOXHRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWLVKLJKHUIRUODUJHFLWLHVWKLVHQODUJHVWKH
effect of the higher percentage of women living alone in large cities. The 
difference in the values of the intercept for small and large cities implies that 
part of the difference in the TFR cannot be accounted for by the explanatory 
YDULDEOHV7KHGLIIHUHQWYDOXHVRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWVRIWKHUHJLRQDO
dummies indicate that in four regions the difference in the TFR between 
small and large municipalities is larger than the difference in the intercept 
indicates. 
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If we take both effects together, it turns out that the .10 difference in the 
TFR between large and small municipalities is made up of a difference by 
.06 that can be explained by the demographic variables, .05 by the cultural 
YDULDEOHVDQGE\QRWVSHFL¿HGGLIIHUHQFHVDFFRXQWHGIRUE\GLIIHUHQFHV
in the intercept between large and small cities), whereas the socioeconomic 
variables have an opposite effect of .07.
In all eight regions included in the model the TFR in the past already differed 
LQWKHVDPHGLUHFWLRQDVWKHVLJQVRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWVLQGLFDWH7KHVH
differences are not completely explained by the variable TFR in the past. 
This indicates that the reduction of the TFR during the last decades has not 
been similar in all regions. For all municipalities taken together the model 
implies that current differences in the TFR equal less than ten percent of the 
GLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKH UHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWHTXDOV  VHH WDEOH
However, for the eight regions included in the model the current differences 
in the TFR are about one half of the past differences. This indicates that 
in those regions the difference of the TFR with the national average has 
declined much more slowly than in other regions.
4.6. Implications for forecasting
In the previous section we showed to what extent the difference of the TFR 
between large and small municipalities can be explained by differences in 
the values of demographic, socioeconomic and cultural variables and by 
GLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHPDJQLWXGHRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWV2QWKHEDVLVRI
assumptions on the possible future direction of change in differences in these 
variables one may conclude to what extent future differences in the TFR are 
expected to decline or to be persistent. 
Future changes in the demographic structure depend on the current age and 
sex structure and on future changes in migration and household formation 
(changes in mortality hardly play a role in explaining changes in the number 
of women in the childbearing ages and changes in fertility have an effect 
in the long run only). As to changes in socioeconomic regional differences 
Cuadrado-Roura (2001) shows that after a period of regional economic 
convergence in the European Union, this process has almost completely 
ended. Fingleton (1999) claims that there is only weak evidence that EU 
regions are converging, requiring more than two centuries for economic 
convergence to be achieved. As to cultural differences Lesthaeghe and Neels 
(2002) suggest, on the basis of an analysis of spatial differences in fertility 
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that are linked to cultural variables between regions in Belgium, France and 
Switzerland, that these are rather stable across time.
The demographic variables lead to a lower TFR in large municipalities due 
to the higher percentage of single women. Thus if the difference in this 
percentage between municipalities will become smaller this will lead to 
smaller differences in the TFR. However, the other demographic variable (viz. 
ethnicity) has an opposite effect. Since this variable has an upward effect on 
the level of the TFR, convergence of the percentage of foreign women (due 
to a stronger increase of this percentage in small municipalities than in large 
municipalities) would lead to diverging trends in the level of the TFR. As the 
FRHI¿FLHQWRIWKHKRXVHKROGYDULDEOHH[FHHGVWKDWRIWKHHWKQLFLW\YDULDEOH
one may expect that the former effect will be larger than the latter (assuming 
that the change in the percentage of ethnic women is not considerably larger 
than the change in the percentage of women living alone). Consequently, 
if demographic differences between large and small cities would become 
smaller, this can be expected to lead to some convergence in the TFR, 
although the total effect will be only moderate due to the effects in opposing 
directions. However, one may question whether it is likely that demographic 
differences between small and large cities will become smaller. Selective 
migration may cause differences in the population structure to be persistent. If 
couples wanting to raise a family move to non-urban regions whereas singles 
move to large cities, the differences in the household structure between large 
and small cities may not tend to decline. Similarly, if new immigrants move 
to cities where already many ethnic groups are living, the differences in 
the ethnic structure may not become smaller either. Furthermore one may 
expect the level of fertility of ethnic groups to decline in the future due to 
the integration of ethnic groups in society. This would lead to a lower value 
RIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWRIWKHHWKQLFYDULDEOH&RQVHTXHQWO\WKH7)5LQ
large cities would decline, causing a bigger difference in the TFR between 
large and small cities. Summing up, it can be concluded that demographic 
changes are not expected to lead to smaller differences in the TFR between 
large and small cities.
The main effect of the socioeconomic variables is that of the percentage of 
SHRSOHUHFHLYLQJVRFLDOEHQH¿WV,QWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQLWZDVVKRZQWKDWWKH
effect of this variable on the difference in the TFR between small and large 
cities is not so much caused by differences in the value of this explanatory 
variable but rather by the difference in the size of the effect (i.e. the value 
RIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQW7KLVLVGXHWRWKHIDFWWKDWWKLVYDULDEOHKDVD
larger impact on the TFR of small municipalities than that of large ones. This 
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implies that if the difference in the percentage of people receiving social 
EHQH¿WVEHWZHHQVPDOODQGODUJHFLWLHVZRXOGUHGXFHDQGWKHYDOXHRIWKH
UHJUHVVLRQ FRHI¿FLHQW ZRXOG QRW FKDQJH WKLV ZRXOG KDYH RQO\PRGHUDWH
effect on the difference in TFR.
The three cultural variables have effects in the same direction. However, 
as cultural differences do not tend to change quickly, they may not lead to 
a strong convergence of the TFR in the near future. But in the long run one 
might expect this variable to lead to some convergence of the TFR. For 
example, if the percentage of orthodox Calvinists in a small municipality 
will drop by ten percent, the TFR is expected to decrease by .12. In addition, 
the effect of the level of the TFR in the past may lead to a decrease in future 
differences in the TFR as there has been some convergence in the TFR during 
the past decades. In 1969 the TFR in small cities was .3 higher than in large 
cities, whereas around 2000 the difference was .1. However, according to the 
model the effect of this decrease on the future difference of the TFR between 
VPDOODQGODUJHFLWLHVZLOORQO\EHPRGHUDWHVLQFHWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQW
is relatively small. For the next 30 years the effect of the past decrease in the 
difference in the TFR will be a reduction of the average TFR for small cities 
by .02. 
Finally the model includes a number of parameters that take account of 
other effects than those of the explanatory variables. First, the intercept 
differs between small and large cities. This implies that the relatively high 
fertility in small cities cannot be completely explained by the demographic, 
socioeconomic and cultural variables. In the absence of a clear explanation 
LWLVREYLRXVO\GLI¿FXOWWRDUJXHZKHWKHUDIXWXUHUHGXFWLRQRIWKLVGLIIHUHQFH
can be expected. True, as remarked above, in the last decades we have seen 
a reduction of the difference in the TFR, but that does not necessarily imply 
that a further reduction should be expected. Note that the effect of the past 
reduction in the TFR on the future level is already accounted for as the 
differences of the TFR in the past are included in the model as explanatory 
variable. Moreover, as Sobotka and Adigüzel (2002) show, regional variation 
in the TFR declined in the 1970s and 1980s, but has hardly changed in the 
1990s. Second, the model includes regional dummies indicating that three 
UHJLRQVKDYHORZHUIHUWLOLW\DQG¿YHUHJLRQVKDYHKLJKHUIHUWLOLW\WKDQZRXOG
be expected on the basis of the values of the explanatory variables. As 
discussed in the previous section, the difference of the TFR in these regions 
with the national average has declined considerably more slowly than in other 
regions. This suggests that these differences may be rather persistent, even 
though the size of the differences has diminished during the last decades. 
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Summing up these arguments it can be concluded that even though some 
convergence of the TFR may be expected, it seems likely that it will be only 
slowly and moderately, and therefore differences in the TFR between large 
and small cities are likely to be rather persistent.
4.7. Conclusions
Even though there are considerable differences in the level of the TFR 
between Dutch municipalities, current differences are smaller than they were 
in the 1970s and 1980s. This chapter is aimed to answer the question whether 
differences will decline further until convergence will be reached or whether 
differences between municipalities may be expected to be persistent. In 
order to answer this question we developed a model explaining differences 
in the TFR between municipalities. The model includes demographic, 




differences in values. Since these variables are not capable of explaining all 
systematic regional variations in the TFR, regional dummies are added to 
the model. In 2 of the 12 regions at the NUTS II level fertility turns out to be 
higher than would be expected on the basis of the values of the explanatory 
variables for the municipalities in those regions; moreover in 3 of the 40 
regions at the NUTS III level fertility is relatively high, whereas in another 
3 regions fertility is low.
The model explains two thirds of the variance of the TFR in the almost 500 
municipalities of the Netherlands. Differences in the TFR between large 
and small cities can be attributed to both differences in the determinants and 
to differences in the relationship between the determinants and fertility. In 
order to assess the size of these differences, the model is estimated separately 
for small and large municipalities. In small municipalities the TFR is .1 
higher than in large municipalities. Looking at the difference that can be 
explained by differences in the values of the explanatory variables the two 
demographic variables (the household structure and the ethnic structure) turn 
out to have opposite effects. The differences in the cultural variables turn 
out to have a larger effect than the other two types of variables. As to the 
GLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWVWKHPDLQGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQVPDOO
and large cities concerns a socioeconomic variable. The percentage of the 
SRSXODWLRQUHFHLYLQJVRFLDOEHQH¿WVKDVDPXFKODUJHULPSDFWLQVPDOOFLWLHV
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than in larger ones. If we take both types of differences together, it turns out 
that the .10 difference in the TFR between large and small municipalities is 
made up of a difference by .06 that can be explained by the demographic 
YDULDEOHVE\WKHFXOWXUDOYDULDEOHVDQGE\QRWVSHFL¿HGGLIIHUHQFHV
whereas the socioeconomic variables have an opposite effect of .07. In all 
eight regions included in the model the TFR in the past already differed in the 
same direction. In those regions the difference of the TFR with the national 
average has declined much more slowly than in other regions.
Since the two demographic variables included in the model have opposite 
effects on the difference in the TFR between small and large municipalities, 
even if the demographic variables would converge, this would not lead to 
a complete convergence of the TFR. Moreover, due to selective migration 
one may question whether strong convergence of the demographic variables 
is likely. Thus demographic trends cannot be expected to lead to strong 
convergence of the TFR. The effect of the main socioeconomic variable is 
not so much caused by differences in the value of the explanatory variable 
EXWUDWKHUE\WKHGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHVL]HRIWKHUHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQW,IWKH
difference in the value of this variable between small and large cities would 
UHGXFHDQG WKHYDOXHRI WKH UHJUHVVLRQFRHI¿FLHQWZRXOGQRW FKDQJH WKLV
would have only moderate effect on the difference in TFR. As cultural 
differences do not tend to change quickly, they may not lead to a strong 
convergence of the TFR in the near future either, but in the long run one 
might expect this variable to lead to some convergence of the TFR. In 
addition, one should take into account the differences in the TFR that cannot 
be explained by the selected variables. As in the three regions with relatively 
ORZIHUWLOLW\DQGWKH¿YHUHJLRQVZLWKUHODWLYHO\KLJKIHUWLOLW\WKHGLIIHUHQFH
of the TFR with the national average has declined considerably less than in 
other regions, these differences may be assumed to be rather persistent in 
the future. In conclusion, even though some convergence of the TFR may 
be expected, it is not likely to be quick and strong and thus differences in the 
TFR between small and large cities may be expected to be rather persistent. 
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Abstract
$JHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV FDQ EH VPRRWKHG XVLQJ SDUDPHWULF PRGHOV RU
splines. Alternatively a relational model can be used which relates the age 
SUR¿OH WR EH ¿WWHG RU SURMHFWHG WR D VWDQGDUG DJH VFKHGXOH7KLV FKDSWHU
introduces TOPALS (tool for projecting age patterns using linear splines), a 
new relational method that is less dependent on the choice of the standard age 
schedule than previous methods. TOPALS models the relationship between 
WKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVWREH¿WWHGDQGWKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHE\D
OLQHDUVSOLQH7KLVFKDSWHUXVHV723$/6IRUVPRRWKLQJIHUWLOLW\DJHSUR¿OHV
for 30 European countries. The use of TOPALS to create scenarios of the 
future level and age pattern of fertility is illustrated by applying the method 
to project future fertility rates for six European countries. 
5.1. Introduction
In order to make population projections, assumptions need to be based on 
WKH IXWXUH YDOXHV RI DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV LQ DGGLWLRQ WR DVVXPSWLRQV
DERXWPRUWDOLW\DQGPLJUDWLRQ'XHWRUDQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQVLQIHUWLOLW\UDWHV
over time, assumptions based on extrapolation from past changes in each 
DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWH WHQG WR UHVXOW LQ HUUDWLF DJH SDWWHUQV0RUHRYHU
such a procedure does not take into account the fact that changes in fertility 
rates which are caused by changes in the timing of fertility are temporary. 
3RVWSRQHPHQWRIIHUWLOLW\ZLOO¿UVWOHDGWRDGHFOLQHLQDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\
rates at young ages, then some time later to an increase at older ages. After a 
certain period the decline at young ages will come to an end, then some time 
later the increase at older ages will stop. Thus past trends will not continue 
forever. For these reasons assumptions about future fertility may be based 
on a parameterized model age schedule rather than by projecting individual 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVVHSDUDWHO\7KHSDUDPHWHUVRIWKHPRGHOVFKHGXOH
PD\ UHÀHFW WKH OHYHO DQG WLPLQJ RI IHUWLOLW\ 7KLV PHDQV WKDW WKH PRGHO
schedule can be used to make assumptions about the extent to which both 
the level and the timing of fertility may change. A large number of model 
age schedules for fertility have been developed. One reason why so many 
models have been developed is that most of them do not accurately describe 
age patterns of fertility for all countries in all periods. 
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There are two main criteria for assessing the usefulness of a method for 
VPRRWKLQJDJHSUR¿OHVWKHDFFXUDF\RIWKH¿WRIWKHPRGHOWRWKHGDWDDQGWKH
possibility of interpreting the values of the parameters. There is a trade-off. 
As many model age schedules turn out not to provide a very accurate 
description of the age pattern for all ages, the model may be adjusted by 
the introduction of additional parameters. However, this may hamper the 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ1RQSDUDPHWULFPHWKRGVVXFKDVVSOLQHVDUHPRUHÀH[LEOH
than parametric models and are therefore capable of describing all kinds of 
age patterns. However, they lack interpretable parameters. One alternative 
approach is to use a relational method: that is, a method in which the age 
pattern is related to one standard age schedule. The function specifying this 
relationship indicates the way in which the age pattern under study differs 
from the standard age schedule. 
The idea of modelling deviations from a standard age schedule was 
developed by Brass (1974). Brass assumes a linear relationship between a 
GRXEOHORJDULWKPLFWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKHDJHSDWWHUQWREH¿WWHGDQGDGRXEOH
logarithmic transformation of a standard age schedule. One problem with 
this approach is that the values of the parameters lack a clear demographic 
interpretation. Another problem with using only two parameters (slope and 
LQWHUFHSWLVWKDWWKHDFFXUDF\RIWKH¿WGHSHQGVKHDYLO\RQWKHFKRLFHRIWKH
standard age schedule. If in one or more age intervals there is some deviation 
EHWZHHQ WKH DJH SDWWHUQ WR EH ¿WWHG DQG WKH VWDQGDUG DJH VFKHGXOHV WZR
parameters are not enough. This article introduces the new relational method 
TOPALS (tool for projecting age patterns using linear splines), which is more 
ÀH[LEOHWKDQWKH%UDVVPHWKRGSURGXFHVDEHWWHU¿WDQGLVHDVLHUWRLQWHUSUHW
TOPALS is capable of describing all kinds of age curves. The parameters 
can be interpreted easily. TOPALS models the age pattern of the ratios of 
WKHDJHVSHFL¿FUDWHVWREH¿WWHGDQGWKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHE\DOLQHDU
spline. The standard age pattern may be the average age pattern of a group of 
countries (e.g., the EU average). For making projections, this may be useful 
LIRQHDVVXPHVIXWXUHFRQYHUJHQFHRIDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVRIGLIIHUHQW
countries to an average pattern. It is also possible to use the age pattern of 
another country as standard. This may be a ‘forerunner’ country and one may 
DVVXPHWKDWWKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVRIGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHVZLOOPRYHLQ
the direction of that of the forerunner country. Alternatively the standard age 
pattern may be a model age schedule, such as the Hadwiger, Beta, or Gamma 
function. TOPALS can be used for making projections of future changes in 
DJHVSHFL¿FUDWHVE\VSHFLI\LQJDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWFKDQJHVLQWKHYDOXHVRI
the ratios of the age pattern to be projected and the standard age schedule for 
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successive age intervals. For example, if the standard age schedule is that of 
a forerunner country, one can assume that the future values of the rate ratios 
for other countries will move towards one. 
The second section of this chapter presents a short overview of previous 
studies on modelling age patterns. We distinguish between parametric 
models, splines and relational methods. Section 5.3 describes TOPALS. 
Section 5.4 applies TOPALS in order to smooth age patterns of fertility for 
30 European countries. The results of TOPALS are compared with those 
for six other methods. Section 5.5 describes how TOPALS may be used for 
FUHDWLQJVFHQDULRVRIIXWXUHYDOXHVRIDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV6HFWLRQ
concludes the chapter and discusses some other possible applications of 
TOPALS. 
5.2. 0HWKRGVIRU¿WWLQJDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV
There is an extensive literature on parametric age schedules describing the 
typical age pattern of fertility (e.g., Hoem et al. 1981; Rogers 1986; Booth 
2006; Peristera and Kostaki 2007). Even though the general age pattern of 
fertility has been similar across many countries for many decades, there are 
important differences as well. As a consequence most model age schedules 
do not describe the fertility rates at each part of the age range accurately for 
all countries in all periods. For that reason various authors have proposed 
variations to the ‘traditional’ models such as the Beta, Gamma and Hadwiger 
models. One alternative is to use non-parametric models such as splines. 
7KH\SURYLGH DQ DFFXUDWH¿W IRU DOO NLQGVRI DJHSDWWHUQ+RZHYHU VLQFH
they do not include parameters that can be interpreted, these methods are 
less useful for making assumptions about future fertility as an input for 
population projections. One alternative is to specify a spline in such a way 
that the parameters can be interpreted (Schmertmann, 2003). Another is 
to develop a relational model in which the age pattern of a given country 
LVUHODWHGWRDVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOH7KHUHODWLRQVKLSVSHFL¿HVWKHZD\LQ
which the age pattern differs from the standard age schedule. 
5.2.1. Parametric models 
This section describes the three most frequently used parametric models for 
¿WWLQJIHUWLOLW\DJHSDWWHUQVWKH+DGZLJHU%HWDDQG*DPPDPRGHOV+RHP
et al., 1981 and Booth 2006). In addition a recently developed parametric 
method will be discussed (Peristera and Kostaki, 2007). 
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One of the earliest models proposed in the literature is the Hadwiger 

















abxf    (1)
where I[ is the fertility rate at age x of the mother and a, b, and c are the three 
parameters to be estimated. Parameter a is associated with the total level of 
fertility, parameter b determines the height of the curve, and parameter c is 
related to the mean age at motherhood. Even though the parameters have 
a demographic interpretation, they indicate a direction of change only and 
their actual values are not directly interpretable. A higher value of a indicates 
that the total fertility level is higher. But the value of a does not equal the 
YDOXHRIWKHWRWDOIHUWLOLW\UDWH7)5)RUH[DPSOHLQ¿WWLQJWKH+DGZLJHU
IXQFWLRQWRDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVLQ(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVLQZH
¿QGWKDWa ranges from 0.75 in Hungary (where the TFR equals 1.35) to 1.24 
in Iceland (where the TFR equals 2.15). A linear regression of the values of 
a and the TFR shows that TFR equals 1.76*a. The value of c turns out to be 
very close to the mean age at childbearing. The value of DEF is related to the 
PRGDODJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWH&KDQGROD&ROHPDQDQG+LRUQVEXW
this does not make the value of b itself easily interpretable and so is not very 
helpful in making assumptions about fertility. 
In several European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Spain, fertility at young ages is higher than would be expected according to 
the Hadwiger function. For that reason Chandola, Coleman and Hiorns (1999) 
propose an extension of the Hadwiger function for describing the bulge in 
fertility at young ages. They assume that the relatively high fertility level at 
\RXQJDJHVUHÀHFWVKHWHURJHQHLW\LQWKHSRSXODWLRQUHODWHGWRWKHHGXFDWLRQDO
level and social status of the mothers, as well as to ethnic differences in 
the timing and level of fertility. They distinguish two subpopulations with 
a different timing and level of fertility. They describe this pattern by a 
mixture model: That is, they replace the right-hand side of equation (1) by 
the weighted sum of two similar terms which describe the age patterns of the 
two subpopulations. 
The Gamma function is given by:










   for x > d   (2)
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where R determines the level of fertility and d the minimum age at 
childbearing. The Gamma function is equivalent to the Pearson Type III 
model which was applied by George et al. (2004) to Canadian data. Hoem 
et al. (1981) show how the parameters b and c are related to the mode, mean 
and variance of the function but not in a simple, linear way and so they do 
not have a direct demographic interpretation. 
The Beta function is given by: 
    





BARf EDE  for Į<x<ȕ  (3)
where R determines the level of fertility. The Beta function is equivalent 
to the Pearson Type I curve proposed by Romaniuk (1973) and Mitra and 
Romaniuk (1973). Hoem et al., (1981) state that Į and ȕ represent lower 
and upper age limits of fertility, but Peristera and Kostaki (2007) show that 
in several cases the value of ȕ far exceeds the maximum age. Hoem et al. 
(1981) show that A and B are related to the mean and variance, but not in a 
simple, easily interpretable way. 
Peristera and Kostaki (2007) note that the form of the fertility curve has 
changed in recent years in various countries, as did Chandola, Coleman and 
+LRUQVEHIRUHWKHP3HULVWHUDDQG.RVWDNLSURSRVHDÀH[LEOH
PRGHOWKDWGHVFULEHVERWKWKHVWDQGDUGDQGWKHGLVWRUWHGDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\
pattern in countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain. Their 
basic model resembles the normal distribution but is asymmetrical, as the 
spread before and after the peak differs: 







where ı[ = ı11 if xμ and ı[ = ı12 if x > μ and c1, μ, ı11 and ı12 are 
the parameters to be estimated. The parameter c1 is associated with the total 
fertility rate, μ is the modal age of fertility and ı11 and ı12UHÀHFWWKHVSUHDGRI
WKHGLVWULEXWLRQEHIRUHDQGDIWHULWVSHDNUHVSHFWLYHO\,QRUGHUWR¿WIHUWLOLW\
curves with high fertility at a young age Peristera and Kostaki (2007) add a 
second term: 















xcxcxf    (5)
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where c1 and c2 UHÀHFW WKH OHYHO RI IHUWLOLW\ DW WKH ¿UVW DQG VHFRQG SHDN
respectively, μ1 and μ2 are related to the mean age of the two subpopulations 
and ı1 and ı2 UHÀHFW WKH VSUHDG DURXQG WKH WZRKXPSV(YHQ WKRXJK WKH
parameters are related to the level, mean age, and spread of the fertility curve, 
WKHDFWXDOYDOXHVRIWKHSDUDPHWHUVDUHGLI¿FXOWWRLQWHUSUHW)RUH[DPSOHLQ
¿WWLQJPRGHOWRIHUWLOLW\GDWDRIYDULRXV(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVWKHHVWLPDWH
of c1 varies from 0.09 in Italy to 0.15 in Denmark. Although there is a positive 
correlation between c1 and the TFR, the correlation is certainly not perfect. If 
model (4) is estimated for 30 European countries, the value of c1 explains not 
more than 80 percent of the variance in the TFR across European countries. 
Gayawan et al. (2010) propose the Adjusted Error Model for modelling 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV LQ$IULFDQFRXQWULHV7KLVPRGHO LVYHU\VLPLODU
to equation (5): they assume c1 = c2 and they add an intercept to the model.
One conclusion that applies for all parametric models is that even though 
the values of the parameters are related to the level, mean age, and variance 
of the functions, the values are not equal to well-known demographic 
indicators such as the TFR and the mean age at childbearing. This hampers 
interpretation of the parameters and limits their usefulness for creating 
demographic scenarios. Moreover one simple model with a limited number 
of parameters does not describe adequately the variety of age patterns of 
fertility across countries in different periods. Therefore several complex 
models including more parameters are needed. 
5.2.2. Splines 
Instead of specifying a statistical model, one may use a non-parametric 
model for smoothing age patterns of fertility. The structure of a 
QRQSDUDPHWULF PRGHO LV QRW VSHFL¿HG D SULRUL EXW LV GHWHUPLQHG IURP
the data. Non-parametric does not mean that the model does not include 
SDUDPHWHUVEXWWKDWWKHQXPEHURISDUDPHWHUVLVQRW¿[HGLQDGYDQFHDQG
that the parameters lack a clear statistical interpretation. There are several 
approaches to estimating non-parametric models. The most widely applied 





of the third-degree polynomial is less accurate than that of a cubic spline, 
which is a piecewise cubic function (Hoem et al., 1981). Cubic splines are 
YHU\ÀH[LEOH0F1HLO7UXVVHOODQG7XUQHUDQG*LONV$FXELF
spline can be described by: 
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where Dj = 0 if x – mkj and Dj = 1 otherwise, m is the minimum age, x
m, kj are the knots, n is the number of knots, a, b, c and djDUHWKHFRHI¿FLHQWV
to be estimated. 
A quadratic spline is a piecewise quadratic function that can be described by: 









where Dj = 0 if x – mkj and Dj = 1 otherwise, m is the minimum age, x
m, kj are the knots, n is the number of knots, a, b and cjDUHWKHFRHI¿FLHQWV
WREHHVWLPDWHG%RWKDTXDGUDWLFDQGDFXELFVSOLQHFDQSURYLGHDJRRG¿W
In general a quadratic spline may require more knots than a cubic spline 
WR SURYLGH DQ DFFXUDWH ¿W )RU ERWK WKH TXDGUDWLF DQG FXELF VSOLQHV WKH
FRHI¿FLHQWVFDQEHHVWLPDWHGE\2UGLQDU\/HDVW6TXDUHV2/6LIWKHNQRWV
DUH¿[HGDSULRUL2WKHUZLVHDQLWHUDWLYHHVWLPDWLRQSURFHGXUHLVQHHGHGIRU
example, a non-linear least squares method. 
Kostaki et al. (2009) propose a new non-parametric method: support vector 
PDFKLQHV690(YHQ WKRXJK WKLVSURYLGHVDJRRG¿W LWVXVHIXOQHVV IRU
SURMHFWLQJDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVVHHPOLPLWHG690PRGHOVDUHPRUH
complex than splines. Since quadratic and cubic splines are capable of 
SURGXFLQJ D JRRG ¿W DVZHOO WKH TXHVWLRQ LVZK\ XVH 690V UDWKHU WKDQ
splines. 
2QHSUREOHP LQXVLQJ VSOLQHV LV WKDW WKHYDOXHVRI WKH FRHI¿FLHQWV ODFND
clear interpretation. For that reason, even though splines provide an accurate 
¿W WKH\DUHQRWYHU\VXLWDEOHIRUVSHFLI\LQJDVVXPSWLRQVDERXW WKHYDOXHV
RI DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV IRU SRSXODWLRQ VFHQDULRV )RU WKDW UHDVRQ
6FKPHUWPDQQSURSRVHV¿WWLQJVSOLQHVE\FKRRVLQJDVNQRWVSDUWLFXODU
DJHVWKDWFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHG6FKPHUWPDQQ¿WVWKHDJHSDWWHUQRIIHUWLOLW\E\
a quadratic spline including four knots, which means that the age schedule 
LV GHVFULEHG E\ ¿YH TXDGUDWLF SLHFHV 7KLVZRXOG UHTXLUH  SDUDPHWHUV
However, Schmertmann reduces the number of parameters by determining 
WKHNQRWVIRUVSHFL¿FDJHV7KH\RXQJHVWDJHDWZKLFKIHUWLOLW\UDWHVDUHDERYH
zero, the age at which fertility reaches its peak level, and the youngest age 
above the peak age at which fertility falls to half its peak level. Furthermore 
the value of the overall level of fertility is included. Schmertmann imposes 
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UHVWULFWLRQVRQWKHYDOXHVRIWKHFRHI¿FLHQWVRIWKHTXDGUDWLFVSOLQHLQVXFK
a way that the resulting function describes the typical form of the fertility 
curve. The Schmertmann method improves the usefulness of splines for 
making projections. However, it is questionable whether one of the indicators, 
the age at which fertility falls to half its peak level, really has an obvious 
demographic interpretation. One general conclusion is that non-parametric 
PRGHOVSURYLGHDEHWWHU¿WWKDQSDUDPHWULFPRGHOV7KHODWWHUDUHVPRRWKHU
DQGWKXVDUHQRWFDSDEOHRIGHVFULELQJYDULRXVVSHFL¿FSDWWHUQVDWFHUWDLQDJHV
However, the usefulness of non-parametric methods for making projections 
or creating scenarios is limited, as they lack easily interpretable parameters.
5.2.3. Relational methods 
)HUWLOLW\ DJH VFKHGXOHV FDQ EH ¿WWHG E\ VSHFLI\LQJ KRZ WKH DJHVSHFL¿F
fertility rates in a particular country deviate from some standard age schedule. 
&RDOHDQG7UXVVHOOPRGHOOHGDJHVSHFL¿FPDULWDOIHUWLOLW\UDWHVDVWKH
product of two model age schedules: a nuptiality schedule and a marital 
fertility schedule. The parameters of the model indicate to what extent the 
DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV IRUDSDUWLFXODUFRXQWU\GHYLDWH IURP WKHPRGHO
age schedules. In the 1970s this model performed rather well (Hoem et al. 
1981 and Rogers, 1986). However, since the 1980s extramarital fertility has 
increased in many countries. For that reason the usefulness of modelling 
marital fertility has decreased. 
Brass (1974) presents a more general relational method in which fertility 
rates can be related to any fertility age schedule as long as it captures the 
JHQHUDOVKDSHRIWKHDJHSDWWHUQRIIHUWLOLW\WREH¿WWHG7KH%UDVVUHODWLRQDO
method is based on the assumption that the (cumulative) age pattern of 




that this standard age schedule can be described by a Gompertz distribution 
as well, there is a linear relationship between the log-log transformation of 
WKHUDWHVWREH¿WWHGDQGWKDWRIWKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOH
*
xx QQ ED   (8)
where Qx = ln ( ln f(x)) and *xQ = ln ( ln f 
*(x)); f(x)  are the 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVWREH¿WWHGDQGI[ are the fertility rates according 
to the standard age schedule. The parameters Į and ȕ can be estimated by 
OLS regression. Even though the basic assumption underlying the method 
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is that rates can be described by a Gompertz distribution, Brass and others 
KDYHVKRZQWKDWYDULRXVW\SHVRIDJHSUR¿OHPD\EHXVHGDVWKHVWDQGDUG
age schedule, including observed rates from another country, as long as 
the standard schedule represents the general age pattern of the rates to be 
¿WWHG=HQJ<Let al., 2000). In addition to using the relational model as an 
instrument for making projections, the model can also be used for making 
HVWLPDWHV RI DJHVSHFL¿F UDWHV IRU FRXQWULHV ZLWK LQFRPSOHWH GDWD 7KH
parameters Į and ȕ can be interpreted as follows: Į determines the location 
of fertility and ȕ the spread. Thus Į indicates whether the age pattern lies to 
the right or left of the standard age schedule and ȕ determines whether the 
age pattern is more or less dispersed than the standard.
Zeng Yi et al. (2000) note that even though the parameters Į and ȕ can be 
interpreted, in practice they do not turn out to be very useful for making 
projections of demographic rates for the future. The main reason is that 
the values Į of ȕ and are not comparable over time and regions, as they 
depend on the choice of the standard age schedule, and in order to have an 
RSWLPDO¿WWKHFKRLFHRIVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHVPD\YDU\DFURVVWLPHDQG
space. Moreover, changes in the values of Į and ȕ lack a clear demographic 
interpretation. They indicate the direction of change only. For example, if 
the age curve is assumed to move to the right, the value of Į should become 
larger. But it is not clear by how much. For that reason Zeng Yi et al. (2000) 
propose an alternative method for the estimation of Į and ȕ. They show that 
the value of ȕ equals the ratio of the interquartile ranges of the standard age 
VFKHGXOHDQGWKDWRI WKHDJHSDWWHUQWREH¿WWHG7KHYDOXHRIĮ is related 
to the median age. Zeng Yi et al. demonstrate that this model is capable of 
GHVFULELQJYDULRXVXQLPRGDODJHSDWWHUQVQDPHO\ IHUWLOLW\¿UVWPDUULDJH
divorce, remarriage, and leaving the parental home. They use Chinese, 
)UHQFK6ZHGLVKDQG86GDWD7KH\XVHWKHPRGHOIRU¿WWLQJDJHSDWWHUQV
based on both a standard age pattern from an earlier period and a standard 
pattern from another country. 
One main advantage of the method proposed by Zeng Yi et al. is its simplicity. 
Once an appropriate standard age schedule is available, one needs to estimate 
WKHYDOXHVRIRQO\WZRSDUDPHWHUV2QHSUREOHPLVWKDWWKHJRRGQHVVRI¿W





extrapolate changes over time. 
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For that reason the present chapter proposes an alternative method that is 
PRUH ÀH[LEOH WKDQ WKH %UDVV UHODWLRQDO PHWKRG 723$/6 )OH[LELOLW\ LV
achieved by introducing more parameters. However, this does not make the 
parameters harder to interpret. The parameters simply indicate the extent to 
ZKLFKWKHDJHSDWWHUQWREH¿WWHGGLIIHUVIURPWKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHLQ
successive age intervals. Since for different points in time the parameters 
may refer to the same standard age schedule they can be used for analysing 
changes over time and therefore become the basis for extrapolations into the 
future. 
5.3. TOPALS
We assume that a standard age schedule of fertility rates is given. The age 
SUR¿OH IRU D JLYHQ FRXQWU\ FDQEH HVWLPDWHGRQ WKHEDVLV RI UDWLRVRI WKH
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVRIWKDWFRXQWU\DQGWKRVHDFFRUGLQJWRWKHVWDQGDUG
age schedule. The rate ratio at age x is:
      
)(
)()( * xf
xfxr   (9)
where I[ is the fertility rate at age x according to the standard age schedule. 
The age pattern of the ratios can be described by a linear spline function. This 
is a piecewise linear curve. The ages at which the successive linear segments 
are connected are called ‘knots’. The ratios at each age can be estimated by 
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where Dj = 0 if x – mkj and Dj = 1 otherwise, m is the minimum age, x
m, kj are the knots, n is the number of knots, a and bj are the parameters to 
be estimated. 
7KLVPRGHOFDQEHHVWLPDWHGLQVHYHUDOZD\V7KHNQRWVFDQEH¿[HGDSULRUL
e.g. on the basis of visual inspection of the age pattern of the rate ratios. 
$OWHUQDWLYHO\WKH\FDQEHFKRVHQLQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKH¿WRIWKHOLQHDUVSOLQH
to the data is optimal. In the latter case a non-linear estimation method is 
required, e.g. a non-linear least squares method. If the location of the knots is 




m«k1 the slope equals â + 0b

 , in the second age interval k1+1«k2, the 
slope equals  â + 0b

  +  1b

 , etc.  It is much easier to interpret the levels of 
WKHUDWHUDWLRVDWVSHFL¿FDJHVWKDQWKHVXFFHVVLYHVORSHVLQWKHDJHLQWHUYDOV
Thus from the regression estimates one can calculate the values of rˆ [ at the 
knots. These can be used as a basis for making projections. Alternatively the 
linear spline can be estimated in a more simple and straightforward way by 
assuming that at the knots the values of the spline equal the observed values. 
,WWXUQVRXWWKDWWKLVSURYLGHVD¿WWKDWLVYHU\FORVHWRWKHRQHSURGXFHGE\
applying OLS. Thus we assume that rˆ P= UP, rˆ N1 = UN1, rˆ N2 = UN2, 
etc. Then the values of a, bj can be estimated by substituting the values of rˆ




       
For the ages above the last knot we assume that the slope equals zero. 
Alternatively one might assume that the slope above the last knot equals 
that before the last knot. Since fertility rates at high ages are small this 
FKRLFHKDUGO\DIIHFWVWKHUHVXOWV,QFRQWUDVWZKHQXVLQJ723$/6WR¿WRWKHU
VFKHGXOHVVXFKDVDJHVSHFL¿FPRUWDOLW\VFKHGXOHVWKLVFKRLFHZRXOGPDNHD
difference. In those cases it is an empirical question which choice one would 
make. 
7KHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVDUHHVWLPDWHGE\PXOWLSO\LQJWKHUDWLRVZKLFK
are estimated by the linear spline function rˆ [E\WKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\
rates according to the model age schedule I[:
 (12)
In the application of TOPALS in the next section we will select the knots by 
minimizing the sum of squared differences between fˆ [ and I[ by means 
of a non-linear least squares method. We apply a grid search where for each 
set of knots we calculate the values of a and bj by solving equation (11) 
rather than by applying OLS. 
)()(ˆ)(ˆ * xfxrxf  . 

































The standard age curve can be the average of several countries (for 
example, the EU average), the age curve of another country (for example, 
a ‘forerunner’ country), the age curve of the same country in a previous 
year, or a model age schedule. Using the estimated rate ratios for making 
SURMHFWLRQV RQ IXWXUH YDOXHV RI DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV WZR DOWHUQDWLYH
procedures may be followed. First, for each country one may calculate a time 
VHULHVRIUDWHUDWLRVE\GLYLGLQJWKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVIRUVXFFHVVLYH
years by a standard age schedule which is assumed to be the ‘target’ age 
pattern to be reached in the long run. This may be the age schedule of a 
forerunner country. The time series of rate ratios shows whether and, if so, 
KRZUDSLGO\ WKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVRI WKHGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHVPRYH
into the direction of the fertility rates of the forerunner country. A partial 
adjustment model can be used to project the future values of the rate ratios. 
This can be considered as a quite ‘objective’ method. The choice of the 
µWDUJHW¶YDOXHVRI WKHDJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHVPD\EH VXEMHFWLYHEXW WKH
parameter of the partial adjustment model estimated for some historical 
period determines how rapidly the rate ratios will move towards one and thus 
ZKHWKHUWKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVZLOOUHDFKWKHµWDUJHW¶YDOXHVEHIRUH
VRPHVSHFL¿FIRUHFDVWKRUL]RQ6HFRQGRQHPD\IROORZDPRUHVXEMHFWLYH
approach by making assumptions about the future values of the rate ratios for 
selected ages based on qualitative arguments. For example, if the standard 
age schedule is the average pattern over a number of countries, for each 
separate country one may make assumptions about the extent to which one 
assumes that the fertility rates at different age ranges will remain different 
from the average or will move towards the average values. In section 5.5 
we will demonstrate both procedures for using TOPALS to create scenarios. 
5.4. 6PRRWKLQJDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV
:H LOOXVWUDWH WKH XVH RI723$/6E\¿WWLQJ DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV IRU
30 European countries: the 27 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom) plus Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. We label 
these 30 European countries as the EU27+3 countries. The data are obtained 
from the database of Eurostat, which is available online (Eurostat, 2010). At 
the time of writing data for 2008 were available for 27 countries. For Italy 
the most recent data were from 2007, for the United Kingdom from 2006, 
and for Belgium from 2005. 
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:HFDOFXODWHGXQZHLJKWHG DQGZHLJKWHG DYHUDJHV RI DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\
rates for the EU27+3 countries. Rather than using total population size of 
each country as weights, we calculated the weighted average by weighing 
the fertility rates for each country by the number of women aged 15-44 
years. The TFR based on the unweighted average of the EU27+3 countries 
equals 1.61, while that based on the weighted average equals 1.58. 
The values of the TFR range from 1.32 in Slovakia to 2.15 in Iceland. Most 
countries in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe have a TFR between 1.3 
and 1.5, whereas most Northern and Western European countries have a TFR 
above 1.6. In the remainder of this chapter we will use weighted averages. 
Figure 5.1 VKRZVWKHXQZHLJKWHGDQGZHLJKWHGDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVIRU
the EU27+3 countries for the year 2008. Since several large EU countries, 
such as Germany and Italy, have relatively low fertility rates among women in 
their 20s or early 30s, the peak of the weighted average age pattern of fertility 
rates is lower than that of the unweighted average. Figure 5.2 compares 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVRIVL[(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVZLWKWKHDYHUDJHRIWKH
EU27+3: Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland and United Kingdom. 
7KHVHFRXQWULHVDUHVHOHFWHGDVWKH\UHÀHFWGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHOHYHODQGDJH
pattern of fertility rates in different parts of Europe. The three Northern 
)LJXUH$JHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVDYHUDJHRI(8FRXQWULHV
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and Western countries, Denmark, the United Kingdom and France, have 
an above average TFR. But there are clear differences in the age pattern of 
fertility rates across these three countries. Whereas in Denmark fertility rates 
at young ages (under 23 years) are below the European average, those in the 
8QLWHG.LQJGRPDUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\KLJKHU7KHDJHSDWWHUQVRI'HQPDUNDQG
France are much more peaked than that of the United Kingdom. The peak 
in France is at slightly younger ages than the European average. The other 
three countries, Germany, Italy and Poland, have below average TFR. In 
*HUPDQ\WKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVDWDOODJHVDUHEHORZWKH(XURSHDQ
average, whereas in Italy the fertility rates at ages 32 or under are lower than 
the European average, but at older ages they are higher. In Poland fertility 
rates at younger ages are relatively high, but at ages 27 or above are very low. 
Figure 5.3 VKRZV WKH UDWH UDWLRV WKDW LV WKH UDWLRV RI WKH DJHVSHFL¿F
fertility rates of these six countries to the EU27+3 average. The solid lines 
VKRZFOHDUO\WKDWWKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVRI
individual countries and the European average vary by age. Thus in addition 
WRGLIIHUHQFHVLQWKHRYHUDOOOHYHORIIHUWLOLW\DVUHÀHFWHGE\GLIIHUHQFHVLQWKH
TFR, there are differences in the age pattern. Usually differences in the age 
pattern are described by the mean age at childbearing. However, differences 
in the mean age do not capture all differences in the age pattern. The average 
age at childbearing of the EU27+3 countries equals 29.2 years. If in a country 
the mean age at childbearing is higher than the European average this can be 
caused by low fertility rates at young ages (e.g., Italy), by a relatively high 
peak of fertility around age 30 (Denmark), or by high fertility rates at older 
ages (France). A low level of the mean age can be caused by high fertility 
rates at young ages (e.g., the United Kingdom) or low fertility rates at older 
ages (Poland). 
7KHOLQHDUVSOLQHVVKRZQLQWKH¿JXUHDUH¿WWHGE\FDOFXODWLQJHTXDWLRQ
The knots are selected by applying a non-linear least squares method to 
data for the 30 European countries in this study. For all countries the same 
knots are selected. This makes cross-country comparisons easier. Linear 
splines based on minimum age 15 years and 5 knots (ages 19, 24, 29, 34 
DQG\HDUV WXUQRXW WR¿W WKHREVHUYHGUDWH UDWLRVDFFXUDWHO\Table 5.1 
shows the values of the rate ratios at these ages for all 30 countries. The root 
mean square error (RMSE) equals 2.83 x 10-3 (see table 5.2). If four knots 
DUH VHOHFWHG WKH¿W LV FOHDUO\ OHVV DFFXUDWH WKH506(HTXDOV[-3. 
+RZHYHUIRUVRPHFRXQWULHVIRXUNQRWVZRXOGEHVXI¿FLHQW7KHVHOHFWLRQ
of a knot at age 19 is needed to capture the relatively high level of fertility 
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15 19 24 29 34 40 TFR MAC
Austria 0.57 0.85 0.99 0.91 0.85 0.81 1.41 29.0
Belgium 0.51 0.87 1.24 1.35 0.95 0.71 1.76 28.8
Bulgaria 8.52 2.03 1.30 0.76 0.53 0.37 1.47 26.1
Cyprus 0.36 0.64 0.92 1.01 0.94 0.92 1.46 29.7
Czech Republic 0.44 0.85 1.00 1.15 0.82 0.63 1.50 28.8
Denmark 0.10 0.56 1.05 1.44 1.34 1.18 1.89 29.9
Estonia 1.28 1.45 1.26 0.94 0.89 0.98 1.65 28.3
Finland 0.12 0.84 1.18 1.24 1.20 1.27 1.85 29.6
France 0.54 0.89 1.33 1.40 1.18 1.24 2.00 29.4
Germany 0.54 0.71 0.85 0.89 0.94 0.90 1.38 29.6
Greece 1.45 0.83 0.89 0.98 1.03 0.98 1.51 29.6
Hungary 2.13 1.12 0.83 0.90 0.74 0.63 1.35 28.4
Iceland 0.00 1.26 1.46 1.40 1.22 1.46 2.15 29.3
Ireland 0.58 1.35 0.95 1.03 1.74 2.25 2.10 30.7
Italy 0.04 0.52 0.69 0.83 1.06 1.29 1.37 30.5
Latvia 1.06 1.62 1.30 0.80 0.63 0.72 1.44 27.6
Lithuania 0.91 1.34 1.27 0.97 0.64 0.51 1.47 27.7
Luxembourg 0.00 0.73 0.88 1.03 1.11 1.06 1.61 30.0
Malta 1.50 1.01 0.96 1.00 0.85 0.56 1.44 28.7
Netherlands 0.25 0.43 0.93 1.30 1.36 0.97 1.77 30.2
Norway 0.17 0.83 1.32 1.35 1.26 1.05 1.96 29.4
Poland 0.54 1.20 1.14 0.91 0.63 0.57 1.39 28.0
Portugal 1.53 0.99 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.85 1.37 29.1
Romania 5.23 1.86 1.11 0.75 0.50 0.42 1.35 26.4
Slovakia 1.63 1.31 0.97 0.86 0.63 0.48 1.32 27.8
Slovenia 0.08 0.37 1.02 1.23 0.91 0.67 1.53 29.4
Spain 1.06 0.89 0.67 0.79 1.19 1.24 1.46 30.3
Sweden 0.18 0.55 1.14 1.32 1.35 1.29 1.91 30.1
Switzerland 0.19 0.39 0.78 0.97 1.19 1.15 1.48 30.5
United Kingdom 1.16 1.77 1.22 1.03 1.09 1.14 1.84 28.7
















x 10-3. Since a large number of knots with small age intervals in between 
hampers the usefulness of the model for creating scenarios, it was decided to 
DSSO\WKHPRGHOLQFOXGLQJ¿YHNQRWV
0XOWLSO\LQJWKHOLQHDUVSOLQHVVKRZQLQ¿JXUHE\WKHZHLJKWHG(8
DYHUDJH IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV VKRZQ LQ¿JXUH  SURGXFHV WKH723$/6 IHUWLOLW\
age schedule for each country. Figure 5.4 shows that TOPALS is capable of 
describing different age patterns of fertility, each based on the same standard 
age schedule. The model is capable of describing the relatively high fertility 
DW \RXQJ DJHV LQ WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPDQG3RODQG7KH¿JXUHV LQ$QQH[
$VKRZVWKH¿WRI723$/6IRUWKHRWKHU(XURSHDQFRXQWULHV)RUPRVW
FRXQWULHVWKH¿WLVVDWLVIDFWRU\2QHH[FHSWLRQLV%XOJDULDZKHUHWKH¿WWHG
curve is not smooth at young ages. This is caused by the fact that the rate 
ratios for Bulgaria at young ages do not exhibit a linear shape between ages 
15 and 19. This implies that an additional knot between these ages would be 
QHHGHGWRREWDLQDVPRRWKFXUYH,IDNQRWDWDJHLVDGGHGWKH¿WLPSURYHV
FRQVLGHUDEO\)XUWKHUPRUHWKH¿WIRU%HOJLXPDQG,UHODQGFDQEHLPSURYHG
by adding a knot at age 27. 
It is interesting to compare the results obtained using TOPALS with those 
obtained using other relational and parametric models. First, we compare the 
results of TOPALS with those of the three most frequently applied parametric 
models: the Hadwiger, Gamma and Beta functions. On average the Beta 
IXQFWLRQ SURGXFHV D EHWWHU ¿W WKDQ WKH RWKHU WZR PRGHOV 7KLV FRQ¿UPV
the results obtained by Peristera and Kostaki (2007). Hoem et al. (1981) 
compared a great variety of methods for smoothing fertility age patterns by 
applying them to Danish fertility data in the 1970s. They concluded that the 
Gamma and Hadwiger functions performed better than the Beta distribution. 
3HULVWHUDDQG.RVWDNLQRWHWKDWWKHXQVDWLVIDFWRU\¿WRIWKH%HWDPRGHO
by Hoem et al. (1981) may be due to the fact that they had problems in 
REWDLQLQJOHDVWVTXDUHVHVWLPDWHVRIWKHFRHI¿FLHQWVRIWKH%HWDGLVWULEXWLRQ
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the normal distribution but allows the slope below and above the mode to 
be different. In case there is high young-age fertility, they extend the model 
(see Equation 5). Table 5.2 shows that the Peristera-Kostaki model performs 




of the Peristera-Kostaki models is about the same as that of TOPALS using 
IRXUUDWKHUWKDQ¿YHNQRWV
Second, we compare the results of TOPALS with those of Schmertmann 
(2003) based on quadratic splines. Table 5.2 shows that although Schmert- 
PDQQ¶VPHWKRGSURGXFHVDIDLUO\DFFXUDWH¿WLWGRHVQRWRXWSHUIRUP723$/6
or the Peristera-Kostaki model. 
Third, we compare the results of TOPALS with the Brass relational model 
using the same standard age schedule. Brass suggested estimating the 
parameters by OLS. This minimizes the differences between the double log 
transformations of the estimated and the observed fertility rates. Table 5.2 
VKRZVWKDWWKLVGRHVQRWSURGXFHDQDGHTXDWH¿WZLWKWKHREVHUYHGIHUWLOLW\
rates. The RMSE equals 6.61 x 10-3. For that reason we estimated the 
parameters of the Brass model by non-linear least squares, which minimizes 
WKH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ WKH HVWLPDWHG DQG REVHUYHG DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\
UDWHV UDWKHU WKDQ WKH GRXEOH ORJ WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV 7KLV LPSURYHV WKH ¿W
considerably: the RMSE decreases to 3.48 x 10-3. The Brass model produces 
DYHU\DFFXUDWH¿WIRU'HQPDUN*HUPDQ\DQG,WDO\+RZHYHUWKHPHWKRGLV
not completely capable of describing the fertility hump at young ages in the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Hungary. Table 5.2 shows that for 3 countries 
WKH%UDVVPRGHOFOHDUO\SURGXFHVDEHWWHU¿WWKDQ723$/6ZKHUHDVIRU
countries the TOPALS model clearly outperforms Brass. 
1RWHWKDWWKHJRRGQHVVRI¿WLVDQHFHVVDU\EXWQRWVXI¿FLHQWUHDVRQIRUVHOHFWLQJ
a model. Another important criterion is the interpretation of the parameters. 
The parameters of the Brass model lack an intuitive interpretation. For that 
reason Zeng Yi et al. (2000) propose a different method for determining the 
values of the parameters of the Brass model which can be interpreted (see 
6HFWLRQ+RZHYHULWWXUQVRXWWKDWWKH¿WLVZRUVHWKDQWKDWRIWKH%UDVV
model estimated by non-linear least squares. The Zeng Yi procedure is very 





the United Kingdom, with the age pattern having a different shape. 
The parameters of TOPALS shown in table 5.1 can be interpreted easily. 
High values of the rate ratios at age 19 indicate relatively high fertility rates 
at young ages. Table 5.1 shows that 11 European countries have high fertility 
at young ages. Of these countries eight are Eastern European. The others are 
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Iceland. High values of the rate ratios at 
age 34 indicate that fertility at older ages is relatively high. Most countries in 
Northern, Western and Southern Europe have high values of the rate ratios at 
age 34. High values of the rate ratios at age 29 indicate that the age pattern 
of the fertility rates is peaked. In most cases a high value at age 29 goes 
together with a high value of the TFR. Ten countries have high values of the 
rate ratio (exceeding 1.1) at age 29: that is, around the peak age. These are 
mainly countries in Northern and Western Europe. Most of these countries 
KDYHDQDERYHDYHUDJHYDOXHRIWKH7)58VXDOO\DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV
are characterized by the level of the TFR and the mean age at childbearing. 
However, as noted above the mean age does not capture all differences in the 
age pattern. Usually low values of the mean age at childbearing go together 
with high fertility rates at young ages. But this is not the case in Iceland and 
Ireland, where fertility at young ages is relatively high but the mean age 
at childbearing is above the European average. On the other hand, a high 
value of the mean age can be caused by high values of fertility rates at ages 
above 30 but by low values at young ages as well. For example, Slovenia 
and Switzerland have above average mean age due to very low fertility rates 
at young ages.
5.5. Scenarios
We illustrate the use of TOPALS for making scenarios by specifying 
assumptions about the future values of the rate ratios for the six countries 
discussed in the preceding section. We demonstrate two approaches. First, 
ZHFRPSDUHWKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVRIWKHVL[FRXQWULHVZLWKWKRVHRI
one ‘forerunner’ country, Sweden. We project the rate ratios of the fertility 
rates of the six countries compared with those of Sweden into the future 
under the assumption that the six countries will move in the direction of the 
Swedish pattern. We estimate a partial adjustment model to assess the speed 
of the converging trend. The second approach uses the rate ratios compared 
with the EU27+3 average shown in table 5.1 as its starting point and makes 
assumptions about how the age patterns of the rate ratios may change in the 
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future. The former approach is more objective, since the tendency towards 
the target age schedule is determined by the estimated parameter of the 
partial adjustment model, whereas the latter approach is based on more or 
less ‘subjective’ assumptions about the future values of the rate ratios. 
5.5.1. Projections based on time series model
Lanzieri (2010) shows that during the last decades there has been a converging 
trend in fertility across EU countries, even though there have been periods 
of divergence. In the latest population scenarios, EUROPOP2008, Eurostat 
assumes that fertility will converge to levels achieved by EU member states 
that are considered as demographic forerunners (Giannakouris, 2008 and 
Lanzieri, 2009). However, it is assumed that convergence will not be reached 
until 2150. This implies that in the last year of the projection period, 2060, no 
complete convergence will be reached yet. The Eurostat scenarios are based 
on linear interpolation between 2008 and 2150. As a consequence, according 
to the Eurostat scenarios for each country, the difference in the TFR with 
the EU average will decline by one-third between 2008 and 2060. In 2150 
the European average of the TFR is assumed to increase to 1.85, the current 
level of Sweden. 
Rather than making an a priori assumption about the year when convergence 
will be reached, we will project the speed of convergence on the basis of an 
analysis of past trends. Both Eurostat and Statistics Sweden hardly expect 
DQ\IXWXUHFKDQJHLQ6ZHGLVKIHUWLOLW\UDWHVDSDUWIURPVKRUWUXQÀXFWXDWLRQV
due, for example, to business cycles) (Statistics Sweden, 2009 and Lanzieri, 
2009). Thus if we consider Sweden as the forerunner country, we can take the 
current Swedish fertility rates as the ‘target’ towards which the fertility rates 
of the other countries will move. Note that the assumption that the Swedish 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVZLOOKDUGO\FKDQJHLQWKHIXWXUHLPSOLHVWKDWWKH
current age schedule of fertility is very close to the cohort age schedule for 
young cohorts. To make such a convergence scenario we calculate rate ratios 
by dividing the fertility rates of the six countries under study by the Swedish 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVLQ6LQFHZHZDQWWRSURMHFWDVPRRWKDJH
SDWWHUQZHXVHWKH6ZHGLVKDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVWKDWDUHVPRRWKHGE\
TOPALS. In specifying linear splines, it turns out that for achieving a good 
¿WIRUWKHVL[FRXQWULHVWKHNQRWVRIWKHUDWHUDWLRVFRPSDUHGZLWKWKH6ZHGLVK
age pattern differ slightly from those compared with the EU27+3 average. 
The knots are at ages 17, 21, 25, 29, 34 and 40. Figure 5.5 shows the time 
series of the rate ratios for the period 1990–2008 for these ages. Note that the 
































































































































countries by the Swedish fertility rates for 2008, as these rates are considered 
to be the target values. 
We model the time series of rate ratios as a partial adjustment model, 
assuming that the rate ratios move towards 1: 
ttt exrxr    ]1)([1)( 1M    (13)
where U[t LV WKH UDWH UDWLR LQ \HDU W ĳ   DQGet is a random term 
with (Ht = 0. This model assumes that the value of U[t is closer to 1 than 
the value of U[t-1. )LJXUH shows how rapidly the values of U[ move 
towards 1 for different values of ĳ, starting from a value of 2 and 0.5 in 2008 
respectively. The lower the value of ĳ, the quicker U[t will move towards 
1. If ĳ is close to 1, U[t moves slowly to 1. If ĳ  model (13) describes a 
random walk, and U[t does not converge to 1. Figure 5.6 shows that if ĳ 
0.98 the difference of the rate ratio with 1 will be halved in the year 2042, 
whereas if ĳ  0.95 the difference with 1 will be halved in 2022. 
Since (Ht = 0 projections of model (13) can be calculated by:  
     
 (14)
where rˆ [t+1|t is the projection of U[t+1 based on observations up to year t. If 
ĳ  1, the projected value of U[t+1 equals the last observed value, similarly 
WRWKHSURMHFWLRQVRIDUDQGRPZDONPRGHO6LQFHĳLQWKHORQJUXQ
the projections will move to:
     




tTt xrxr MM   1)()(ˆ |  (15)
Thus if ĳ < 1 the projections will move to 1 for large T.
For each age and for each country we estimated the value of ĳ for the period 
1990-2008 by OLS using equation (13). Table 5.3 shows the estimated values 
of ĳ. For ages 34 and 40 the values of ĳ are below 1 for all countries. This 
indicates that there is a clear tendency towards the Swedish levels of fertility 
rates of women in their 30s. For Poland ages 21 and 25 have relatively low 
values of ĳ. This indicates that the fertility rates at young ages rapidly move 
in the direction of the Swedish levels. In contrast, for age 17 ĳ = 1 and thus 
there is no convergence towards 1. In most other countries values of ĳ exceed 
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.90, indicating that for most countries it will take several decades before the 
FXUUHQWOHYHORIWKH6ZHGLVKDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVLVUHDFKHG
Using the estimated values of ĳ, equation (14) is used to make projections of 
the rate ratios to 2030. Figure 5.5 shows that most rate ratios move towards 
1, but that the speed varies strongly across ages and across countries. For 
example, for Poland the rate ratios of women in their 30s show an increase, 
but it will take many years before they will reach the value of 1. For Polish 
women at age 29 the increase towards 1 is more rapid. 
The rate ratios for the year 2030 are used to make projections of the 
DJHVSHFL¿FUDWHVIRUWKHVL[FRXQWULHV)LJXUH shows that for the three 
low-fertility countries an increase of fertility rates in women in their late 
20s and 30s is projected. Figure 5.7 shows that the projected age pattern 
for Denmark is less peaked than the observed pattern in 2008. This can be 
explained by the fact that the current age pattern for Sweden is less peaked 
than the Danish pattern. If this is considered implausible, one alternative 
would be to use the age pattern of another country as the standard age 
schedule: so, for example, the age pattern of fertility in the Netherlands is 
more peaked than that in other European countries. Below we will show 
DQDOWHUQDWLYHVFHQDULR)XUWKHUPRUH¿JXUHVKRZVWKDWWKHSURMHFWHGDJH
patterns are not smooth for all countries, particularly at young ages for the 
United Kingdom and Poland, and around the peak age for Germany. The 
reason why the curve for the United Kingdom is not very smooth is that 
the age pattern of fertility there at young ages differs strongly from that in 















Denmark 0.67 0.82 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.94
United Kingdom 0.98 0.97 0.82 0.97 0.96 0.94
France 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.95 0.94
Germany 0.99 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.97
Italy 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.94
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the reason why the projected age pattern is not smooth around age 29 is that 
the projections of the rate ratios for knots next to each other differ strongly. 
Table 5.3 shows that the values of ĳ differ between ages 25, 29 and 34. If we 
were to replace the value of ĳ for age 29 by a value somewhere between the 
values for ages 25 and 34, this would produce a smooth age pattern. For the 
Polish fertility rates at young ages the same explanation applies: the values 
of ĳ for ages 17 and 21 differ markedly. Below we will show alternative 
scenarios that exhibit smooth age patterns. 
Table 5.4 compares the values of the TFR resulting from these projected 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVZLWKWKH(852323VFHQDULRJLYHQE\(XURVWDW
Even though, mirroring our assumption, Eurostat assumes convergence 
towards the Swedish fertility level, our projections of the TFR exceed those 
of Eurostat. One explanation is that Eurostat assumes a linear change in the 
direction of the Swedish level, whereas the partial adjustment model that we 
XVHLPSOLHVDQRQOLQHDUFKDQJHDVVKRZQE\¿JXUH$QRWKHULPSRUWDQW
difference between our projections and the Eurostat scenarios is that whereas 
Eurostat assumes Polish fertility will be lower than that of the other two 
low-fertility countries, Germany and Italy, our projection for Poland exceeds 
those for the other two countries. The main explanation is that the projected 
rate ratio at the peak age (29) increases more strongly for Poland than for 
Germany and Italy. 
These scenarios show that projecting the rate ratios for the age at each knot 




rate ratios compared with
Sweden EU27+3 average
Denmark 1.89 1.90 1.92 1.85
United Kingdom 1.84 1.96 1.94 1.84
France 2.00 2.01 2.09 1.96
Germany 1.38 1.57 1.55 1.42
Italy 1.37 1.45 1.56 1.46
Poland 1.39 1.62 1.57 1.36
7DEOH7RWDO)HUWLOLW\5DWHLQDQGVFHQDULRVIRU
United Kingdom and Italy: TFR in 2007 instead of 2008.
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at neighbouring knots move in different directions. Instead of extrapolating 
values of rate ratios on the basis of time series analyses, one may make 
qualitative assumptions about the future values of the rate ratios assuming a 
smooth age pattern. 
5.5.2. Scenarios based on qualitative assumptions
When specifying scenarios of future fertility it is important to identify the 
main determinants underlying past trends in fertility in order to assess to 
what extent the trends may be expected to continue. One main trend in 
fertility across Europe has been the postponement of fertility (Kohler, Billari 
and Ortega, 2002 and Frejka and Sobotka, 2008). While Northern countries 
seem to be at the last stage, other countries are at earlier stages (De Beer, 
2006a and Frejka and Sobotka, 2008). Billari and Kohler (2004) regard 
cultural changes (such as secularization and individualism), the rise in the 
education of women, and the uncertainty during political changes in Eastern 
Europe as the main causes of the postponement. Goldstein (2006) argues that 
the biological upper age limits of fertility have not yet been reached by far 
and, consequently, postponement of fertility can continue for decades. Even 
though to some extent postponement can lead to a decline in the ultimate 
level of fertility of young cohorts due to the increase of infertility with age, 
Lanzieri (2009) notes that there is more or less a shared opinion that the 
catching up of postponed fertility will lead to a rise in the total fertility rate 
(Bongaarts, 2002; Sobotka, 2004 and De Beer, 2006a). On the basis of an 
analysis of recent fertility data Goldstein, Sobotka, and Jasilioniene (2009) 
FRQFOXGHWKDWWKHSRVWSRQHPHQWRIIHUWLOLW\³KDVEHJXQWRUXQLWVFRXUVH´$VD
consequence they expect a rise of the total fertility rate in the coming decades. 
Frejka et al. (2008) argue that in the foreseeable future postponement of 
childbearing to older ages will continue. They assume that in Northern and 
Western Europe fertility will be maintained close to the replacement level. 
In Southern,  Central, and Eastern Europe they expect that some increase 
in fertility rates may occur, but they assume that fertility will remain well 
below the replacement level. Frejka and Sobotka (2008) mention various 
explanations of this divide, including cultural differences and differences in 
family policies. 
Figure 5.8 shows the linear splines describing the age patterns of the rate 
UDWLRVRIWKHVL[FRXQWULHVXQGHUVWXG\LQ7KHVROLGOLQHVLQ¿JXUH
DUHWKHVDPHDVWKHGRWWHGOLQHVLQ¿JXUH$VVXPLQJWKDWWKHSRVWSRQHPHQW
process has not yet reached its end, one would expect that the rate ratios of 
women in their 30s will increase. Figure 5.8 shows a possible scenario for 































































































ages the fertility rates in Northern and Western Europe will remain higher 
than in Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe. Thus for Denmark, France, 
and the United Kingdom we will assume higher values of the rate ratios of 
women in their late 20s and 30s than for the three other countries. 
Figure 5.5 shows that the fertility rates at young ages in the United Kingdom 
have been declining since 1990. Therefore one plausible scenario seems to 
be that the high fertility rates at young ages in the United Kingdom will 
GHFOLQHLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKH(XURSHDQDYHUDJH7KXV¿JXUHVKRZVD
scenario for the United Kingdom where fertility rates at young ages will 
decline and older ages will increase. In the German-speaking countries in 
Central Europe fertility rates have been low for quite a long period. Lutz, 
Skirbekk, and Testa (2006) hypothesize that fertility may not rise from the 
current low levels due to adapted ideals of family size. This is the so-called 
‘low fertility trap’ (Goldstein, Lutz and Testa, 2003). However, even though 
the total fertility rate has hardly changed during the last decade, fertility rates 
at ages 30 and above have been increasing in recent years. Therefore one 
plausible scenario may assume that for ages 29 and above there will be some 
movement towards the Nordic countries, but it does not seem likely that 
Germany will reach that level, since the gap between Northern and Central 
European countries has been considerable for quite some time now. Figure 5.8 
shows such a scenario. In Italy fertility rates have been increasing for women 
in their 30s. The decrease of fertility rates among young women has stopped 
quite recently, so one may expect that the catching up of postponed births 
will continue for some time. Therefore an increase of fertility rates among 
women in their late 20s and early 30s may be expected. In Eastern European 
countries fertility levels have been low since the fall of Communism. Frejka 
PHQWLRQVWZRH[SODQDWLRQV7KH¿UVWLVWKDWWKHHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDO
crises which occurred during the transition from the state socialist economies 
to market economies in the early 1990s were the principal causes of the 
decline in fertility. The second is that the diffusion of Western norms, values, 
and attitudes regarding family formation caused the changes in childbearing. 
Frejka argues that these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Figure 
5.5 shows that in recent years there has been a slight increase in fertility, 
especially at older ages. One scenario could be to assume that the Eastern 
European countries will move towards the current European average, so that 
the rate ratios will become equal to 1. This would be in line with Frejka’s 
assumption that young generations will adopt Western type norms, values, 
and attitudes regarding childbearing. That would result in a slight decline 





fertility rates of the six countries under study. These are shown in ¿JXUH
5.9 6LQFH WKH VFHQDULRV GHVFULEHG LQ ¿JXUH  VKRZ UDWKHU VPRRWK DJH
SDWWHUQV RI WKH UDWH UDWLRV WKH SURMHFWHG DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV VKRZQ




values of the rate ratios at age 29 for 2030 as in 2008, whereas the scenarios 
VKRZQLQ¿JXUHDUHEDVHGRQWKHOHVVSHDNHG6ZHGLVKDJHSDWWHUQ7KH
levels of the TFR implied by these scenarios are shown in table 5.4. They 
are close to the projections based on the assumption of convergence towards 
the Swedish fertility rates discussed above. The main difference is that the 
projected level of the TFR for Italy is higher according to the scenario shown 
LQ ¿JXUH 7KH H[SODQDWLRQ LV WKDW WKH SURMHFWLRQV VKRZQ LQ ¿JXUH 
assume no increase in fertility rates for Italy up to age 29 (since the values 
of ĳHTXDOZKHUHDVLQ¿JXUHZHDVVXPHVRPHFRQYHUJHQFHWRZDUGV
the European average and thus an increase in rate ratios of women in their 
20s. Whereas both scenarios are based on the assumption that there will be 
a converging tendency of fertility across European countries, the scenarios 
show that there will still be clear differences in the TFR of the high-fertility 
countries in Northern and Western Europe and the low-fertility countries in 
Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe. This is in line with the assumption 
by Frejka and Sobotka (2008) that this cross-country diversity in fertility is 
likely to prevail for decades to come. 
5.6. Conclusion and discussion
The period TFR is determined not only by changes in the average number of 
children per woman among successive cohorts, but by changes in the timing 
of fertility as well. Since the effects of changes in the timing of fertility are 
temporary, we cannot simply extrapolate from recent changes in the TFR 
into the future. It is obvious that there are boundaries to changes in fertility 
rates. One solution is to adjust the level of fertility for changes in the tempo of 
fertility (see, e.g., Frejka and Sobotka, 2008). However, there is some debate 
about the usefulness of such an adjustment (Van Imhoff, 2001; Schoen, 2004 
and Goldstein, Sobotka and Jasilioniene, 2009). An alternative would be to 
PDNHDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHIXWXUHYDOXHVRIWKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV
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)RU PDNLQJ SURMHFWLRQV RI IXWXUH DJHVSHFL¿F UDWHV LW LV XVHIXO WR XVH
VWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHVUDWKHUWKDQSURMHFWLQJHDFKDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWH
separately. One approach is to make assumptions about the future values of 
the parameters of the standard age schedule. A disadvantage of this method 
LVWKDWWKHYDOXHVRIWKHVHSDUDPHWHUVWHQGWREHGLI¿FXOWWRLQWHUSUHW8VXDOO\
they can be interpreted as indicating the direction of changes in the level, 
timing, and spread of fertility only, but the exact meaning of the value is 
not clear. Another disadvantage is that ‘basic’ model age schedules do 
not describe accurately age patterns for all age intervals in all countries at 
all periods. Consequently several extensions of these models have been 
proposed in the literature, making them more complicated. A possible way 
forward is to use splines. They are capable of describing all kinds of age 
SDWWHUQV6SOLQHVWHQGWRSURYLGHDEHWWHU¿WWKDQSDUDPHWULFPRGHOVVLQFH
parametric models are smoother and thus do not capture deviations in 
VSHFL¿FDJHLQWHUYDOVLQREVHUYHGGDWD+RZHYHUWKHLUXVHIXOQHVVIRUPDNLQJ
projections or creating scenarios is limited, as they do not include interpretable 
parameters. Another approach is to use relational methods, as proposed by 
Brass in the 1970s. These models use a standard age schedule, but instead 
of making assumptions about the future values of the parameters of the age 
schedule, they make assumptions about the way in which the age pattern 
to be projected may differ from the standard age schedule. A big advantage 
of this approach is that the function describing the relationship between the 
DJHSDWWHUQWREH¿WWHGRUSURMHFWHGDQGWKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHLVPXFK
simpler than the function describing the standard age pattern. One drawback 
of the Brass method, however, is that it includes two parameters that are 
GLI¿FXOWWRLQWHUSUHWDQGLVWKHUHIRUHQRWVRXVHIXOLQFUHDWLQJVFHQDULRV
7KLVFKDSWHU LQWURGXFHVDQHZUHODWLRQDOPHWKRGIRU¿WWLQJDQGSURMHFWLQJ




degree of smoothness. In general there is a trade-off: the smoother the age 
FXUYHWKHOHVVDFFXUDWHWKH¿W7KHÀH[LELOLW\RI723$/6LPSOLHVWKDWWKH
method is less sensitive to the choice of standard age schedule than the Brass 
model. Therefore one standard curve may be appropriate for describing 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVLQFRXQWULHVZLWKGLIIHUHQWDJHSDWWHUQV+RZHYHU
this does not imply that the choice of the standard age schedule is arbitrary. 
7KHPRUHVWURQJO\WKHDJHSDWWHUQRIWKHUDWHVWREH¿WWHGGLIIHUVIURPWKH
VWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHWKHPRUHNQRWVDUHQHHGHGWRSURYLGHDQDFFXUDWH¿W
If many knots are needed one may consider choosing another standard age 
139$PHWKRGIRUSURMHFWLQJDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV723$/6
schedule. Visual inspection of the graph of the age pattern of the rate ratios 
shows immediately whether or not many knots will be needed. If the curve 
RIWKHUDWHUDWLRVLVVLJQL¿FDQWO\QRQOLQHDULQDSDUWLFXODUDJHLQWHUYDOWKLV
LPSOLHVWKDWPDQ\NQRWVZLOOEHQHHGHGIRUREWDLQLQJDJRRG¿WIRUWKDWDJH
interval. In selecting an appropriate standard age schedule, the main criterion 
LVQRW WKH¿WZLWK WKHGDWDEXW WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WKHYDOXHVRI WKH UDWH
ratios. If the standard age schedule does not have a clear geographical or 
RWKHU UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKHDJHVSHFL¿F UDWHV WREH¿WWHGRUSURMHFWHG WKH
values of the rate ratios lack a clear interpretation and thus their usefulness in 
creating scenarios is limited. 
TOPALS can be used for making scenarios in two ways, one of which is 
more objective, while the other is more subjective. First, one may specify 
DµWDUJHW¶DJHVFKHGXOHRIIHUWLOLW\GHVFULELQJWKHYDOXHVRIWKHDJHVSHFL¿F
fertility rates that are expected to be reached in the long run. This may be 
the current fertility age schedule of a forerunner country. Second, one may 
make an assumption about the fertility age schedule of a young cohort. In 
WKHODWWHUFDVHWKHSHULRGDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVDUHDVVXPHGWRPRYHLQ
the direction of a cohort age schedule. The time series of the rate ratios of the 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVWREHSURMHFWHGDQGWKHWDUJHWDJHVFKHGXOHVKRZV
whether the fertility rates are moving towards the target. A partial adjustment 
model can be estimated to determine how quickly the fertility rates will move 
LQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIWKHWDUJHWYDOXHV2QHEHQH¿WRIXVLQJDSDUWLDODGMXVWPHQW
model is that the forecaster does not need to specify a priori in which year the 
target value will be reached. In addition, if the average fertility rates over a 
number of countries are used as the standard age schedule the rate ratios will 
show how the current age pattern and level of fertility of each country differ 
from the average pattern. The forecaster can specify qualitative assumptions 
about the way in which future differences in the age pattern of fertility may 
differ from the current pattern. If one assumes convergence across countries, 
it follows that the future values of the rate ratios will move towards a value 
DURXQGZKHUHDVLIRQHDVVXPHVWKDWFHUWDLQFRXQWU\VSHFL¿FFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
of fertility are persistent (e.g., relatively low or high fertility at the youngest 
RUROGHVWDJHVLWIROORZVWKDWUDWHUDWLRVIRUVSHFL¿FDJHLQWHUYDOVZLOOUHPDLQ
constant. 
The use of TOPALS for making assumptions about fertility implies that one 
LVPDNLQJDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHOHYHOVRIDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVDQGWKDW
the value of the TFR is an outcome, whereas in many countries it is common 
SUDFWLFHLQPDNLQJSURMHFWLRQVWR¿UVWPDNHDQDVVXPSWLRQDERXWWKHIXWXUH
YDOXHV RI WKH 7)5 DQG WKHQ FDOFXODWH DJHVSHFL¿F UDWHV LQ OLQH ZLWK WKLV
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assumption. The illustrations in this chapter show that when using TOPALS 
to create scenarios one may assume that the changes in fertility rates differ 
across ages. Rather than assuming only that the total level of fertility will 
increase or that fertility will be postponed, it is possible to make separate 
assumptions for different ages. Thus TOPALS makes it possible to create 
scenarios in which the shape of the age schedule changes. This allows the 
forecaster to make a distinction between a rise in the mean age at childbearing 
due to a decrease in fertility rates at very young ages and a rise at older ages 
caused by the catching up of postponed births. The use of TOPALS makes 
it possible to estimate whether the fertility age pattern will be more peaked 
in the future or not. For example, the Netherlands has a relatively high mean 
age at childbearing but not very high fertility rates at the oldest ages. The 
reason is that the fertility age pattern in the Netherlands is more peaked than 
the European average. The Dutch case shows that postponement of fertility 
will not necessarily result in a postponement of fertility to the oldest ages, 
which would imply an increase in the number of couples with problems of 
infecundity. Thus one alternative to the scenarios discussed in the previous 
section would be to use a combination of Swedish and Dutch fertility rates 
DV VWDQGDUG DJH VFKHGXOH QDPHO\ WKH 'XWFK DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV
multiplied by the ratio of the Swedish and Dutch TFRs. Then one could 
create a scenario which assumes that other countries will move towards 
the peaked age pattern of the Netherlands and the relatively high level of 
Sweden. 
TOPALS can be used in combination with other smoothing methods. For 
example, one may use a cubic spline for producing a smooth age schedule 
of fertility for a given country in a given year and use TOPALS to make 
assumptions about future changes in this age schedule. In this case one 
is trying to explain not the form of the smooth age schedule but rather 
future changes compared with this standard age schedule. Alternatively 
TOPALS can be used in combination with a simple parametric model to 
describe deviations in the age pattern of fertility for a particular country 
in comparison with this simple model. Applied in this way, TOPALS may 
increase the usefulness of simple parametric models without making them 
more complicated. For example, the relatively high fertility rates at young 
ages in the United Kingdom and Ireland can be described by using the 
Hadwiger function as standard age schedule, with TOPALS to describe the 
high fertility rates at young ages. 
This chapter shows how TOPALS can be applied for smoothing and 
SURMHFWLQJ DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV IRU (8 FRXQWULHV 723$/6PD\ EH
141$PHWKRGIRUSURMHFWLQJDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV723$/6
XVHGWR¿WDQGSURMHFWDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVLQRWKHUSDUWVRIWKHZRUOG
as well: for example, using data from the Human Fertility Database (2010), 
developed by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research and the 
Vienna Institute of Demography. For countries with missing or less reliable 
RUGHWDLOHGGDWD723$/6FDQEHXVHGWRHVWLPDWHVLQJOH\HDUDJHVSHFL¿F
IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV IRU H[DPSOH ZKHQ RQO\ GDWD IRU ¿YH\HDU DJH JURXSV DUH
available. Brass’s relational model is widely used for this purpose. Using 
723$/6RQHPD\FKRRVHWKHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVRIDQHLJKERXULQJ
country or a parametric model as the standard age schedule. Furthermore 
TOPALS may be used for regional population projections. It is common 
practice to make assumptions about regional differences in fertility rates 
compared with the national average. Thus one may calculate rate ratios 
RI DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV DW UHJLRQDO DQG DW QDWLRQDO OHYHOV DQGPDNH
assumptions about future changes in these rate ratios. 
2QHRIWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHÀH[LELOLW\RI723$/6LVWKDWLWFDQDOVREH
XVHGIRUGHVFULELQJDJHVSHFL¿FUDWHVRWKHUWKDQIHUWLOLW\)RUH[DPSOHWKH
QH[W FKDSWHU VKRZV WKDW 723$/6 FDQ EH XVHG IRU ¿WWLQJ DQG SURMHFWLQJ
DJHVSHFL¿F PRUWDOLW\ UDWHV 2QH ¿QDO SRVVLEOH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI 723$/6
LV WR FUHDWH VFHQDULRV RI DJHVSHFL¿F UDWHV WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW WKH HIIHFWV
of covariates. For example, when the effect of the level of educational 
attainment varies between age groups, TOPALS can be used to create 
scenarios of the rates for different education categories (De Beer, Van der 
Gaag and Willekens, 2007). 

6. 6PRRWKLQJDQGSURMHFWLQJDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHV
of death by TOPALS
Abstract
TOPALS is a relational model that can be used for smoothing and projecting 
DJHVSHFL¿F UDWHV RU SUREDELOLWLHV7KLV FKDSWHU VKRZV KRZ723$/6 FDQ
EH XVHG IRU SURMHFWLQJ DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV IRU  (XURSHDQ
countries. Projected death probabilities for Japanese women in the year 2060 
are used as standard age schedule. A partial adjustment model is used to 
assess to what extent death probabilities of European countries will move in 
the direction of the Japanese level. Three alternative scenarios are calculated.
6.1. Introduction




interpreted easily. TOPALS can be used to describe different age schedules. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates how TOPALS can be used to smooth and project 
DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV 7KLV FKDSWHU GHPRQVWUDWHV KRZ 723$/6 FDQ
EH XVHG WR VPRRWK DQG SURMHFW DJHVSHFL¿F SUREDELOLWLHV RI GHDWK IRU 
European countries on the basis of data from the Human Mortality Database 
(2010). TOPALS can be applied to make different types of scenarios. It can 
be used to calculate baseline scenarios which can be regarded as a projection 
of past trends. But it can be used to make alternative scenarios as well.
Projections of life expectancy at birth are usually based on extrapolations of 
WLPHVHULHVHLWKHURIOLIHH[SHFWDQF\LWVHOIRURIWKHXQGHUO\LQJDJHVSHFL¿F
probabilities of death or of parameters of a model describing the age pattern 
of mortality (Bongaarts, 2006 and Tabeau et al., 2001). Even though there 
is general agreement that life expectancy will continue to grow, there is less 
agreement on the extent of the increase (Bongaarts, 2006; Garssen, 2006 
and De Beer, 2006). Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) note that the ‘best practice’ 
life expectancy has been increasing linearly by 2.5 years per decade during 
the past 150 years. They expect that this trend will continue in the coming 
decades. Bongaarts (2006) agrees that life expectancy at birth will continue 
to increase but assumes that the average increase will be 1.5 years per decade. 
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Bongaarts argues that the strong decline in death rates at young ages observed 
in the last 50 years cannot continue since the death probabilities have already 
reached very low levels. Olshansky and Carnes (1994) argue that a linear 
projection of life expectancy is very optimistic as this can only be achieved 
LIWKHGHFOLQHLQDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKZLOODFFHOHUDWH2OVKDQVN\
et al. (2005) and Stewart, Cutler and Rosen (2009) argue that an increase in 
obesity may reduce the increase in life expectancy. In the past decades there 
KDYHEHHQGLIIHUHQWXQGHUO\LQJFKDQJHVLQDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
:KHUHDVLPSURYHPHQWVLQOLIHH[SHFWDQF\LQWKH¿UVWKDOIRIWKHst century 
were mainly caused by a strong decline in infant mortality, improvement in 
recent decades is mainly due to a decline of mortality at older ages. Even 
though there has been a linear increase in best practice life expectancy, 
XQGHUO\LQJGHFOLQHVLQDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVKDYHQRWEHHQOLQHDU
Thus it is not obvious that  life expectancy will continue to increase linearly 
in the future. Moreover life expectancy in individual countries has not shown 
a linear increase over very long periods (Lee, 2006). 
7KLVFKDSWHUGHVFULEHVKRZ723$/6SURMHFWVDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
by modelling a movement towards levels of death probabilities that are 
consistent with a linear extrapolation of best practice life expectancy. 
723$/6XVHVDOLQHDUVSOLQHWRPRGHOWKHUDWLRVEHWZHHQWKHDJHVSHFL¿F
UDWHV RU SUREDELOLWLHV WR EH¿WWHG RU SURMHFWHG DQG D VPRRWK VWDQGDUG DJH
VFKHGXOH)RUVPRRWKLQJDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVDVPRRWKVWDQGDUG
age schedule is used. This can be a model age schedule or the average age 
pattern of mortality across a number of countries. This chapter uses the 
DYHUDJHDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVRI1RUWKHUQ:HVWHUQDQG6RXWKHUQ
European countries as standard.  Using TOPALS for making projections of 
DJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRQHQHHGVWRPDNHSURMHFWLRQVIRUVHOHFWHGDJHV
(the so-called knots) only. This article uses TOPALS for making three 
scenarios. Each of the scenarios uses the same standard age schedule. In line 
with Oeppen and Vaupel’s suggestion that the best practice life expectancy 
of Japanese women may continue to increase linearly, we make a projection 
RIDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVRI-DSDQHVHZRPHQIRUDVVXPLQJD
linear increase in life expectancy. The scenarios differ by the assumptions to 
what extent the probabilities of death of European countries are assumed to 
move into the direction of the best practice level. This can be described by a 
partial adjustment model which includes one parameter. 
The second section of this chapter gives a brief discussion of methods that 
FDQ EH XVHG IRU VPRRWKLQJ DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV DQG WKH WKLUG




of TOPALS for making three alternative scenarios for 26 European countries. 
7KH¿QDOVHFWLRQVXPPDUL]HVDQGGLVFXVVHVWKHUHVXOWV
6.2. 0HWKRGVIRUVPRRWKLQJDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
The Gompertz model of mortality implies that mortality rates increase 
exponentially with age. The mortality rate equals the number of deaths at 
age x divided by the number of person-years at risk at age x. Mortality rates 
can be estimated from population statistics. The death probability is the 
probability that a person who has reached age x will die before reaching 
age x+1$JHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV FDQ EH GHULYHG IURP PRUWDOLW\
rates. For example, assuming a uniform distribution of exposure in [T[
 P[[1+½P[] where T[ is the death probability at age x and P[ is 
the mortality rate. For one-year intervals the values of mortality rates and 
death probabilities are close, but death probabilities are always smaller than 
PRUWDOLW\ UDWHV )RU LQGLYLGXDO FRXQWULHV DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV
show a rather irregular pattern. Therefore for analysing changes over time 
and making projections it is useful to smooth the age pattern. Different 
methods may be used for this purpose. Parameterisation of mortality by age 
has a long history (Booth, 2006). Nowadays the most widely used method is 









)( 2)(  (1)
where the left-hand side represents the odds that an individual aged x will die 
before age x+1. This model includes eight parameters to be estimated. All 
WKHVHSDUDPHWHUVKDYHDSRVLWLYHYDOXH7KH¿UVWWHUPRIWKHULJKWKDQGVLGH
UHÀHFWVLQIDQWDQGHDUO\FKLOGKRRGPRUWDOLW\ WKHVHFRQGWHUPWKHDFFLGHQW
hump and the third term the exponential increase in mortality at later ages. 
One problem in using this model for projection purposes is that even though 
the three terms have an interpretation, the individual eight parameters lack 
a direct demographic interpretation. Another problem is that the parameter 
values are interdependent (McNown et al., 1995). Booth (2006) concludes 
that the Heligman-Pollard model is not very useful for forecasting. Even the 
HLJKWSDUDPHWHUVLQWKH+HOLJPDQ3ROODUGPRGHOVHHPQRWWREHVXI¿FLHQWWR
describe age-patterns of mortality for all countries. For that reason Kostaki 
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(1992) presented a nine-parameter version. Carriere (1992) proposed a 
four-term model with eleven parameters. 
Instead of making the model more complicated by adding parameters one 
alternative procedure is to estimate a relational model. This implies that one 
XVHVDVPRRWKDJHSDWWHUQDQGVSHFL¿HVDVLPSOHPRGHOWKDWGHVFULEHVKRZ
WKHDJHVSHFL¿FUDWHVWREHVPRRWKHGGLIIHUIURPWKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOH
Brass (1971) presents a relational method in which age-patterns of mortality 
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where O[ is the life table survival probability and O[ is the standard 
survival probability. The parameters Į and ȕ can be estimated by OLS 
regression. The parameter Į is related to the life expectancy at birth (Brass, 
1971; 1974). )LJXUH shows estimated values of Į and life expectancy 
at birth for 26 European countries. The values of Į are estimated using the 
average death probabilities of 15 Northern, Western and Southern European 
FRXQWULHVDVVWDQGDUGVHHVHFWLRQIRUGHWDLOV7KH¿JXUHVKRZVDVWURQJ
inverse relationship between Į and life expectancy at birth.  Life expectancy 
at birth explains 99.5 percent of the variance in Į for men and 97.4 percent 
for women. However in contrast with life expectancy the value of Į has no 
direct demographic interpretation. The relationship between the value of Į 
and life expectancy differs between men and women. For example, for men 
life expectancy of 73 years corresponds with a value of Į of 0.6, and for 
women with a value of Į of 1.3. The value of ȕUHÀHFWVWKHVWHHSQHVVZLWK
which the survival probabilities change with age (Brass, 1971). 
If  ȕ , the steepness of the age schedule of death probabilities is the same 
as that of the standard schedule. If ȕ! 1 the steepness of the age curve to 
EH¿WWHGLV ODUJHUWKDQWKDWRI WKHVWDQGDUGVFKHGXOH)RUWKH(XURSHDQ
countries the estimated value of ȕ ranges from .93 to 1.22. If Į = 0 and ȕ! 
WKHDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVIRUDJHVXSWR\HDUVIRUPHQDQG
up to 77 years for women are lower than those according to the average 
age schedule and for older ages higher. Thus for making projections, if one 
assumes that life expectancy at birth will increase and that this will be mainly 
caused by a decline of mortality at older ages, one should assume that the 
value of Į will increase and that of ȕ will decrease. However, it would be 
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6ROLGOLQHĮULJKWD[LVUHYHUVHRUGHU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GLI¿FXOWWRGHWHUPLQHWRZKLFKYDOXHVĮ and ȕ will change as these values do 
not have a direct demographic interpretation. 
6.3. Methods for projecting life expectancy
Life expectancy at birth can be projected on the basis of a time series of life 
H[SHFWDQF\RURQWKHEDVLVRIDWLPHVHULHVRIDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
(Bongaarts, 2006). Since 1981 Japanese women have had the highest life 
expectancy at birth. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) label this as the ‘best practice’ 
life expectancy. )LJXUH shows that since the early 1980s the development 
of life expectancy at birth of Japanese women is close to linear. Thus one 
may project life expectancy at birth of Japanese women by a random walk 
model with drift:
 (3)
where  eW  = life expectancy at birth in year t, c is a constant term (‘drift’) 
and ut is a random term, with (Xt = 0. In 2008 life expectancy of Japanese 
women equaled 86 years. For the period 1978-2008, the estimate of c 
equals 0.26. This implies that life expectancy at birth of Japanese women 
has increased by one year in each four years period. This corresponds with 
Oeppen and Vaupel’s estimate. Using equation (3) to project life expectancy 
of birth of Japanese women leads to a projected value of 99.6 years in 2060 
and 110 years in 2100. Changes in the level of life expectancy at birth are 
FDXVHGE\FKDQJHVLQWKHXQGHUO\LQJDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWK,I
WKHORJDULWKPVRIDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKGHFUHDVHLQDOLQHDUZD\
life expectancy will increase less than linearly. 
The Lee-Carter method has become the most widely applied model for 
PDNLQJSURMHFWLRQVRIDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWK%RRWK/HH
and Carter (1992) decompose the level of mortality rates into age-dependent 
DQG WLPHGHSHQGHQW FRPSRQHQWV 6LQFH WKH WLPH VHULHV RI DJHVSHFL¿F
mortality rates and death probabilities show similar developments over time, 




ttt xekxbxaxq )()()()(ln   (4)
where T[t is the probability of death at age x in year WD[ describes the 
average age pattern, kt describes the change in probabilities of death over 
 
ttt ucee  1,0,0
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time, E[ determines how the change varies by age, and H[t is a random 
term with E(H[t) = 0. Lee and Carter (1992) assume that ¦  
x
xb 1)(
and ¦  
t
tk 0. 
These normalizations make it possible to obtain unique least squares 
estimates of the values of D[, E[ and kt. For this purpose Singular Value 
Decomposition (SDV) is applied, but linear regression produces similar 
results (Lee and Carter, 1992). Since D[ and E[ are time invariant, future 
values of T[t can be projected by projecting kt. The Box-Jenkins method is 
used to identify an ARIMA model for projecting kt. In almost all applications 
kt is projected by a random walk with drift model (Booth, 2006):
 (5)
where d = the drift parameter and u is a random term with (Xt = 0 and 
(Xtut+j = 0 forM . Thus kt+T can be projected by:
    
 .ˆˆ | dTkk ttTt    (6)
)LJXUH/LIHH[SHFWDQF\DWELUWKRI-DSDQHVHZRPHQ
6ROLGOLQHREVHUYHGYDOXHV'RWWHGOLQH5DQGRPZDONZLWKGULIW¿WWHG
values, 1978-2008; projected values, 2009-2100). Dashed line: Lee-Carter model 
(projected values 2009-2100).       
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where tTtk |ˆ  is the projection of kt+T based on observations up to and including 
t and  dˆ is the estimate of the drift. It can easily be shown that this implies that 
for each age x the logarithm of the probability of death can be projected by a 
random walk with drift model. 
From (4) it can be derived that: 
 
 
111 )()())(()(ln)(ln    tttttt xexekkxbxqxq  (7)
This can be rewritten as:
 
11 )()()()(ln)(ln   tttt xexvdxbxqxq    (8) 
where Y[t = E[Xt H[t. Since E[Y[t]= 0, the probability of death at age 
x can be projected by: 
      
 .)(ˆ)()(ln)(ˆln | tttTt xedxTbxqxq    (9)
This implies that the projected change in the logarithm of the probability 
of death is linear. Applying the Lee-Carter model to the time series of 
probabilities of death of Japanese women for the period 1978-2008 leads to 
a projection of life expectancy at birth in 2060 of 97.1 years and a value of 
102.0 years in 2100. Figure 6.2 shows that in the long run the projections of 
the Lee-Carter model are lower than those of linear projections of the time 
series of life expectancy. This demonstrates that a linear projection of logged 
death probabilities leads to a lower projection of life expectancy than a linear 
projection of life expectancy itself.
The Lee-Carter model does not produce a smooth age pattern, since the 
projected changes in the death probabilities differ across ages. For that reason 
5HQVKDZDQG+DEHUPDQVXJJHVWWRVPRRWKWKHSURMHFWHGDJHVSHFL¿F
death probabilities by a cubic spline. One alternative method is to project 
WKH DJH SDWWHUQ RI GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV UDWKHU WKDQ LQGLYLGXDO DJHVSHFL¿F
death probabilities. One method is to project the parameters of a model 
age schedule, such as the Heligman-Pollard model. However, as we noted 
in section 6.2 this raises two problems. The values of the individual eight 
parameters have no direct demographic interpretation and the parameters 
cannot be projected independently from each other. Another method is to 
apply a relational model. In section 6.2 we discussed the Brass relational 
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model. By making assumptions about the future values of Į and ȕ one can 
XVH WKLVPRGHO IRUPDNLQJSURMHFWLRQVRI DJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
Brass (1974) suggests to project Į and ȕ on the basis of past trends. One 
problem, however, is that if death probabilities across time are related to the 
VDPHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHWKH¿WRIWKHPRGHOPD\YDU\DFURVVWLPH7KXV
one may question to what extent changes in Į and ȕ over time accurately 
describe changes in the age pattern of mortality. The next section describes 
the new relational model TOPALS that is less sensitive to the choice of 
the standard age schedule and thus is better capable of describing changes 
RYHU WLPHZKLFKPDNHV LWPRUH VXLWDEOH IRU SURMHFWLQJ DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK
probabilities. 
6.4. TOPALS
We assume that a standard age schedule of probabilities of death is given. 
7KHDJHSUR¿OHIRUDJLYHQFRXQWU\FDQEHHVWLPDWHGRQWKHEDVLVRIUDWLRVRI
WKHDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKRIWKDWFRXQWU\DQGWKRVHDFFRUGLQJWR




xqxr   (10) 
where T[ is the probability of death at age x according to the standard age 
schedule. The age pattern of the risk ratios can be described by a linear spline 
function. This is a piecewise linear curve. The ages at which the successive 
linear segments are connected are called ‘knots’. The risk ratios at each age 










where Dj = 0 if [Nj, and Dj = 1 otherwise, kj are the knots, a and bj are the 
SDUDPHWHUVWREHHVWLPDWHG7KHNQRWVFDQEHFKRVHQLQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKH¿W
of the linear spline to the data is optimal, e.g. by applying a non-linear least 
squares method. However, this would result in different knots for different 
countries. Since we want to make cross-country comparisons we decided to 
¿[WKHORFDWLRQRIWKHNQRWVDSULRULDWWKHVDPHDJHVIRUHDFKFRXQWU\:H
use data from the Human Mortality Database. They refer to ages 0 up to 
DQGLQFOXGLQJ:HGHFLGHGWR¿[WKHNQRWVDWDJHV«
6LQFHDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKIRUDJHVVKRZDQLUUHJXODU
pattern, we assume the risk ratios for these ages to be equal to the average 
of the risk ratios for this age group, i.e. the slope of the spline is assumed to 
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equal zero for ages 0-20. The values of a and bj  can be estimated by OLS. A 
simpler procedure is to assume that the values of the spline at the knots equal 
WKHREVHUYHGYDOXHV,WWXUQVRXWWKDWWKLVSURYLGHVD¿WWKDWLVYHU\FORVHWR









xrkr , )(ˆ 2kr = )( 2kr , )(ˆ 3kr = )( 3kr ,..., )(ˆ 1nkr = )( 1nkr .
Then the values of a, bj can be estimated by substituting the values of
 )(ˆ 1kr ,   )(ˆ 2kr , etc. in (11). This yields:
    





























1 ˆ)()(   (12) 
7KHDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKDUHHVWLPDWHGE\PXOWLSO\LQJWKHUDWLRV
which are estimated by the linear spline function  )(ˆ xr E\WKHDJHVSHFL¿F
death probabilities according to the model age schedule T[:
   
)()(ˆ)( * xqxrxq  .  (13)
)RU VPRRWKLQJ DJHVSHFL¿F SUREDELOLWLHV RI GHDWK WKH VWDQGDUG DJH FXUYH
can be the average of several countries, e.g. the EU average, the age curve 
of another country or a model age schedule. For projections the standard 
age schedule can be the age schedule of a ‘forerunner’ country or some age 
pattern that may be expected to be reached in the long run. Oeppen and Vaupel 
(2002) and Bongaarts (2006) argue that there is no evidence of approaching 
limits to longevity. Therefore we do not assume that a certain limit will be 
reached in a given year. Instead we assume that death probabilities will move 
towards the ‘best practice’ level in the long run. We estimate the speed with 
which the probabilities of death move into the direction of the target values 
using a partial adjustment model. This model assumes that the speed of the 




the life expectancy leader and that they converge more than proportionally 
with the size of the gap between their life expectancy and record life 
expectancy. We model the time series of risk ratios as a partial adjustment 
model assuming that the risk ratios move towards 1:
 ttt xexrxxr )(]1)([)(1)( 1   M  (14)
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where U[t is the risk ratio in year t, 0 ĳ[DQGH[t is a random term 
with (>H[t] = 0. This model assumes that the value of U[t is closer to 1 than 
the value of U[t-1. The lower the value of ĳ[, the quicker U[t will move 
towards 1. If ĳ[ is close to 1, U[t moves slowly to 1. If ĳ[= 1 model (14) 
describes a random walk, and U[t does not converge to 1. The reason for 
assuming that ĳ[LVWKDWLIĳ[ > 1 the risk ratios would move away 
from 1. If the probabilities of death are higher than those according to the 
standard schedule, (14) implies that the death probabilities are projected to 
decrease, whereas if the death probabilities are smaller than those according 
to the standard schedule, the model projects an increase.
Since (>H[t] = 0 projections of model (14) can be calculated by:  
       
 )(1)(ˆ)()(ˆ |1| xxrxxr tkttkt MM    (15)





tTt xxrxxr )(1)()()(ˆ | MM    (16)
Thus if ĳ(x) < 1 the projections will move to 1 for large T. 
7KHIXWXUHYDOXHVRIWKHDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKFDQEHSURMHFWHG
by:
)()(ˆ)(ˆ *|| xqxrxq tTttTt   .   (17)
Obviously the values of U[t depend on the choice of T[. If the target 
values T[ are very low, the values of U[t will be high. The estimate of 
the value of ĳ[ depends on the level of U[t. If the values of U[ are high, 
i.e. the distance to the target value is large, the value of ĳ[ will be high 
and it will take more time to reach the target value. Thus if one assumes 
extremely low probabilities of death as target values, they will be reached 
LQWKHYHU\ORQJUXQRQO\'LIIHUHQWVFHQDULRVFDQEHVSHFL¿HGE\GLIIHUHQW
values of the target pattern. If very low target values would be assumed, the 
probabilities of death may decline to a much lower level. However, these 
low levels would only be reached in the very distant future. For the next 50 
years or so that would not lead to quite different scenarios. For specifying 
alternative scenarios for the next 50 or 100 years the values of ĳ[ are more 
important. Assuming a low level of ĳ[ implies that the low target levels of 
DJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKZLOOEHUHDFKHGTXLFNHU
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Instead of applying the partial adjustment model (14) the risk ratios can be 
projected by using a random walk with drift model for the logarithms of the 
risk ratios: 
ttt xexcxrxr )()()(ln)(ln 1    (18)
Since:
    
ttt xqxqxr )(ln)(ln)(ln
*  (19)
we can derive the model for projecting probabilities of death by substituting 
(19) into (18): 
   
 ttt xexcxqxq )()()(ln)(ln 1    (20)
A comparison with the projections produced by the Lee-Carter model (8) 
shows that the projections are similar as both project a linear change of the 
logarithms of the probabilities of death. However, the projections based on 
(20) do not equal those based on (8) for two reasons. First, using TOPALS 
the random walk model is used for projecting probabilities of death at the 
knots only and the projections for ages in between are obtained by the linear 
spline of risk ratios (11). Secondly, the estimate of the drift F[ in equation 
(20) does not equal the estimate of the drift E[G in equation (8). The drift in 
equation (20) is estimated for each knot separately by: 
    
 Lxqxqxc Lttt /))(ln)((ln)(ˆ   (21)
,QHTXDWLRQWKHGULIWLQFOXGHVDQDJHVSHFL¿FFRPSRQHQWE[ that does 
not change over time and a component d that is estimated from the time 
series kt: 
    
Lkkd Ltt /)ˆˆ(ˆ   (22)
The estimates of kt and kt-L are based on a summation across all ages as can 
be seen from rewriting (4). Since ¦  
x
xb 1)( and ¦  
x
txe 0)( kt can be 
derived from (4) as follows:   
 ¦ ¦ 
x x
tt xaxqk )()(ln (23)
As a consequence the time series of kt is more stable than the time series of 




Solid line: observed values; dashed line: Lee-Carter model; dotted line: Random 
























of the death probability of Hungarian men at ages 40 and 70. The observation 
period is 1976-2006. The dotted lines show the projections that are based on 
a random walk with drift model where the drift is estimated by equation 
(21). The dashed lines show the Lee-Carter projections based on equation 
7KHODWWHUSURMHFWLRQVH[WUDSRODWHWKH¿WWHGWLPHVHULHVUDWKHUWKDQWKH
observed time series. Note that for both ages the Lee-Carter model describes 
a similar development across time apart from differences in the levels of the 
death probabilities between both ages.  Since for age 70 the average decline 
LQWKH¿WWHGWLPHVHULHVLQWKHSHULRGLVVPDOOHUWKDQWKHDYHUDJH
GHFOLQH EHWZHHQ WKH ODVW DQG ¿UVW SRLQW RI WKH REVHUYHG WLPH VHULHV WKH
Lee-Carter model projects a smaller decrease than the random walk model 
(20). For age 40 the opposite is true. 
6.5. 6PRRWKLQJDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWK
$JHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV DUH REWDLQHG IURP WKH +XPDQ0RUWDOLW\
Database (2010). This database includes life tables for 29 European countries. 
These countries include 23 of the 27 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Six non-EU countries are included: Belarus, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Switzerland, Ukraine. For our analyses we used data for 26 countries. We 
did not include Iceland and Luxembourg because of their small population 
size, and we did not include Slovenia because the time series is shorter 
than for the other countries. The most recent year for which the database 
includes data for all 26 countries is 2006. For the sake of cross-country 
comparability we used this year as jump-off year for the projections for all 
countries. For our analyses we use the probabilities of death from these life 
tables. The probabilities of death included in the Human Mortality Database 
are smoothed at the highest ages using a logistic model (Wilmoth et al., 
2007). It is assumed that across all countries the death probability at age 110 
equals 1. As a consequence the age patterns at the oldest ages look similar 
across countries. Even though there is discussion whether mortality rates at 
the oldest ages increase with age as described by a logistic or a Gompertz 
model (Boleslawski and Tabeau, 2001 and Booth, 2006), we decided to use 
the estimates included in the Human Mortality Database as these data are 
comparable across countries. 
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For applying TOPALS we need to specify a smooth standard age schedule. 
)RUWKLVSXUSRVHZHFDOFXODWHGWKHZHLJKWHGDYHUDJHRIWKHDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWK
probabilities for men and women of 15 Northern, Western and Southern 
European countries included in the Human Mortality Database: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
We weighted the death probabilities by total population size for men and 
women separately. We label this as the NWS European average. Figure 
VKRZVWKHORJDULWKPVRIWKHDYHUDJHDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVIRU
IHPDOHV7KHXSSHUSDQHORI¿JXUHVKRZVWKDWWKHDYHUDJHSUREDELOLWLHV
are not smooth at ages below 20. At older age there are some irregular 
ÀXFWXDWLRQVDVZHOO,QRUGHUWRREWDLQDVPRRWKSDWWHUQIRUWKHZKROHDJH
schedule we estimated the Heligman-Pollard model. The middle panel of 
¿JXUHVKRZVWKDWWKLVGRHVQRWSURGXFHDSHUIHFW¿WIRUDOODJHV$URXQG
DJHWKH¿WWHGYDOXHVDUH WRR ORZDQGDURXQGDJHWRRKLJK)RU WKDW
reason we applied TOPALS using the Heligman-Pollard curve as standard 
age schedule. For women the risk ratio at age 50 equals 1.3 and for age 
LWHTXDOV)RUPHQWKHULVNUDWLRVDUHPXFKFORVHUWRDVWKH¿WRI
WKH+HOLJPDQ3ROODUGIXQFWLRQLVEHWWHU0XOWLSO\LQJWKHDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWK
SUREDELOLWLHVDFFRUGLQJWR WKH+HOLJPDQ3ROODUGPRGHOE\ WKH¿WWHG OLQHDU
spline (not shown here) produces the smooth curve shown in the lower panel 
RI¿JXUHZKLFKWXUQVRXWWRSURYLGHDYHU\DFFXUDWH¿W7KLVFXUYHLVXVHG
DVVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHIRUVPRRWKLQJWKHDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
for the 26 European countries in this study.
We illustrate the use of TOPALS by applying the method to three countries 
which are representative for the variation in mortality patterns in Europe. 
Germany has death probabilities that are close to the European average, Italy 
has lower death probabilities and Hungary has high probabilities. Figures 
DDQGE FRPSDUHDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHV IRUPHQDQGZRPHQIRU
these countries with the NWS European average. Life expectancy at birth 
for Germany equals 77.2 years for men and 82.3 for women. The NWS 
European average equals 77.4 years for men and 82.8 years for women. 
Italy has lower death probabilities for almost all ages. Life expectancy at 
birth for Italian men equals 78.6 years, thus 1.2 years above the average and 
for women the Italian life expectancy of 84.1 years is 1.3 years above the 
average. For Hungary life expectancy for men equals 69.2, thus 8.2 years 
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)LJXUHDandE show the risk ratios for the three countries compared 
with the NWS European average for men and women respectively. For 
each country we estimated linear splines. Since the death probabilities show 
ODUJHÀXFWXDWLRQVDW\RXQJDJHVIRUHVWLPDWLQJWKHVSOLQHZHFDOFXODWHGWKH
average value of the risk ratios for ages 0-20. For subsequent ages we use 
knots at intervals of ten years. 7DEOH shows the values of the risk ratios 
at the knots. The table shows that high or low life expectancies do not imply 
that the death probabilities across all ages are relatively low or high. The 
GLIIHUHQFHVRIWKHDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVZLWKWKH1:6(XURSHDQ
DYHUDJH GLIIHU E\ DJH7DEOH  VKRZV WKDW XQWLO DJH  WKH DJHVSHFL¿F
death probabilities for Germany are slightly below the NWS European 
average and at higher ages slightly above the average. For Italian men the 
DJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVDUHUHODWLYHO\ORZDURXQGDJHEXWFORVHWR
the average for ages 80 and older. For women the death probabilities are 20 
percent lower than the average for most ages. Tables B.1 and B.2 in Annex 
B show the values of the risk ratios for all countries in this study for men 
and women respectively. These tables show that for other countries with low 
mortality the age pattern may be different than for Italy. For example, for 
French women life expectancy at birth is the same as for Italian women, but 
for French women the death probabilities for women in their 40s and 50s are 
higher than the NWS European average. French women have remarkably 
low mortality at higher ages. The low life expectancy of both Hungarian 
men and women is mainly caused by the very high mortality between ages 
40 and 60. For men the death probabilities around age 50 are even over three 
times as high as the NWS European average. This pattern is typical for most 
Eastern European countries. Table B.1 shows that for Russia and Ukraine 
the death probabilities are very high at ages 30 and 40. At older ages the 
differences are smaller. For women the differences are considerably smaller 
than for men. Note that for most countries the risk ratios at the oldest ages are 
close to 1. This is caused by the fact that in the Human Mortality Database 
WKHDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVDWROGDJHVDUHVPRRWKHGXVLQJWKHVDPH
method across countries.





Heligman-Pollard model to the logarithms of the death probabilities, the 
Brass model to the logits of the survival probabilities and TOPALS to the 
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root mean square error (RMSE) for the logarithms of the death probabilities. 
For males the RMSE for TOPALS is smaller than for the Heligman-Pollard 
and Brass models for 16 countries out of the 26 countries, and for females for 
15 countries. The Heligman-Pollard model performs best for ten countries 
for males and seven countries for females respectively. The Brass model 
outperforms the other two for four countries for females and for none for males. 
7KXVRQDYHUDJH723$/6SURGXFHVDEHWWHU¿WWKDQWKH+HOLJPDQ3ROODUG
and Brass models. However for many countries the differences are small. 
,IZHORRNDWGLIIHUHQFHVDFURVVWKHPHWKRGVH[FHHGLQJ¿YHSHUFHQWRIWKH
506(RQO\ZH¿QGWKDW723$/6RXWSHUIRUPVWKHRWKHUWZRPHWKRGVLQ




TOPALS is less sensitive to the choice of the standard age schedule. For 
H[DPSOHLQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQZHXVHSURMHFWHGDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
of Japanese women as a standard age schedule for making scenarios of the 
death probabilities for European countries. The Japanese age pattern differs 
Males Females
Ages Germany Italy Hungary Germany Italy Hungary
0-20 0.93 0.86 1.47 0.89 0.87 1.25
30 0.81 0.86 1.50 1.01 0.80 1.60
40 0.91 0.79 2.51 0.98 0.81 2.07
50 1.02 0.72 3.12 1.14 0.78 2.19
60 1.00 0.85 2.40 1.00 0.84 1.85
70 1.05 0.91 1.92 1.04 0.89 1.86
80 1.01 0.96 1.46 1.07 0.89 1.60
90 1.06 0.98 0.87 1.14 0.97 1.14
100 1.09 0.99 0.86 1.12 0.98 1.01
109 1.04 0.98 0.81 1.05 0.98 0.94
Life expectancy
  at birth
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TXLWH VWURQJO\ IURP WKH (XURSHDQ WKH DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV DW
higher ages are considerably lower. Using this age schedule as standard for 
¿WWLQJ723$/6WKH506(LQFUHDVHVRQO\VOLJKWO\FRPSDUHGZLWKWKDWVKRZQ
in table 6.2. For males the average RMSE increases by 13 percent and for 
females by 10 per cent. However, using this age schedule as standard for 
¿WWLQJ WKH%UDVVUHODWLRQPRGHO WKH¿WRI WKH%UDVVPRGHOEHFRPHVUDWKHU
poor: the RMSE becomes 2.9 times as high. Thus the Brass model is much 
more sensitive to the choice of the standard age schedule.
6.6. 6FHQDULRVRIDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWK
The use of TOPALS for projecting death probabilities will be illustrated by 
making three types of scenarios. For each scenario we use the same ‘target’ 
DJHVSHFL¿F SUREDELOLWLHV RI GHDWK )RU WKLV SXUSRVH ZH XVH DJHVSHFL¿F
probabilities of death of Japanese women. )LJXUHVKRZVWKHDJHVSHFL¿F
death probabilities of Japanese women in 2008 and compares these with the 
NWS European average. In line with Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) we assume 
that life expectancy at birth of Japanese women will increase linearly. In 
section 6.3 we showed that this implies that life expectancy at birth of 
-DSDQHVHZRPHQZRXOGLQFUHDVHWR\HDUVLQVHH¿JXUH:H
)LJXUH$JHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
Solid line: Japanese women in 2008. 
Dotted line: average of 15 Northern, Western and Southern European countries.
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FDOFXODWHG DJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKE\ UHGXFLQJ WKH DJHVSHFL¿F
probabilities of death of 2008 by 74 percent which corresponds with a life 
expectancy at birth of 99.6 years. Since this produces a rather irregular 
age pattern we used TOPALS to smooth the age pattern. For this purpose 
we used the NWS European average as standard age curve, i.e. the same 
age schedule that we used as standard in section 6.5. Figure 6.8 shows the 
smooth target pattern. Instead of assuming the same percentage decrease in 
death probabilities across all ages to calculate the target pattern we could 
have assumed a change in the age pattern, e.g. we could have assumed that 
the decline at older ages will be larger than at young ages. However, note that 
the difference between the death probabilities of Japanese women in 2008 
and the NWS European average between ages 50 and 85 is larger than that 
at younger ages. This implies that an equal percentage reduction of death 
probabilities of Japanese women across all ages produces a target pattern 
which shows a stronger reduction of death probabilities between ages 50 and 
85 compared with the current NWS European than for younger ages.
We calculated three scenarios based on this same target pattern. For the 
ages at the knots we make time series of risk ratios by dividing the death 
probabilities for each country by the target values. )LJXUHVDDQGE 
show the time series of risk ratios for three selected ages for Germany, Italy 
and Hungary, for men and women for the period 1976-2006. The scenarios 
are based on projections of these risk ratios into the future. The scenarios 
differ by the speed with which the target values will be reached, i.e. the speed 
ZLWKZKLFKWKHULVNUDWLRVPRYHWRZDUGV7KH¿JXUHVVKRZWKDWWKHUDWH
of decline has differed across ages and across countries. For the youngest 
age group 0-20 years the decline has been strong. For age 90 there has 
been a moderate decline only. For Hungary, the development of mortality 
of middle-aged men showed an increase in the 1970s and 1980s.  For the 
¿UVW VFHQDULR ZH HVWLPDWH WKH SDUWLDO DGMXVWPHQWPRGHO IRU HDFK FRXQWU\
separately. We call this the Baseline scenario. The second scenario assumes 
that the values of ĳ are equal for all countries. This scenario assumes that 
there will be a similar trend across European countries. We call this the 
Convergence scenario. The third scenario assumes that the future decrease 
in death probabilities will exceed that in the last three decades. We label this 
as the Acceleration scenario.
 Baseline Scenario
Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) suggest that life expectancy for individual 
countries can be projected by assuming that the gap with the best-practice 
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for all countries. However, Oeppen and Vaupel acknowledge that life 
expectancy has not increased with the same speed across all countries during 
the last century. Therefore we assume that death probabilities move towards 
the best practice levels, but that the speed may differ. Thus we specify the 
year that the best practice level will be reached not a priori: it depends on 
the value of ĳ. The Baseline scenario projects the risk ratios using equation 
(15). This scenario can be considered as an extrapolation of past trends. We 
estimate the parameter ĳ for each country at each knot separately for the 
period 1976-2006 by minimizing the sum of squared residuals of equation 
(14). This estimation period is similar to the period that Eurostat chooses 
as basis for their latest scenarios (Lanzieri, 2009). The values of ĳ indicate 
how strongly the observed probabilities of death move towards the low 
levels corresponding with a life expectancy of 99.6 years. 7DEOH shows 
the estimated values of ĳ for Germany, Italy and Hungary. If ĳ is close to 
1, the projections will move very slowly to the target value, and thus death 
probabilities will decline slowly. If ĳ equals 1, the projected value equals 
the last observed value and does not move towards the target level. This 
is the case for Hungarian men at ages 50 and 60. For Italy for most ages 
the values of ĳ are lower than for the other two countries, thus the model 
will project a more rapid decline of death probabilities for Italy. Tables B.3 
and B.4 in Annex B show the estimated values of ĳ for all countries in this 
study for men and women respectively. The tables show that the estimated 
values of ĳ for older ages tend to be closer to one than for younger ages. The 
explanation is that at the older ages there has been a slow decrease in death 
probabilities. This implies that the Baseline scenario projects only limited 
decrease at older ages in the future. Note that even though we assume the 
same target levels of probabilities of death across all countries and for both 
sexes, this does not imply that this is a convergence scenario. The projections 
differ across countries for two reasons: the differences between the current 
and target values of the death probabilities differ and the values of ĳ are 
different across countries.
By multiplying the projected risk ratios by the target values of the 
probabilities of death we obtain projections of the death probabilities for 
each country. )LJXUHVDE and F show the projections for three 
VHOHFWHG DJHV IRU *HUPDQ\ ,WDO\ DQG +XQJDU\ 7KH ¿JXUHV FRPSDUH WKH
Baseline scenario with the projections according to the Lee-Carter model. 
Generally the projections according to the Baseline scenario are rather close 
to the Lee-Carter projections. However, for German and Hungarian men 
aged 90 the jump-off point of the Lee-Carter projections differs from the 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1976 1986 1996 2006 2016 2026 2036 2046 2056
178 Chapter 6
projections are based on a random walk with drift projection starting from 
the last estimated value of the death probability according to equation (4) 
rather than from the last observed value. We discussed this issue at the end 
RIVHFWLRQVHH¿JXUH)RUWKLVUHDVRQ/HHDQG0LOOHUVXJJHVW
to use the last observed value as jump-off value for the projections of the 
Lee-Carter model. This would make the Lee-Carter projections closer to the 
Baseline scenario. 
)LJXUHV D and E FRPSDUH WKH DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV
projected by the Baseline scenario with the pattern in the last observation 
\HDUDQGZLWKWKHWDUJHWSDWWHUQIRUPHQDQGZRPHQUHVSHFWLYLO\7KH¿JXUHV
show that for young ages the projected death probabilities are rather close 
to the target pattern, whereas for the oldest ages the projections are close to 
WKHODVWREVHUYHGYDOXHV7KLVUHÀHFWVWKHUHODWLYHO\VWURQJGHFOLQHLQGHDWK
probabilities at young ages and the slow decline at older ages during the 
observation period. For Hungarian men the death probabilities at middle 
ages hardly decline. This is the result of the fact during a large part of the 
estimation period death probabilities at middle age increased and that in 
more recent years there has been only a moderate decrease as a consequence 
of which death probabilities in 2006 were higher than in 1976.
7DEOHV and  show the values of life expectancy at birth in 2060 for men 
DQGZRPHQUHVSHFWLYHO\ZKLFKUHVXOWIURPWKHSURMHFWLRQVRIWKHDJHVSHFL¿F
death probabilities according to the Baseline scenario. In 2008 life 
expectancy at birth for Japanese women equalled 86 years. Table 6.5 shows 
that according to Baseline scenario in all Northern, Western and Southern 
European countries life expectancy of women is expected to reach that level 
well before 2060. In most Eastern European countries that level would not 
be reached before 2060. Table 6.4 shows that for men life expectancy at 
birth for most Northern, Western and Southern European countries would 
approach the current world record level around 2060. The target pattern 
assumes an increase in life expectancy to 99.6 years in 2060. None of the 
European countries is expected to approach that level in this century.
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the Lee-Carter projections as well. For most 
Northern, Western and Southern European countries the differences between 
the Baseline scenario and the Lee-Carter projection are moderate. On 
average the projected life expectancy according to the Baseline scenario 
in 2060 for the 15 Northern, Western and Southern European countries is 
0.2 years lower than the Lee-Carter projection. For four Eastern European 
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The explanation is that the projections based on the partial adjustment 
projections are restricted since it is assumed that ĳ . Thus if at certain 
ages death probabilities have increased in the observation period, the model 
projects a constant future level, whereas the projections of the Lee-Carter 
model project an increase in death probabilities at those ages. Figure 6.11 
shows that the age pattern of death probabilities projected by TOPALS 
is smooth. In contrast, the age pattern projected by the Lee-Carter model 
(not shown here) is rather irregular. Lee and Carter (1992) suggest to use 
¿YH\HDUVDJHJURXSV+RZHYHUVLQFHPRUWDOLW\UDWHVLQFUHDVHVWURQJO\E\
age, this is a rather crude approximation. As an alternative Renshaw and 
Haberman (2003) and Currie et alVXJJHVWWRVPRRWKWKHDJHVSHFL¿F
death probabilities using splines. 
 Sensitivity analysis
The projections of the Baseline scenario depend on different choices: (1) the 
choice of the estimation period for estimating the parameter of the partial 
adjustment model, (2) the choice of the partial adjustment model for making 
projections and (3) the choice of the target pattern for calculating the risk 
ratios. It is useful to examine how sensitive the projections are to these 
choices. 7DEOH compares the Baseline scenarios for Germany, Italy and 
Hungary with projections based on alternative assumptions. The table shows 
that choosing a shorter, more recent estimation period for estimating the value 
of ĳ would result in considerably higher projections for Hungary, especially 
for men. The reason is that the development of mortality in Hungary in 
recent years has been more favourable than in the 1970s and 1980s as was 
VKRZQLQ¿JXUH)RU*HUPDQ\DQG,WDO\WKHHIIHFWRIFKRRVLQJDGLIIHUHQW
estimation period is clearly smaller. If the Lee-Carter model is estimated for 
a shorter period the effects on the projections are similar.
If instead of using the partial adjustment model (15) we use the random 
walk model with drift (18) for making projections for Germany and Italy the 
projections become higher. The reason is that the projections of the random 
walk model with drift are unconstrained. The projections of the random walk 
model are closer to those of the Lee-Carter model as would be expected since 
the parameter kt of the Lee-Carter model is projected by a random walk model 
as well. However, the projections are not equal to those of the Lee-Carter 
model. The reason was explained at the end of  section 6.4. For Hungarian 
men the random walk model projection is very low. The explanation is that 
the random walk model projects an increase in death probabilities of men 
in their 50s and 60s, since the death probabilities in 2006 exceeded those in 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































above for Hungarian men the estimated value of ĳ at knots 50 and 60 equals 
1 (see table 6.3). This implies that the projection equal the last value in the 
observation period. 
The projections of the partial adjustment model are based on assuming target 
values of the death probabilities that would result in a life expectancy at 
birth of 99.6 years. If higher target values of the death probabilities would 
be assumed, the projected life expectancy would be lower.  However table 
6.6 shows that the change in the projected value is considerably smaller 
than the difference between the target values. If it would be assumed that 
the target level of life expectancy equals 95 years instead of 99.6 years the 
projected life expectancy for men would hardly be affected. For women 
the projections would be 0.3 to 1.1 years lower. If the target levels of death 
probabilities are chosen so that they result in a life expectancy at birth of 110 
years rather than  99.6 years, the projected life expectancy for Italian men 
and women would become about 1 year higher. For the other two countries 
the differences would be considerably smaller. The explanation is that the 
estimated values of ĳ change if another target level is chosen. If the target 
value is lower the estimated value of ĳ becomes higher, which implies that 
the model projects that it will take much more time before that lower target 
level will be reached. Instead of assuming the same rate of decline across 
all ages one could specify target values assuming a different age pattern. 
For example, one might assume that the decrease in death probabilities at 
older ages is larger than at younger ages. However, that would not result 
in strongly different projections, since the estimated values of ĳ at older 
ages are close to one. This would lead to different projections only if one 
would assume that in the future different values of ĳ would apply than in the 
observation period. The conclusion of the sensitivity analysis is that even 
though different choices would result in different projections, the differences 
are moderate only.
 Convergence scenario
There is ample empirical evidence that there has been a converging 
tendency in mortality declines during the last decades (Wilson, 2001; 
White, 2002; Janssen et al., 2004; Bongaarts, 2006 and Lanzieri, 2009). 
Life expectancy has increased more strongly in countries that had relatively 
low life expectancies. The latest Eurostat projections, EUROPOP2008, are 
based on the assumption that there is a converging trend in the long run 
(Lanzieri, 2009). The main underlying assumption is that the socioeconomic 
differences between Member States of the European Union will fade out in 
the long run (Lanzieri, 2009). The scenario assumes that advanced medical 
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Germany Italy Hungary
men women men women men women
Baseline 
scenario
86.4 89.6 87.5 91.4 73.9 84.4
Estimation 
period 1986-2006
86.5 89.2 88.2 91.7 78.5 86.7
Random walk 
model
87.4 90.4 88.7 92.8 70.5 84.2
Target value life 
expectancy = 95 
years
86.0 88.5 87.6 90.7 73.8 84.1
Target value life 
expectancy = 110 
years
87.1 89.9 88.8 92.6 74.1 84.7
7DEOH6HQVLWLYLW\DQDO\VLVRISURMHFWLRQVRIOLIHH[SHFWDQF\DWELUWKLQ
*HUPDQ\,WDO\DQG+XQJDU\
Note: Baseline scenario: estimation period 1976-2006; target value of life expectancy 
= 99.6 years.
techniques will be accessible in each country and healthy life styles will 
be homogeneously spread in Europe. Gender differences in life style are 
assumed to diminish. Differences in smoking between men and women 
have decreased. Moreover, improvement of standards of living will have a 
stronger positive effect on male life expectancy as they are more sensitive to 
economic conditions, which will narrow the gender gap in life expectancy 
(Brunner, 1997). The convergence scenario of EUROPOP2008 assumes that 
full convergence will be reached in 2150. In specifying our Convergence 
scenario we follow a different approach. We follow the recommendation 
by Janssen and Kunst (2007) that rather than assuming that mortality rates 
of different countries will reach the same target level by the end of the 
projection period, the average mortality change among similar countries 
should be used as the basis for the long-run projection of the mortality levels 
for the individual countries. One reason is, that as Bongaarts (2006) argues, 
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WKHDYHUDJHSDFHRIPRUWDOLW\GHFOLQHDFURVVDQXPEHURIFRXQWULHVUHÀHFWV
the effects of improvements in medical technology and behaviour whereas 
FRXQWU\VSHFL¿FGHYLDWLRQVDUHXQSUHGLFWDEOH7XOMDSXUNDUet al. (2000) found 
that the time-dependent parameter of the Lee-Carter model follows a common 
pattern for the G7 countries. Li and Lee (2005) argue that long-run forecasts 
for individual countries can be improved by estimating the time-dependent 
parameter in the Lee-Carter model for a group of countries. Thus there may 
be two reasons for specifying a Convergence scenario. One obvious reason 
is that one assumes that there is a converging tendency among European 
countries. But another important reason is that estimating a common long-run 
trend for a group of countries may provide a more reliable basis for long-run 
projections as it excludes the effect of temporary deviations in individual 
FRXQWULHV7KHUHIRUHZHVSHFL¿HGD&RQYHUJHQFHVFHQDULRE\HVWLPDWLQJWKH
values of ĳ for time series of the average probabilities of death of 15 Northern, 
Western and Southern European countries. We calculated weighted averages 
using population size as weight. We did not include the Central and Eastern 
European countries in the estimation of the common parameter as these have 
clearly followed a different development in the sample period. The estimated 
values of ĳ are given in table 6.3. For the Convergence scenario we use 
these estimated values of ĳ for making projections for all European countries 
including the Central and Eastern European countries. 
(852323SURMHFWVWKHOHYHOVRIWKHDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVLQ
2100 by applying the Lee-Carter model to the average across 12 Northern, 
Western and Southern European countries. Compared with the 15 countries 
we use, Eurostat did not include Ireland, Norway and Switzerland. The 
/HH&DUWHUPRGHO LV ¿WWHG WR WKH SHULRG  7KH OHYHOV IRU 
are obtained by exponential interpolation. This results in a rather strong 
converging trend. Whereas in 2006 the difference between the lowest and 
highest values of life expectancy shown in tables 6.4. and 6.5. were 13.8 years 
for men and 7.9 years for women respectively, Eurostat assumes that this 
will be decreased to 5.4 years for men and 3.6 years for women in 2060 (we 
exclude Belarus, Russia and Ukraine from these comparisons as Eurostat did 
not produce scenarios for these three countries). According to the Baseline 
scenario the differences between the countries with the highest and lowest 
levels of life expectancy in 2060 would be larger than in 2006. This is mainly 
due to the relatively small increases projected for the Eastern European 
countries.  Our Convergence scenario projects that the differences between 
the lowest and highest life expectancy in 2060 would become 8.4 years for 
men and 4.3 years for women. This is smaller than the differences in 2006 
but larger than the Eurostat scenario. Again, this can mainly be explained 
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by the Eastern European countries. If we look at the Northern, Western and 
Southern European countries, the Convergence scenario projects that the 
differences between the lowest and highest values of life expectancy would 
become 2.1 years for men and 1.8 years for women compared with 1.7 years 
for both men and women according to Eurostat.
)LJXUHVDEand F compare the projected death probabilities 
for men according to the Convergence scenario with those according to the 
Baseline scenario for three ages. For Germany the projections according to 
both scenarios are similar, which can be explained by the fact that Germany 
is a rather average country. For Italy there is slightly less decrease in the 
death probabilities according to the Convergence scenario. The reason is 
that the Italian decrease according to the Baseline scenario is above average. 
Figure 6.12b shows that for Hungarian middle aged men the decrease in 
death probabilities according to the Convergence scenario is considerably 
stronger than according to the Baseline scenario. Figure 6.12c shows that 
at the oldest ages the opposite is true. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show that for all 
Central and Eastern European countries life expectancy according to the 
Convergence scenario is considerably higher than according to the Baseline 
scenario. On average the Convergence scenario is 3.6 years higher for men 
and 2.0 years for women than the Baseline scenario. For most Northern, 
Western and Southern European countries the differences between both 
scenarios are under one year. There are two clear exceptions: for Denmark 
and the Netherlands the Baseline scenario projects only a moderate increase 
since both countries have shown a below average increase in the observation 
period. For both countries life expectancy according to the Convergence 
scenario is two years higher than according to the Baseline scenario. 
 Acceleration scenario
The future may differ from the past. Even though mortality has declined 
steadily for a long period, the causes of this decline have changed over 
time. In the past the main cause of increase in life expectancy at birth was a 
decline in infant mortality. This was mainly caused by advances in hygiene, 
PHGLFLQHDQGLPSURYHPHQWRIOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQV,QWKH¿UVWKDOIRIWKHth 
century the main cause of death were infectious diseases. In the second half 
of the century death by infectious diseases has declined strongly across all 
ages. The main causes of death have become cardiovascular diseases and 
cancer. During the last 50 years mortality by cancer has increased. One main 
cause has been smoking. In recent decades in many countries mortality 
by cardiovascular diseases has decreased as a consequence of advances in 
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been falling as well due to a decline in smoking. As the causes of changes 
in death probabilities have changed over time there is no a priori reason 
why the decline of mortality in the future should be the same as in the past. 
Olshansky et al. (2009) assume that in the next 50 years the risk of death may 
EHLQÀXHQFHGE\DFFHOHUDWHGDGYDQFHVLQELRPHGLFDOWHFKQRORJ\E\FKDQJHV
in behavioural risk factors and by aggressive management of symptoms. 
Therefore we developed a third scenario assuming that the future rate of 
decline in mortality will be stronger than during the observation period. 
In the Acceleration scenario we assume that the time needed for reaching 
D  SHUFHQW UHGXFWLRQ LQ WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH FXUUHQW DJHVSHFL¿F
probabilities of death of each country and the target values will be half of 
that according to the Convergence scenario. We calculate our Acceleration 
scenario by reducing the values of ĳ for each age. This is illustrated in ¿JXUH
 which shows the projection of the risk ratios for men aged 50 according 
to the Convergence scenario. The estimated value of ĳ equals .977. Starting 
from a risk ratio of 9.12 in 2006, this value of ĳ implies that it will take 30 
years (in the year 2036) to reach a 50 percent reduction in the value of the 
risk ratio compared with the target value of 1. In order to reach this value 
within 15 years (in the year 2021) the value of ĳ has to be reduced to .955. 
The latter value is used for the calculation of the Acceleration scenario. The 
values of ĳ  for the Acceleration scenario are shown in table 6.3.
Figures 6.12a, 6.12b and 6.12c show that according to the Acceleration 
scenario the death probabilities decline at a higher rate than during the 
observation period. From tables 6.4 and 6.5 it can be calculated that average 
life expectancy according to the Acceleration scenario would be six years 
higher than according to the Convergence scenario for men and four years 
for women respectively. The tables show that for two thirds of the Northern, 
Western and Southern European countries the linear projection of life 
expectancy leads to a higher projection than the Acceleration scenario. This 
clearly illustrates that a linear increase in life expectancy can only be achieved 
E\DQDFFHOHUDWLRQ LQ WKHGHFUHDVHRI DJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV)RU
most Eastern European countries the linear projections of life expectancy are 
lower than the three scenarios. The explanation is that death probabilities at 
middle ages have shown an increase during the observation period, but that 
the three scenarios do not project an increase in death probabilities because 
it was assumed that ĳ. 
)LJXUHVDandEcompare the age pattern of the death probabilities of 





Solid line: Convergence scenario. Dashed line: Acceleration scenario.
ages the Acceleration scenario differs considerably from the target pattern. 
The reason is that the values of ĳ for ages 80 and over (shown in table 6.3) 
are closer to 1 than the values for middle ages. Olshansky et al. (2009) 
specify one scenario in which they assume that the slope of the mortality age 
schedule will be reduced. Using TOPALS and the partial adjustment model 
we can specify such a scenario by assuming lower values of ĳ for older 
ages. Note that the target pattern implies a decreasing slope for ages 80 and 
over. By reducing the value of ĳ the projections move more strongly in that 
direction. For example one could assume that the values of ĳ for ages 80 and 
over are equal to those for ages 50 to 70. Such a scenario would lead to an 
additional increase in life expectancy of three to four years compared with 
the Acceleration scenario.
6.7. Conclusion and discussion
TOPALS is a relational model that can be used to smooth and project 
DJHVSHFL¿F SUREDELOLWLHV RI GHDWK 7KH EHQH¿WV RI 723$/6 DUH WKDW WKH
PHWKRG LV HDV\ DQG ÀH[LEOH ZKLOH LWV SHUIRUPDQFH LV FRPSDUDEOH ZLWK
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1956PRRWKLQJDQGSURMHFWLQJDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKE\723$/6
UDWLRVEHWZHHQWKHDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKRIDJLYHQFRXQWU\DQG
a smooth standard age schedule. This implies that the relationship of the 
DJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVRIWKDWFRXQWU\DQGWKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOH
can be described by risk ratios at selected ages only, the so-called knots. The 
XVHRIDVSOLQHPDNHV723$/6ÀH[LEOHLWFDQGHVFULEHGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIDJH
VFKHGXOHV7KLVFKDSWHUXVHV723$/6WRVPRRWKDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRI
death for 26 European countries. If the standard age schedule is the average 
over a number of countries the risk ratios simply indicate to what extent the 
death probabilities of a country at different ages are higher or lower than the 
average. Using the average of 15 Northern, Western and Southern European 
countries as standard schedule, TOPALS turns out to produce smooth age 
FXUYHV IRU WKH (XURSHDQ FRXQWULHV2Q DYHUDJH WKH JRRGQHVV RI ¿W RI
TOPALS is better than that of the Heligman-Pollard model and the Brass 
relational model. 
If the standard age schedule describes the best practice level of mortality, 
the risk ratios show how much higher death probabilities at different ages 
are than the best practice level. A partial adjustment model can be used to 
project how rapidly the death probabilities at the knots will move towards 
the best practice level. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) argue that best practice 
life expectancy at birth has followed a linear increase for a century and a 
half and that a reasonable scenario is that this linear trend will continue for 
decades to come. Since the early 1980s life expectancy at birth of Japanese 
women has been the highest in the world. Thus a linear projection of life 
H[SHFWDQF\ RI -DSDQHVH ZRPHQ ¿YH GHFDGHV DKHDG PD\ EH DVVXPHG WR
LQGLFDWH WKHPLQLPXP IXWXUH OHYHOV RI DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV LQ
the next 50 years. Using these levels as standard age schedule, TOPALS 
and a partial adjustment model can be used to project to what extent death 
probabilities in European countries will move in the direction of those levels. 
Instead of a priori assuming that the record level will be reached by other 
countries before a given forecast horizon, we estimate the parameter ĳof the 
partial adjustment model which determines how rapidly death probabilities 
move towards this pattern. The value of ĳ can be estimated for each country 
separately. This produces a Baseline scenario. Table 6.4 shows that the 
Baseline scenario projects that life expectancy at birth in 2060 for men in 
Northern, Western and Southern European countries will range from 83 to 
88 years and table 6.5 shows that the range for women will be from 87 to 
92 years.  For Central and Eastern European countries the range is wider: 
from 63 to 82 years for men and from 76 to 87 years for women.  This is 
due to the fact that the development of death probabilities in countries such 
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as Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. On average the Baseline scenario 
is slightly higher than the Eurostat scenario for Northern, Western and 
Southern European countries. For Central and Eastern European countries 
the Eurostat scenarios are much higher as they assume strong convergence 
towards the low levels in Northern, Western and Southern Europe. 
TOPALS can be used to calculate alternative scenarios as well. One scenario 
is to assume that different European countries will follow similar trends. 
There are two reasons for making such a scenario. One reason is that there 
is empirical evidence that mortality trends in developed countries have 
followed a converging trend. Another reason is that estimation of a common 
trend in mortality decline across a number of countries may produce a more 
stable trend than separate estimates of the trend for individual countries 
which are more sensitive to temporary deviations from the long-run trend. 
In this chapter TOPALS is used to calculate a Convergence scenario which 
uses estimates of the values of ĳ for average death probabilities across 15 
Northern, Western and Southern European countries. The Convergence 
scenario projects a narrow range for Northern, Western and Southern 
European countries in 2060: from 85 to 87 years for men and from 89 to 
91 years for women. For Central and Eastern European countries the 
Convergence scenario projects a rather narrow range as well: from 76 to 84 
years for men and from 85 to 89 years for women. 
During the last decades the decline in death probabilities at older ages has 
been moderate in many countries. This implies that even if very low target 
values are assumed, the projections will move only very slowly to these low 
values, and thus within the foreseeable future not very low levels will be 
reached. An alternative assumption is to assume that in the future the death 
probabilities will move more quickly to the target values than they have done 
during the last decades. The Acceleration scenario assumes that the time 
QHHGHGWRUHGXFHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHFXUUHQWOHYHORIDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWK
probabilities and the target level by 50 percent will be half that according 
to the Convergence scenario. According to the Acceleration scenario life 
expectancy of men in Northern, Western and Southern European countries 
would range from 90 to 91 years and for women from 93 to 94 years in 2060. 
For Central and Eastern Europe life expectancy would range from 86 to 89 
years for men and from 91 to 93 years for women. The gender gap would 
become about three years. The Acceleration scenario is closer to a linear 
projection of life expectancy than the Baseline scenario. Thus assuming a 




decision to be made is the choice of the base period (Janssen and Kunst, 
2007; Alders and De Beer, 2006). Forecasters tend to follow the general rule 
that for making long-run forecasts, one should use a long base period, i.e. a 
period that is at least as long as the period for which projections are made 
(Janssen and Kunst, 2007). However, this simple rule of thumb does not 
DOZD\VOHDGWRVDWLVIDFWRU\SURMHFWLRQV/HHDQG0LOOHUVXJJHVWWR¿W
the Lee-Carter model to the period since 1950 in order to avoid departures 
of the time series of the time-dependent parameter from linearity. In many 
Western European countries developments in mortality of men were not 
very favourable in the 1950 and 1960s. As a consequence projections based 
on time series of the last 50 or 60 years seem to be rather pessimistic. In 
most European countries the decline in mortality of men in the last ten years 
has been stronger than in previous decades. Thus if the projections would 
be based on the last ten years of the observation period projections of life 
expectancy of men would have been higher. In contrast, in many Northern, 
Western and Southern European countries, the increase in life expectancy 
of women in the last ten years have been smaller than before. Thus using 
a short base period would result in lower projections of life expectancy of 
women. However, one may question whether a base period of ten years is 
a sound basis for making projections for several decades into the future 
since developments over such a short period may be caused by temporal 
deviations from the long-term trend (Janssen and Kunst, 2007). Booth, 
Maindonald and Smith (2002) proposed a method for determining the 
RSWLPDO¿WWLQJSHULRGRIWKH/HH&DUWHUPRGHO7KHLUFULWHULRQLVZKHWKHUWKH
recent trend is linear. This seems to produce reasonably accurate forecasts 
for the relatively short run. Booth, Tickle and Smith (2005) examine this 
SURFHGXUHIRU\HDUVDKHDGIRUHFDVWVIRUGLIIHUHQWFRXQWULHV7KH\¿QGWKDW
their procedure improves average forecast accuracy in a number of cases, 
but not in all cases. Moreover, accuracy of short-term projections does not 
necessarily imply that long-term projections will be accurate. One way of 
examining the effect of the choice of the base period on forecast accuracy is 
to calculate the size of ex ante forecast errors, i.e. to examine the accuracy of 
projections of observations outside the base period. However, this procedure 
is not very helpful for examining the accuracy of long-run projections, as this 
would imply that one would need to examine whether very old data would 
help in projecting recent observations. It is questionable to what extent this 
would provide useful information for new projections. 
2QHEHQH¿WRIWKH/HH&DUWHUPRGHOLVWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIIRUHFDVWLQWHUYDOV
The use of the random walk model with drift to project the time-dependent 
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parameter of the Lee-Carter model allows to calculate forecast intervals 
(Lee and Carter, 1992). However, one should note that the estimation of the 
forecast intervals depends on the choices to be made when estimating the 
model. For example, the choice of the estimation period does not only affect 
the point projections of the Lee-Carter model but the estimate of the forecast 
intervals as well. The uncertainty of the projections based on TOPALS 
together with the partial adjustment model could be assessed by Monte 
Carlo simulation assuming some distribution of the target values and of the 
values of ĳ. Expert opinion can be used to formulate assumptions about the 
probability distribution of the target values (Lutz et al., 1998; Alders and De 
Beer, 2006).
The method described in this chapter projects period and age effects of 
changes in death probabilities and do not take into account cohort effects. 
Booth (2006) and Janssen and Kunst (2007) note that only few forecasts of 
mortality are based on cohort models. Cohort effects can lead to non-linear 
developments (Renshaw and Haberman, 2006). For example, changes in 
smoking behaviour have caused non-linear effects. It caused an increase in 
death by lung cancer between 1950 and 1990 among cohorts who started 
WRVPRNH LQ WKH¿UVWKDOIRI WKHth century (Peto et al., 2005). After the 
prevalence of smoking declined, death by lung cancer has started to decline. 
Bongaarts (2006) and Janssen and Kunst (2007) suggest that forecasts of 
mortality can be improved by estimating which part of mortality changes 
can be explained by changes in smoking behaviour. Because of the long 
time lag between smoking and death by lung cancer, recent statistics on 
smoking behaviour can be used to project smoking-related mortality for the 
next decades. The part of mortality that is not affected by smoking can be 
projected using a linear projection model. TOPALS could be used for this 
purpose by estimating the partial adjustment model for time series of risk 
ratios that are ‘corrected’ for the effect of smoking.
This chapter describes a method for making scenarios of future mortality 
on the basis of an analysis of past time series of death probabilities and life 
expectancy. One alternative is to look for determinants of changes in mortality. 
For example, the increase in life expectancy can be explained by changes in life 
style behaviour (diet, smoking, physical exercise), the availability of medical 
and long-term care, the improvement of medical technology, prevention, and 
OLYLQJFRQGLWLRQV+RZHYHULWLVYHU\GLI¿FXOWWRDVVHVVWKHLQGLYLGXDOHIIHFWV
of these determinants as they have changed simultaneously. Moreover, it is 
GLI¿FXOWWRPDNHSURMHFWLRQVRIWKHVHXQGHUO\LQJFDXVHV%RRWK7KLV
would imply that one would need to make forecasts of medical technical 
2016PRRWKLQJDQGSURMHFWLQJDJHVSHFL¿FSUREDELOLWLHVRIGHDWKE\723$/6
progress and its effects on mortality, forecasts of the availability of medical 
care, which is dependent on both economic developments and political 
choices, and forecasts of future changes in behaviour. Nevertheless, one 
may develop scenarios based on alternative assumptions about the future 
developments in these determinants and their effect on mortality. This can 
UHVXOWLQDOWHUQDWLYHDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHWDUJHWSDWWHUQRIDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWK
probabilities and TOPALS together with the partial adjustment model can be 
XVHGWRPDNHSURMHFWLRQVRIDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV WRZDUGVWKHVH
WDUJHWOHYHOV7KHYDOXHRIWKHFRHI¿FLHQWĳ of the partial adjustment model 
can be estimated on the basis of the times series of risk ratios. However, that 
would not lead to widely different scenarios as low target levels will lead to 
relatively high estimated values of ĳ. Alternatively one can determine the 
value of ĳ on the basis of an assumption about the number of years it will 
take until the difference with the target pattern will be reduced by 50 percent. 
For example, if ĳ equals 0.933 it will take ten years to halve the distance to 
the target value. If one would assume that it would take 20 years to reduce 
the difference with the target value by 50 percent one should assumes that 
the value of ĳ  equals 0.966.

7. Conclusions and discussion
Population forecasts project the future population by age and sex. Usually 
the cohort component model is used for making the calculations. Starting 
from the current population numbers by age and sex the cohort component 
model projects how the population will change as a consequence of changes 
in the levels of fertility, mortality, and migration. Thus for making population 
projections assumptions need to be made about future changes in fertility, 
mortality, and migration. These assumptions can be based on quantitative 
models, e.g. time series models or explanatory models. On the basis of an 
assessment of trends observed in the past, time series models can be used to 
make projections showing what will happen if past trends will continue. Even 
though such model based projections may seem objective, the application 
of models for making projections is based on a number of choices that 
are not always made explicit by the forecaster. Alternatively forecasts can 
be argument based, i.e. they can be based on expert opinions about likely 
future developments in the main drivers of changes in fertility, mortality and 
migration. Whether forecasts are based on models or arguments, they are 
based on choices and assumptions. 
This book describes different models that can be used for making assumptions 
about future changes in fertility, mortality, and migration. The emphasis is 
on quantitative methods. We argue that the choices and assumptions that 
need to be made when using these methods should be made explicit. The 
methods should be regarded as tools for forecasters rather than as statistical 
models that ‘automatically’ produce forecasts. If in using these methods the 
forecaster would have made different choices the outcomes of the forecasts 
or scenarios would have been different. In order to make it possible for users 
to judge the quality of forecasts and scenarios the forecasting process should 
be transparent. The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, we summarize 
WKHPDLQ¿QGLQJVRI&KDSWHUVDQGDERXWPLJUDWLRQ&KDSWHUVDQG
about fertility and Chapter 6 about mortality. Subsequently we discuss the 
use of methods for making population projections, scenarios and forecasts 
in a transparent way.
7.1. Migration
Many countries do not have reliable or detailed statistics of international 
PLJUDWLRQ 'XH WR GLIIHUHQFHV LQ GH¿QLWLRQV DQG PHDVXUHPHQW PHWKRGV
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FURVVFRXQWU\FRPSDULVRQVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQSDWWHUQVDUHGLI¿FXOW
Moreover, under-registration, under-coverage and accuracy of the collection 
system affect the measurement of migration. The main source of differences 
LQGH¿QLWLRQRIPLJUDWLRQDUHWKHSODFHRIUHVLGHQFHDQGWKHGXUDWLRQRIVWD\
The legal place of residence is not necessarily the same as the actual place 
of residence. For example, emigrants may be registered in their country of 
citizenship even after several years of living abroad. The duration of stay 
criterion in most European countries ranges from three months to one year. 
But some countries measure permanent change of residence only and some 
other countries do not take duration of stay into account at all. One main cause 
of under-registration of migration is that migrants may not report a change 
in place of residence. In general migrants have more incentive to report their 
arrival than their departure. Therefore immigration statistics are generally 
considered more reliable than emigration statistics. Under-coverage occurs 
because particular migrant groups may not be included in statistics, e.g. 
nationals, asylum seekers or students. In some countries migration statistics 
are based on sample surveys. These may be unreliable due to sampling 
HUURUVLIWKHVDPSOHVL]HLVVPDOO%HFDXVHRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQGH¿QLWLRQ
registration, coverage and accuracy the numbers of emigrants reported 
by sending countries differ from the numbers of immigrants reported by 
receiving countries. 
Chapter 2 shows how comparing migration statistics from sending and 
receiving countries can help in making internationally consistent estimates 
RIPLJUDWLRQÀRZV7KHLGHDEHKLQGWKHPHWKRGLVVLPSOH,IZHFRPSDUH
emigration statistics of country A to countries B, C and D with the 
immigration statistics of countries B, C and DDQGZH¿QGWKDWWKHHPLJUDWLRQ
statistics are x percent lower than the corresponding immigration statistics, 
we assume that emigration statistics of country A should be multiplied by 
100/(100-x) in order to obtain estimates of the ‘true’ size of emigration. 
In fact, the calculations are a bit more complicated than this, because this 
calculation implies that it is assumed that the immigration statistics are 
FRUUHFW%XWLPPLJUDWLRQVWDWLVWLFVDUHDIIHFWHGE\GLIIHUHQFHVLQGH¿QLWLRQ
and measurement errors as well. Thus the immigration numbers need to 
EH DGMXVWHG WRR )RU WKDW UHDVRQ WZR WDEOHV RI PLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV EHWZHHQ
countries are compared. One table is based on immigration statistics reported 
by receiving countries and shows immigration numbers by country of 
immigration and by country of origin. The other table is based on emigration 
statistics by country of destination reported by sending countries. One 
can calculate adjustment factors for immigration and emigration for each 
country in such a way that for each country the total number of immigrants 
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calculated from the adjusted immigration table equals the total from the 
DGMXVWHGHPLJUDWLRQWDEOH,QRUGHUWR¿QGDXQLTXHVHWRIDGMXVWPHQWIDFWRUV
one needs to impose one restriction. For example, one may assume that 
immigration statistics of one particular country are reliable. This implies that 
one can assume that the adjustment factor for immigration for that country 
equals one. The calculations can easily been done in a spreadsheet program. 
One basic assumption underlying these calculations is that the distributions 
of reported immigration by country of origin and reported emigration by 
country of destination correspond with the distribution of actual migration 
ÀRZV7KLV DVVXPSWLRQPD\ QRW KROG LQ DOO FDVHV )RU H[DPSOH UHSRUWHG
emigration from country A to country B may be x percent too low, but 
reported emigration from country A to country C may be y per cent too low. 
Estimating one adjustment factor for emigration from country A would result 
LQRYHUHVWLPDWLQJRQHÀRZDQGXQGHUHVWLPDWLQJ WKHRWKHU)RU WKDW UHDVRQ
parameters are added to the model in order to take this effect into account. 
However, the number of additional parameters should be limited. Otherwise, 
the estimate of the adjustment factor for a particular country is based on 
a very limited number of data only. Thus if there is reason to believe that 
for one country the reported distribution of immigration or emigration by 
country of origin or destination differs strongly from the actual distribution 
it should be concluded that comparing the immigration and emigration 
WDEOHVGRHVQRWSURYLGHVXI¿FLHQWLQIRUPDWLRQ$GGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQZLOO
be needed. This may be obtained from expert opinions. The IMEM project is 
aimed to develop a Bayesian method which includes expert opinion (Raymer 
and Smith, 2010). The method described in chapter 2 can only be applied 
for countries reporting immigration and emigration numbers by country of 
origin and destination respectively. If data are missing, a two-step procedure 
can be followed (Raymer et al7KH¿UVWVWHSHVWLPDWHVPLVVLQJGDWD
using covariate information. The second step harmonises the estimates using 
the procedure described in chapter 2. 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO PLJUDWLRQ ÀRZV WHQG WR VKRZ PRUH VKRUWUXQ ÀXFWXDWLRQV
than developments in fertility and mortality. One reason is that changes in 
migration are heavily dependent on economic and political changes, whereas 
fertility and mortality are dependent on gradual long-term trends, such as 
cultural changes and changes in living conditions and health care. Another 
reason is that immigration totals include different categories of migrants, such 
as labour migrants, family migrants, asylum seekers and returning nationals 
and these categories show different changes across time. The same applies 
to emigration. Chapter 3 shows how time-series models can be applied to 
extrapolate immigration, emigration, and net migration. Because of the 
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VWURQJÀXFWXDWLRQVLQPLJUDWLRQGLIIHUHQWH[WUDSRODWLRQPRGHOVPD\SURGXFH
a wide range of projected outcomes. Deterministic time series models 
DVVXPHWKDWWKHUHLVD¿[HGWUHQGWKDWLVQRWDIIHFWHGE\UDQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQV
These models project long-term trends. If recent changes deviate from this 
trend, they are not projected into the future because they are assumed to 
be temporary only. As a result projections made in successive years react 
only slowly to recent changes in the time series. In contrast stochastic time 
series models, such as ARIMA models, are based on the assumption that 
WKHWUHQGLVVXEMHFWWRUDQGRPFKDQJHV5HFHQWÀXFWXDWLRQVDIIHFWWKHOHYHO
of the trend. The results of extrapolations depend on various choices made 
by the forecaster. In addition to the choice between a deterministic and a 
stochastic time series model the choice of the base period makes a difference. 
For example, a long base period may suggest that migration shows random 
ÀXFWXDWLRQVDURXQGDFRQVWDQW OHYHOZKHUHDVDVKRUWEDVHSHULRGVXJJHVWV
that there is an increasing trend, as is illustrated in chapter 3.  Since there 
is no single extrapolation method that outperforms all other models under 
all circumstances and each model has its pros and cons, the logical way to 
improve projections is to examine the explanations behind the changes in 
migration.
There is not a single explanation of changes in migration. The types and 
mechanisms of migration have changed. In the 1960s shortages in the 
Western European labour market created opportunities for labour migrants 
from Southern countries. After the rise of the unemployment level during 
the economic recession in the early 1970s, most Western European countries 
imposed immigration restrictions. Many labour migrants returned home, but 
those who stayed brought their families over, which lead to an increase of 
IDPLO\UHXQL¿FDWLRQ7KHFROODSVHRIFRPPXQLVPLQ(DVWHUQ(XURSHUHVXOWHG
in an increase in immigration from Eastern to Western Europe in the 1990s. 
At the end of the 20th and the start of the 21st century wars and unrest in 
former Yugoslavia and the Middle East lead to an increase in asylum seekers. 
Labour migration is primarily affected by the situation in the labour market, 
marriage migration is affected by the partner choice of the resident migrant 
population, the migration of asylum seekers is affected by political turmoil 
in sending countries and asylum policies in receiving countries, and return 
migration of nationals is affected by the size of emigration of nationals in 
previous years. Argument based forecasts should take these driving forces 
into account. For projecting the future number of labour migrants the main 
question is whether the decline in the working age population will lead to 
shortages in the labour market. An increase of labour force participation 
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rates may lead to an increase in labour supply, whereas an increase of labour 
productivity, of imports and of investments in other countries may reduce 
labour demand. On the other hand, ageing of the working age population 
may lead to a decrease in labour supply, whereas population ageing may 
lead to an increase in the demand of health care and of long term care, and 
this may cause additional labour demand, as these sectors tend to be labour 
intensive. 
A forecast of marriage migration can be based on assumptions about the 
choice of partners by resident migrants. This may differ strongly between 
origins of migrants. Some migrant groups tend to marry a partner from the 
country of origin, whereas others choose a partner in the country of residence. 
Thus a projection should take these differences into account. For making 
assumptions about the future number of asylum seekers one can make 
VHSDUDWHDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHWRWDOLQÀRZWRWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQGWKH
distribution between EU countries. The former depends primarily on the 
situation in sending countries, whereas the latter depends on differences in 
the strictness of policies across receiving countries. The analysis in chapter 
3 shows that a larger part of changes in the number of asylum seekers in 
individual European countries were due to changes in the distribution of 
DV\OXPVHHNHUVRYHU(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVWKDQWRFKDQJHVLQWKHWRWDOLQÀRZ
to the EU. Thus projections of the future number of asylum seekers should 
be based on assumptions about future co-ordination of migration policies 
between EU countries. 
Projections of the future size of emigration depend on assumptions about 
return migration of immigrants and about the propensity to emigrate of 
nationals. Return migration varies strongly by type of immigrant. The return 
migration rate of labour migrants tends to be considerably higher than that of 
family migrants. Nationals may emigrate for different reasons. Students and 
labour migrants may be expected to leave the country of origin temporarily. 
3HRSOHZKRHPLJUDWHEHFDXVHWKH\DUHQRWVDWLV¿HGZLWKWKHVLWXDWLRQLQWKHLU
home country and retired people who emigrate to Southern Europe because 
of the warmer climate may be expected to stay in the destination country for a 
longer period. In short, many factors affect different types of immigration and 
emigration and thus argument based forecasts of future migration depend on 
many underlying assumptions. Moreover, the interdependency of forecasts 
of immigration and emigration should be taken into account. Emigration 
RIIRUHLJQHUVGHSHQGVRQWKHVL]HRI LPPLJUDWLRQÀRZVLQSUHYLRXV\HDUV
whereas immigration of nationals depends on emigration in previous years. 
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Thus if immigration increases, one may expect an increase in emigration of 
migrants some years later, whereas if emigration of nationals increases, one 
may expect an increase in immigration of nationals some years later.
7.2. Fertility
Forecasts of fertility can be based on expectations, explanations, or 
extrapolations. In various surveys young women are asked how many 
children they expect to have during their lifetime. As expectations are not 
always realised, the results of these surveys cannot be used at face value 
for making forecasts (De Beer, 1991, 2000). To some extent the deviations 
between expectations and actual behaviour are systematic. For example, 
one reason for not having the intended number of children is the break-up 
of a relationship. Another reason is infecundity. As a result expectations of 
future fertility of young cohorts tend to be higher than actual fertility. To the 
extent that the differences between intentions and realisations are systematic, 
a model may be used to adjust the expectations (De Beer, 1991). However, 
the realisation of expectations does not only depend on individual factors 
but also on changes in the social, economic and political  environment. If 
respondents are not better capable of projecting these changes than population 
forecasters, the use of expectations data will not improve forecast accuracy 
(De Beer, 2000). 
Differences in levels of fertility can be used for forecasting by means of 
distinguishing population categories with different levels of fertility. For 
example, one may distinguish fertility by the level of educational attainment. 
One can use this difference for making forecasts of future fertility in either 
of two ways. One may either assume that the proportion of people with a 
high level of educational attainment will increase or one may assume that 
the differences in the level of fertility by level of educational attainment 
will diminish, e.g. because the fertility level of people with a lower level of 
education will move towards that of people with a high education. Another 
example of using fertility differences for making forecasts is to examine 
regional or international differences. Chapter 4 examines regional differences 
in the level of fertility and chapter 5 international differences. If one assumes 
that the fertility level of one region or country will move into the direction of 
the current level of fertility of another region or country, this can be used for 
making forecasts for the former region or country.
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Chapter 4 examines regional differences in the level of fertility in 
the Netherlands. The focus is on differences between small and large 
municipalities. The level of fertility in small cities exceeds that in large cities. 
$QH[SODQDWRU\PRGHOLVVSHFL¿HGLQRUGHUWRH[SODLQWKHVHGLIIHUHQFHV)RXU
categories of variables are used: demographic, socioeconomic, cultural 
and regional variables. The demographic variables include the household 
structure and the ethnic structure of the population. The socioeconomic 
variables include the proportion of newly built houses as a percentage of the 
stock of houses, the percentage of the population with low income and the 
SHUFHQWDJHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQUHFHLYLQJVRFLDOEHQH¿WV7KHFXOWXUDOYDULDEOHV
include religion and the degree of urbanization. The regional variables are 
included because not all systematic regional patterns can be accounted for 
by the other explanatory variables. The explanatory model can be used for 
argument based forecasting. First, one should make assumptions about 
whether or not the differences in the explanatory variables will persist or 
will diminish in the future. Second, the model can be used to assess the 
consequences of these assumptions for future differences in fertility levels. 
For example, the demographic variables show two opposite effects. In large 
municipalities both the percentage of young Moroccan and Turkish women 
and the percentage of young women living alone are relatively high. The 
former has an upward on the level of fertility and the latter has a downward 
effect. If the differences between small and large cities in the ethnic and 
household structure would become smaller, this would not have a strong 
effect on differences in the average level of fertility, because both variables 
have opposite effects. However, one may argue that demographic differences 
between small and large cities will not become smaller. Selective migration 
may cause differences in the population structure to be persistent. Moreover, 
if the level of fertility of ethnic groups will decline into the direction of the 
level of nationals, this will have a downward effect on the level of fertility in 
big cities, and as result the difference in the level of fertility between large 
and small cities may increase rather than decrease. Chapter 4 shows how 
assumptions can be made about the future effects of the other explanatory 
variables as well. In this way the model can be used as an instrument for 
argument based forecasting. Statistics Netherlands and the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency use this model for making assumptions 
DERXWWKHIXWXUHOHYHORIIHUWLOLW\IRUWKHRI¿FLDOUHJLRQDOSRSXODWLRQIRUHFDVWV
for the Netherlands (De Jong et al., 2005).
Chapter 5 shows how international comparisons of fertility can be used for 
making projections and scenarios of future fertility. The most widely used 
indicator of fertility is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR). The level of the TFR 
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is determined not only by changes in the average number of children per 
woman across successive cohorts, but by changes in the timing of fertility 
as well. Since the effects of changes in the timing of fertility are temporary, 
we cannot simply extrapolate recent changes of the TFR into the future. For 
that reason it is useful to make assumptions about the future values of the 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVUDWKHUWKDQDERXWWKHOHYHORIWKH7)56HSDUDWH
SURMHFWLRQV RI LQGLYLGXDO DJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHV ZLOO OHDG WR LUUHJXODU
patterns. Chapter 5 shows how the relational model TOPALS (Tool for 
SURMHFWLQJ DJHVSHFL¿F UDWHV XVLQJ OLQHDU VSOLQHV FDQ EH XVHG WR SURMHFW
D VPRRWKDJH VFKHGXOH723$/6GHVFULEHV WKH UDWLRVRI  WKH DJHVSHFL¿F
fertility rates to be projected and those of a smooth standard age schedule 
E\DOLQHDUVSOLQH2QHEHQH¿WLVWKDWRQHGRHVQRWQHHGDFRPSOH[PRGHOWR
describe the age pattern. One only needs to describe the differences compared 
with that standard age schedule. If one uses the average fertility rates over a 
number of countries as the standard age schedule, the rate ratios indicate to 
ZKDWH[WHQWDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVRIDFRXQWU\GHYLDWHIURPWKHDYHUDJH
7KHEHQH¿WRIXVLQJDOLQHDUVSOLQHLVWKDWRQHQHHGVWRVSHFLI\WKHYDOXHVRI
the rate ratios at selected ages, the so-called knots, only. 
TOPALS makes it possible to create scenarios in which the shape of the age 
schedule changes. This allows the forecaster to make a distinction between 
a rise in the mean age at childbearing due to a decrease in fertility rates 
at very young ages and a rise at older ages caused by the catching up of 
postponed births. If one assumes that the differences of the fertility rates 
in a country with the European average will become smaller, TOPALS 
can be used for making a convergence scenario. Alternatively the current 
fertility pattern of a ‘forerunner’ country (after smoothing) or an assumption 
about the future fertility age schedule of a young cohort can be used as 
standard age schedule. Chapter 5 shows how a partial adjustment model can 
EHHVWLPDWHG WRGHWHUPLQHKRZTXLFNO\ WKHDJHVSHFL¿F IHUWLOLW\ UDWHVZLOO
move in the direction of the current fertility pattern of Sweden. Sweden is 
generally considered to be a forerunner country. Since both the Eurostat and 
WKH6ZHGLVKQDWLRQDOSRSXODWLRQSURMHFWLRQVDVVXPHWKDWDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\
rates in Sweden will hardly change in the future, the current age pattern 
RIIHUWLOLW\UHÀHFWV WKHIXWXUHIHUWLOLW\SDWWHUQRI\RXQJFRKRUWVDQGFDQEH
UHJDUGHGDVDµWDUJHW¶IRURWKHU(XURSHDQFRXQWULHV2QHEHQH¿WRIXVLQJD
partial adjustment model is that the forecaster does not need to specify a 
priori in which year other countries will reach the current Swedish pattern. 
In contrast the most recent Eurostat scenario assumes that convergence will 
be reached in the year 2150. The projections calculated by TOPALS exceed 
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those of Eurostat. In addition, chapter 5 shows how TOPALS can be used 
for making a scenario of future fertility on the basis of assumptions about 
changes in the age pattern of fertility in Nordic, Western, Central, Southern 
and Eastern European countries compared with the current average European 
pattern. This scenario can produce different age patterns across countries.
7.3. Mortality
Changes in mortality rates can be explained by improvements in public 
health, advances in medical treatment, changes in bio-medical technology, 
availability and quality of long term care, improvements in the standard 
of living, introduction of safety measures, effectiveness of preventive 
screening, changes in socioeconomic inequality and changes in health-related 
behaviour such as smoking, alcohol use, diet and physical exercise. If these 
explanations are to be used for making forecasts, the magnitude of the 
effects of these developments on the level of mortality needs to be assessed 
and assumptions be made about future developments in the main driving 
IRUFHVRIPRUWDOLW\FKDQJHV(YHQ WKRXJKPDQ\IDFWRUVKDYHDQ LQÀXHQFH
on changes in mortality, the development of life expectancy at birth has 
shown a gradual development over time. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) show 
that ‘best practice’ life expectancy at birth has shown a linear trend for more 
than a century and a half. Thus rather than assessing the separate effects 
of all underlying forces, one may choose to forecast future mortality by 
extrapolating the linear trend of life expectancy into the future. Oeppen 
and Vaupel calculate that life expectancy has increased by 2.5 years per 
decade. They argue that there is no reason why this linear trend will not 
FRQWLQXHLQWKHFRPLQJGHFDGHV+RZHYHUWKHXQGHUO\LQJDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWK
SUREDELOLWLHVKDYHFKDQJHGLQGLIIHUHQWGLUHFWLRQV,IFKDQJHVLQDJHVSHFL¿F
death probabilities are projected into the future life expectancy will increase 
slower than a linear projection. This raises the question whether projections 
of future mortality should be based on an extrapolation of life expectancy or 
RIDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
Chapter 6 shows how both approaches can be combined by using TOPALS. 
Since 1981 life expectancy of Japanese women is the highest in the world. 
A linear projection of life expectancy of Japanese women results in a level 
of life expectancy of almost 100 years in 2060. This corresponds with a 74 
SHUFHQW UHGXFWLRQ RI DJHVSHFL¿F GHDWK SUREDELOLWLHV RI -DSDQHVH ZRPHQ
compared with the 2008 levels. These values can be regarded as the target 
level of mortality for other countries. Chapter 6 describes how a partial 
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adjustment model can be estimated in order to assess with what speed 
DJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVRI(XURSHDQFRXQWULHVZLOOPRYHWRZDUGV
the target values. Note that the use of this model does not imply that it is 
assumed that the target level will be reached within the forecast period, but 
rather that the death probabilities will move in that direction. TOPALS uses 
a linear spline to describe the ratio between the death probabilities of each 
country and the target level. The use of a linear spline implies that the partial 
adjustment model needs to be estimated for selected ages (the knots) only. 
The partial adjustment model can be estimated separately for each country. 
For Northern, Western and Southern European countries this results in a 
projected life expectancy at birth in 2060 ranging from 83 to 88 years for 
men and ranging from 87 to 92 years for women. Thus for all countries life 
expectancy of women in 2060 would be higher than the current Japanese 
level of 86 years. 
One alternative approach is to estimate the partial adjustment model for 
the average death probabilities across a number of countries. In chapter 6 
the average death probabilities over 15 Northern, Western and Southern 
(XURSHDQ FRXQWULHV DUH FDOFXODWHG 2QH EHQH¿W RI XVLQJ DYHUDJH GHDWK
probabilities rather than the separate probabilities for each individual country 
is that the average trends may be more stable in the long run. These estimates 
produce  converging projections. According to this Convergence scenario 
life expectancy in 2060 would range from 85 to 87 years for men and from 
89 to 91 years for women. 
Another scenario can be based on the assumption that in the future the 
decrease in mortality may be stronger than in the past, e.g. due to medical 
progress. An Acceleration scenario is calculated under the assumption that 
the number of years needed to reach a reduction of the difference between 
the current and target pattern by 50 percent is halved. This would result in a 
projected life expectancy of men from 90 to 91 years and for women from 
93 to 94 years. 
In all scenarios the projected life expectancy for Central and Eastern 
European countries will be lower than in the Northern, Western and Southern 
European countries, but the differences in the Convergence and Acceleration 
scenarios will be much smaller than in the Baseline scenario which is based 
on the projection of a continuation of past trends in each country. Obviously 
RWKHUVFHQDULRVFDQEHVSHFL¿HGDVZHOO)RUH[DPSOHRQHPD\DVVXPHWKDW
the future decline in death probabilities at older ages will surpass that at 
younger ages. Another scenario could be to assume that the differences in 
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mortality between East and West Europe would become smaller in the long 
run. The aim of describing these scenarios is to illustrate how TOPALS can 
easily be used to make alternative scenarios rather than to present the most 
likely scenario.
7.4. Transparency of population projections, scenarios and forecasts
Calculations of the future size and age structure of the population are based 
on assumptions about future changes in the levels of fertility, mortality, 
and migration. Depending on the type of assumptions the outcomes of 
these calculations can be considered as projections, scenarios or forecasts. 
Projections are aimed to describe what will happen in the future if current 
trends will continue. Time-series models seem the most appropriate 
instrument to calculate projections. They identify past trends and show the 
effects of a continuation of these trends in the future. Scenarios describe 
alternative futures that may occur assuming different future developments in 
the driving forces of fertility, mortality and migration. Explanatory models 
can be used to assess to what extent future fertility, mortality and migration 
may vary depending on alternative assumptions about future social, 
economic, cultural, political or technological developments.
Forecasts are aimed to describe the most likely future. The difference with 
projections and scenarios is not the method that is used but the interpretation 
of the underlying assumptions. If the forecaster assumes that a continuation 
of trends represents the most likely future, then the projection of these trends 
can be interpreted as a forecast. If the forecaster shows how extrapolations 
based on different assumptions lead to different outcomes, these projections 
can be interpreted as alternative scenarios. If the forecaster makes different 
scenarios, e.g. based on alternative assumptions about future developments 
in driving forces, and considers one of these scenarios as most likely, the 
latter scenario can be considered as a forecast, whereas the other scenarios 
show possible alternative developments. Thus a forecast does not follow 
automatically from the application of a method. The distinction between 
projections, scenarios and forecasts cannot be made solely on the basis of 
the methods that are applied. A projection or a scenario can be regarded as a 
forecast if the forecaster assumes that this will be a likely future. However, 
DV.H\¿W] QRWHV VWDWLVWLFDODJHQFLHVXVXDOO\ ODEHO WKHRXWFRPHVRI
their calculations as projections, whereas users interpret them as forecasts. 
Keilman (2008) argues that, unless the agency presents its assumptions as 
unrealistic, the projections published by statistical agencies can be regarded 
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as forecasts indicating a likely development, given the current knowledge of 
the forecaster. Eurostat uses the term scenarios for their projections. In 2008 
Eurostat published a ‘Convergence scenario’ and a ‘No migration scenario’. 
Since the ‘No migration’ scenario is not considered as a realistic scenario, 
the convergence scenario is used as a forecast by other European agencies. 
Eurostat argues that a converging tendency is in line with past trends 
(Lanzieri, 2009). This suggests that this scenario should be considered as a 
forecast of a likely development rather than one scenario of a possible future. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHXVHRIWKHODEHOVSURMHFWLRQVDQGVFHQDULRVLVQRWVXI¿FLHQW
to distinguish them from forecasts. Both projections and scenarios are based 
on choices and assumptions. Even the assumption that past trends will 
continue in the future does not automatically lead to one projection. The 
choice of the time series model, the choice of the base period and the choice 
of the indicator to be projected can make a lot of difference. A deterministic 
model, e.g. D OLQHDU WLPH WUHQG DVVXPHV WKDW WKHUH LV D¿[HG WUHQG WKDW LV
QRW DIIHFWHGE\ UDQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQVZKHUHDV D VWRFKDVWLFPRGHO VXFK DV
DQ$5,0$PRGHODVVXPHVWKDWUDQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQVDIIHFWWKHOHYHORIWKH
trend. Deterministic models emphasise long-run developments. Projections 
based on this model tend to react slowly to recent changes in the time series. 
In contrast, projections based on a stochastic model tend to react very 
quickly. A long base period may result in quite different projections than 
a short period. Chapter 3 shows that a long base period may suggest that 
there is no increasing trend in migration, whereas a short base period does. 
Chapter 6 shows that in projecting mortality the choice of the indicator to be 
projected makes a difference: a projection of life expectancy at birth results 
LQGLIIHUHQWYDOXHVWKDQDSURMHFWLRQRIDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHV
If an explanatory model is used, the forecaster needs to make assumptions 
about the future values of the explanatory variables. Lutz (2009) developed a 
questionnaire including the main driving forces of future changes in fertility, 
mortality and migration. For example for changes in life expectancy the main 
forces are biomedical technology, effectiveness of health care, behavioural 
changes, possible new infectious diseases, environmental change, and 
changes in population composition. For each of these forces a set of 
DUJXPHQWVLVGH¿QHGWKDWZRXOGKDYHDQLQÀXHQFHRQWKHIXWXUHHIIHFWVRI
these forces. For example, for the effects of health care systems on changes 
in life expectancy the arguments are: The costs of new treatments will be 
prohibitive for a large part of the population, there will be very effective 
new technologies, waiting times for treatment will increase, society will 
afford expensive new treatments, progress in preventive medicine will lead 
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to lower death rates, and dissemination of health information will increase 
longevity. For each of these arguments experts are asked to weigh the validity 
of the argument (ranging from ‘very likely to be right’ to ‘very likely to be 
wrong’) and to indicate the impact of the argument (ranging from ‘a large 
XSZDUGLQÀXHQFHRQOLIHH[SHFWDQF\¶WRµDODUJHGRZQZDUGLQÀXHQFHRQOLIH
expectancy’). Both the answers to the validity question and to the impact 
question are given a weight. In addition the experts are asked the relative 
importance of the six forces. These are used to weigh the scores in order 
to produce one number for each expert for life expectancy. These numbers 
are not directly used to project the future level of life expectancy. Lutz asks 
each expert what will be the likely future value of life expectancy in a given 
year. The scores of the experts are used to assess the relative importance 
of the forces. For example, Lutz (2009) describes the results of a survey 
among international experts in which experts expect that life expectancy 
will increase by two years per decade on average. The results of the survey 
show that experts attribute about a half of the increase in life expectancy 
to bio-medical progress. Lutz concludes that technological progress will 
lead to an increase in life expectancy by one year per decade. However, 
there are two problems in following this approach. First, the forces are not 
independent and thus their effects on life expectancy cannot simply be added 
up. Secondly, the assumption that life expectancy will increase by two years 
per decade is the average of the increase in life expectancy expected by 
experts and does not follow directly from the arguments. Even though this 
exercise is useful in assessing forces underlying future changes in mortality, 
fertility, and migration, the resulting forecasts are not purely argument based 
since the projected changes in fertility, life expectancy and net migration 
do not follow directly from the arguments but rather are averages of expert 
opinions. Thus the forecast is expert based rather than argument based.
Rather than emphasising the distinction between the terms projections, 
scenarios and forecasts, it is important to make the underlying choices and 
assumptions as well as the reasons for making the choices and assumptions 
explicit. The forecaster should make the methods and assumptions transparent 
in order to make it possible for the user to determine how to interpret the 
outcomes of the calculations. Armstrong (2001) describes 139 principles for 
forecasting. They cover the collection and preparation of data, the selection 
and application of methods, and the evaluation and presentation of forecasts. 
Armstrong (2001) argues: “When managers receive forecasts, they often 
cannot judge their quality. Instead of focusing on the forecasts, however, they 
FDQGHFLGHZKHWKHUWKHIRUHFDVWLQJSURFHVVZDVUHDVRQDEOHIRUWKHVLWXDWLRQ´
This requires that it is necessary for users to know which decisions are made 
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by the forecaster. Two principles mentioned by Armstrong are “Provide 
FRPSOHWH VLPSOHDQGFOHDU H[SODQDWLRQVRIPHWKRGV´DQG³'HVFULEH\RXU
DVVXPSWLRQV´,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHIRUHFDVWLQJSURFHVVVKRXOGEHWUDQVSDUHQW
One main reason given by Armstrong is that by examining forecasting 
processes and improving them, accuracy can be increased. 
,Q RUGHU WR DFKLHYH WUDQVSDUHQF\ LW LV QRW VXI¿FLHQW WRPDNH FKRLFHV DQG
assumptions explicit. In addition, it is important that the forecaster gives 
arguments for the choices and provides information about the consequences 
of these choices. For example, when using an extrapolation model the 
forecaster should indicate which difference it would have made if another 
base period or another model would have been chosen. When using an 
explanatory model the forecaster should indicate to what extent alternative 
assumptions about the future developments of the explanatory variables 
would have resulted in different scenarios. Transparency is a necessary 
condition for users to be able to assess whether a projection can be regarded 
as a forecast of a likely future or a scenario of only one possible future and 
whether a scenario can be regarded as a projection that extrapolates past 
trends or as a forecast of likely developments. 
One obvious criterion for regarding a projection or scenario as forecast is 
accuracy. If past projections or scenarios produced by the same method or 
by the same forecaster have turned out to be accurate, the user may regard 
the projections or scenarios as forecasts. If short-term forecasts have been 
published regularly, such as daily weather forecasts or quarterly economic 
IRUHFDVWVWKHUHLVVXI¿FLHQWHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHWRDVVHVVWKHIRUHFDVWDFFXUDF\
If projections have repeatedly been proven to be reasonably accurate, the 
user can regard new projections made by the same method or by the same 
forecaster as reliable forecasts. However, for long run forecasts  there are 
only few forecasts of which the accuracy can be examined. Moreover the 
methods may have changed or trends may have changed, which make it 
PXFKPRUHGLI¿FXOWWRDVVHVVZKHWKHUIRUHFDVWDFFXUDF\LQWKHSDVWZLOOEH
relevant for the future. In those cases the user cannot simply conclude that 
a method that produced accurate forecasts in the past or a forecaster with 
a good track record in the past is likely to produce accurate forecasts in 
the future. The user needs information about the reasons for the choice of 
a particular method and the underlying assumptions in order to be able to 
assess the validity of new forecasts for the long run. Thus transparency of 
forecast and scenarios is a necessary condition for a user to be able to decide 
whether a projection or scenario can be considered as forecast. 
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The uncertainty of the validity of the choices and assumptions underlying 
projections, scenarios and forecasts implies that population forecasts are 
uncertain. De Beer (2000) gives an overview of issues related with uncertainty 
of population projections. The traditional way to deal with the uncertainty 
of population forecasts is to present deterministic variants or scenarios. 
This implies that alternative sets of assumptions about the future levels of 
fertility, mortality and migration have to be made. These assumptions can 
be combined into a limited set of scenarios, e.g. a low variant combining 
low values of the total fertility rate, life expectancy and net migration and 
a high variant based on high values of these components. The reason for 
combining low values of the components of change in one variant and high 
values in another is not that it is assumed that these values are assumed to be 
interdependent, but because these variants result in low and high projections 
of population growth. If it is assumed that there is no perfect correlation 
between the levels of fertility, life expectancy and net migration the range 
between these variants overestimates the uncertainty of future population 
growth. 
For that reason several researchers have proposed to make stochastic or 
probabilistic population projections (e.g. Alho and Spencer, 2005 and Lutz 
DQG*ROGVWHLQ,Q6WDWLVWLFV1HWKHUODQGVZDVWKH¿UVWQDWLRQDO
statistical institute that published stochastic population forecasts (Alders 
and de Beer, 1998 and Keilman, 2008). These projections are based on 
assumptions about the future probability distribution of fertility, mortality, 
and migration. This requires that assumptions are made about the form of 
the distribution and about parameters of that distribution. For example if a 
normal distribution is used the forecaster has to make an assumption about the 
future values of the variance of the total fertility rate, life expectancy at birth 
and net migration. These assumptions can be based on an analysis of forecast 
errors in the past, the variance can be estimated on the basis of a time series 
model, or the assumption about the future value of the variance can be based 
on expert judgment. If past forecast errors are analysed one problem is that 
the results depend on the particular period for which the errors are examined. 
For example, if the level of an indicator has not changed much during the 
last ten years, a random walk forecast made ten years ago projecting that the 
indicator would remain constant, would have produced accurate forecasts, 
and thus one could conclude that the variance is relatively small. However, 
in another period in which the indicator showed an increasing or decreasing 
trend, this projection method would have lead to poor results and thus the 
variance would be large. One alternative approach is to estimate the variance 
of the forecast errors from a stochastic time series model. This calculation 
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LVEDVHGRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHFRUUHFWWLPHVHULHVPRGHOLVVSHFL¿HG
i.e. it is assumed that future developments will be like the past. However, 
one source of uncertainty of forecasts is that future developments may not 
be a continuation of past trends. This would imply that past changes may 
not inform us on possible future changes. For that reason forecast variance 
can be determined on the basis of expert opinions about the probability of 
future events that have not yet occurred, e.g. medical breakthroughs leading 
to a strong increase in longevity. This implies that assumptions about the 
probability distribution of forecasts can be based on arguments just like 
forecasts themselves. The assessment of the probability of forecasts is a 
forecast itself. This does not imply that probabilistic forecasts are not useful. 
In contrast, rational decision making requires that a proper assessment of 
the probability of forecasts should be taken into account, even though the 
assessment of the probability is to some extent subjective (Raiffa, 1997).
The aim of this book is to show how methods can be used to make projections 
and scenarios in a transparent way. Chapters 2 to 5 illustrate the usefulness 
of using quantitative methods for making assumptions about future changes 
in fertility, mortality, and migration forecasts. In order for the forecasts to 
be transparent, the methods should be as simple as possible. Both for the 
forecaster and the user it should be clear what choices are made and what 
the consequences of these choices are. If methods are complicated, forecasts 
come from a black box. Forecasts are projections or scenarios that result 
from applying a method but if the forecaster cannot explain why the method 
SURGXFHVWKDWIRUHFDVWLWZLOOEHGLI¿FXOWIRUWKHXVHUWRMXGJHWKHYDOLGLW\RI
the forecast. The aim of chapters 2 to 5 is not to present one model that will 
RXWSHUIRUPDOORWKHUPRGHOV1HLWKHULVWKHDLPWR¿QGRQHPRGHOWKDWZLOO
produce objective forecasts, i.e. forecasts that do not depend on choices to be 
made by the forecaster. It is inevitable that the forecaster has to make choices 
and it is important that these choices are made on the basis of arguments and 
do not remain implicit. The user should know which choices are made, what 
the reasons for those choices are and what the impact of those choices is on 
the outcomes. 
7KH¿UVWVWHSLQPDNLQJIRUHFDVWVLVWRDVVHVVWKHTXDOLW\RIGDWD$V.HLOPDQ
(2008) notes “poor data quality tends to go together with poor forecast 
SHUIRUPDQFH´,QPRVWFRXQWULHVWKHTXDOLW\RIGDWDRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOPLJUDWLRQ
is considerably poorer than data on fertility and mortality. Particularly the 
size of emigration tends to be underestimated in most countries because of 
under-registration. Chapter 2 shows how migration data can be improved 
by using a simple model that compares data from different countries. Apart 
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from systematic errors in statistics due to under-registration, data may be 
DIIHFWHGE\UDQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQV,QRUGHUWRDYRLGWKDWUDQGRPÀXFWXDWLRQV
are projected into the future, it is useful to smooth data before making 
projections. Chapters 5 and 6 show how TOPALS can be used for smoothing 
DJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHVDQGGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVUHVSHFWLYHO\723$/6LV
DUHODWLRQDOPRGHOWKDWFDQEHXVHGWRVPRRWKDOOW\SHVRIDJHVSHFL¿FUDWHV
or probabilities using a smooth standard age schedule. Both chapters show 
WKDWIRUPDQ\FRXQWULHVWKH¿WRI723$/6LVEHWWHUWKDQWKDWRIFRPSOLFDWHG
models.
Once reliable and smooth estimates are available, they can be used as a basis 
for projections. Chapter 3 shows how time series models can be used to 
make projections. Since different time series models may lead to different 
projections, Chapter 3 argues that it is useful to examine explanations behind 
the changes in migration. Since different types of migration are affected by 
different driving forces, an argument-based forecast of migration should be 
based on a distinction of types of immigration and emigration. Chapter 4 
illustrates how an explanatory model can be used for making assumptions 
about future changes in fertility. The model is used to assess the effects of 
different types of explanatory variables on regional differences in the level of 
fertility. The chapter shows how assumptions about future developments in 
the explanatory variables and their effect on the level of fertility can be used 
as arguments for forecasting whether or not regional differences in the level 
of fertility will disappear. 
Chapters 5 and 6 show how TOPALS can produce time series projections as 
well as alternative scenarios for fertility and mortality respectively. In both 
cases several choices have to be made, particularly about the choice of the 
standard age schedule which can be used as target pattern and about the 
way the values of the rate or risk ratios are determined. These values can 
be estimated on the basis of a time series for one country or for a group of 
countries or assumptions about the future values of the rate or risk ratios 
can be made on the basis of qualitative arguments. Chapter 5 shows how 
723$/6FDQEHXVHGWRPDNHSURMHFWLRQVRIIXWXUHDJHVSHFL¿FIHUWLOLW\UDWHV
assuming that the fertility rates of countries in different European regions 
will move towards the Swedish pattern. The extent to which this target will 
EHUHDFKHGZLWKLQWKHSURMHFWLRQSHULRGGHSHQGVRQWKHHVWLPDWHGFRHI¿FLHQW
RIDWLPHVHULHVPRGHOWKDWLV¿WWHGWRSDVWWLPHVHULHV$OWHUQDWLYHO\FKDSWHU
shows how TOPALS can be used to make scenarios assuming that the shape 
of the age pattern of fertility will change. Chapter 6 shows how TOPALS 
FDQEHXVHGWRPDNHSURMHFWLRQVRIDJHVSHFL¿FGHDWKSUREDELOLWLHVDVVXPLQJ
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that they will move in the direction of the world record level. The extent to 
which this level will be approached differs across countries. To project future 
changes a time series model can be estimated for each country separately or 
for a combination of countries. Alternatively TOPALS can be used to make 
a scenario assuming that future declines in mortality will be stronger than in 
the past. TOPALS is a tool rather than a statistical model. 
TOPALS is a useful instrument for making transparent projections and 
scenarios because it is both conceptually and computationally simple. 
Because TOPALS is a relational model it does not include a complicated 
mathematical formula to describe age schedules. Rather it uses a standard age 
schedule. Because different standard age schedules can be used, TOPALS is 
ÀH[LEOH$VDUHVXOW723$/6FDQEHXVHGWRGHVFULEHGLIIHUHQWDJHSDWWHUQV
of fertility and mortality. This makes it possible to use TOPALS both for 
cross-country comparisons and for analyses and projections of changes over 
time. Because TOPALS uses linear splines it does not need a complex model 
WRGHVFULEHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHDJHVSHFL¿FUDWHVWREHSURMHFWHGDQG
WKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOH5DWKHULWVSHFL¿HVUDWLRVEHWZHHQWKHDJHVSHFL¿F
rates to be projected and the standard age schedule for selected ages and 
interpolates the value for ages in between. The use of TOPALS is transparent 
because it describes differences in age patterns across countries and changes 
over time in a rather intuitive way. It does not use parameters that may be 
GLI¿FXOWWRLQWHUSUHW,IWKHVWDQGDUGDJHVFKHGXOHLVWKHDYHUDJHRYHUDQXPEHU
RIFRXQWULHVDQGWKHDJHVSHFL¿FUDWHVRUSUREDELOLWLHVIRUVSHFL¿FDJHVIRUD
particular country are higher than the average, the rate or risk ratios are larger 
than one. If one assumes that convergence will occur, the rate or risk ratios 
will move towards a value of one. 
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Figure B.1.  Time dependent parameter kt of the Lee-Carter model









































Methoden voor het schatten en voorspellen van geboorte,
sterfte en migratie
Het nut van bevolkingsprognoses behoeft eigenlijk geen betoog. Denk maar 
aan de discussies over vergrijzing en bevolkingskrimp. De betrouwbaarheid 
YDQGHPRJUD¿VFKHSURJQRVHVLVRYHUKHWDOJHPHHQJURWHUGDQGLHYDQDQGHUH
prognoses die door sociale wetenschappers of economen worden gemaakt. 
Dit komt niet doordat demografen zoveel betere voorspellers zijn, maar 
doordat bevolkingsontwikkelingen zich nu eenmaal beter op de lange termijn 
laten voorspellen. De reden ligt voor de hand: de meeste mensen die de 
komende decennia in Nederland zullen wonen, wonen er nu al. 
Op grond van enkele veronderstellingen over overlevingskansen, 
geboortecijfers en migrantenaantallen kan eenvoudig worden voorspeld hoe 
sterk de bevolkingsomvang zal veranderen. Als je bijvoorbeeld veronderstelt 
dat alle mensen die nu jonger dan veertig jaar zijn over twintig jaar nog in 
Nederland wonen, en op grond van gemiddelde cijfers over de afgelopen 
twintig jaar, veronderstelt dat van de 40-64-jarigen er over twintig jaar nog 
80 procent zullen leven en van de 65-plussers nog een kwart, dat er per jaar 
200 duizend kinderen worden geboren, en dat er per saldo per jaar 20 duizend 
migranten naar Nederland komen, kun je met een eenvoudige berekening 
voorspellen dat de bevolkingsomvang de komende twintig jaar met 1 miljoen 
personen toeneemt, van 16,7 miljoen nu naar 17,7 miljoen over twintig jaar, 
en dat de bevolking vergrijst: het percentage 65-plussers neemt toe van 16 
procent nu naar 24 procent over twintig jaar. Deze prognose zal ongetwijfeld 
niet precies uitkomen, maar waarschijnlijk toch ook niet heel erg ver van 
de werkelijkheid afwijken. De laatste bevolkingsprognose van het CBS 
voorspelt ook dat Nederland over twintig jaar 17,7 miljoen inwoners zal 
tellen en dat het percentage 65-plussers 24 zal bedragen. 
De methoden die het CBS gebruikt zijn geavanceerder en de veronderstel-
lingen subtieler dan in dit eenvoudige rekenvoorbeeld. Zo houdt het CBS 
rekening met veranderingen in overlevingskansen, met veranderingen in 
JHERRUWHFLMIHUVHQPHWYHUVFKLOOHQGHFDWHJRULHsQLPPLJUDQWHQHQHPLJUDQWHQ
Hierdoor is de CBS-prognose beter onderbouwd dan deze eenvoudige 
extrapolatie. Bovendien kan het CBS de toekomstige bevolking in een grotere 
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mate van detail voorspellen, bijvoorbeeld door onderscheid te maken naar 
leeftijd, geslacht en geboorteland. Maar het eenvoudige rekenvoorbeeld laat 
wel zien dat de bevolkingsgroei en de vergrijzing in de komende twintig jaar 
met een veel grotere zekerheid valt te voorspellen dan de economische groei 
of de klimaatverandering. Ook al gaat men van andere veronderstellingen 
uit, dan nog zal de prognose van de toekomstige bevolkingsomvang van 
Nederland niet meer dan een paar procent hoger of lager uitkomen. Daarom 
kunnen demografen uitspraken doen over waarschijnlijke toekomstige 
GHPRJUD¿VFKHRQWZLNNHOLQJHQLQGHNRPHQGHGHFHQQLD WHUZLMOHFRQRPHQ
en klimaatwetenschappers meer de neiging hebben scenario’s te maken van 
mogelijke toekomstige ontwikkelingen op de lange termijn.
Het eenvoudige rekenvoorbeeld is gebaseerd op drie veronderstellingen, 
namelijk over het toekomstige aantal geboorten, het toekomstige aantal 
migranten en toekomstige overlevingskansen. De hierboven veronderstelde 
percentages en aantallen komen globaal overeen met de gemiddelde cijfers 
die in de afgelopen twintig jaar zijn waargenomen. Willen we de prognose 
preciezer maken en beter onderbouwen dan is het de moeite waard om te 
bekijken of die veronderstellingen kunnen worden verbeterd. Zo zijn de 
overlevingskansen de afgelopen eeuw gestegen, dus het lijkt redelijk om 
te veronderstellen dat ze de komende twintig jaar verder zullen verbeteren. 
In het rekenvoorbeeld werd verondersteld dat een kwart van de 65-plussers 
over twintig jaar nog leeft. Maar het CBS gaat er in de bevolkingsprognose 
vanuit dat de overlevingskans zal toenemen tot een derde. Verder werd in het 
rekenvoorbeeld uitgegaan van het ronde getal van 200 duizend geboorten per 
jaar. Het jaarlijkse aantal geboorten hangt af van het gemiddelde kindertal per 
vrouw, van de leeftijd waarop vrouwen moeder worden en van veranderingen 
in het aantal vrouwen op de ‘vruchtbare’ leeftijden. Door met deze factoren 
expliciet rekening te houden kan de prognose beter worden onderbouwd 
dan door eenvoudig van een rond aantal uit te gaan. Ook werd in het 
rekenvoorbeeld uitgegaan van een constant migratiesaldo. Het migratiesaldo 
is het verschil tussen het aantal immigranten en emigranten. Door rekening te 
houden met uiteenlopende ontwikkelingen in de immigratie en de emigratie 
en door bovendien onderscheid te maken tussen verschillende soorten 
migranten (zoals arbeidsmigranten, huwelijksmigranten en asielzoekers) 
kan de veronderstelling over de toekomstige omvang van de migratie beter 
worden onderbouwd.
Dit proefschrift beschrijft methoden waarmee prognosemakers hun 
veronderstellingen over toekomstige geboorte-, sterfte- en migratiecijfers 
beter kunnen onderbouwen. Het doel hiervan is de betrouwbaarheid van de 
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prognose te verbeteren. Of de prognose door toepassing van deze methoden 
ook echt dichter bij de werkelijkheid zal liggen, valt van te voren nooit 
met zekerheid te zeggen. Je kunt van een prognosemaker niet verlangen 
dat prognoses precies uitkomen. Wel mag je verwachten dat de prognose 
goed onderbouwd wordt, in die zin dat zo goed mogelijk gebruik wordt 
gemaakt van de kennis die beschikbaar is op het moment dat de prognose 
wordt gemaakt. Het doel van de methoden die in dit proefschrift worden 
besproken, is dan ook om de onderbouwing van de prognose te verbeteren 
en vooral om de keuzes die onvermijdelijk moeten worden gemaakt door 
de prognosemaker zo expliciet mogelijk te maken. Met andere woorden: 
de prognoses zo transparant mogelijk te maken. Vandaar de titel van dit 
proefschrift. 
Migratie
Wil men goede prognoses kunnen maken dan is een eerste vereiste dat de cijfers 
waarop de prognose wordt gebaseerd, betrouwbaar zijn. Migratiecijfers zijn 
over het algemeen minder betrouwbaar dan cijfers over geboorte en sterfte. 
Een van de belangrijkste redenen is dat niet iedereen die naar het buitenland 
vertrekt om daar te gaan wonen dit bij de gemeente meldt. Over het algemeen 
zijn immigratiecijfers betrouwbaarder dan emigratiecijfers, omdat veel 
immigranten er wel belang bij hebben zich in hun nieuwe woonplaats bij 
de autoriteiten te melden, maar minder om hun vertrek te melden in het land 
waar ze vandaan komen. 
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft een methode om de kwaliteit van migratiesta-
tistieken te verbeteren op basis van internationale vergelijkingen van 
immigratie- en emigratiecijfers. De gedachte erachter is heel eenvoudig. 
Als we de emigratiestatistiek van een land vergelijken met de immigraties-
tatistieken van de landen waar de emigranten uit dat land heen vertrekken 
en het blijkt dat de emigratiecijfers systematisch x procent lager zijn dan de 
immigratiecijfers, kunnen we op basis van dat percentage de schatting van 
het emigratiecijfer verhogen. De methode is overigens iets ingewikkelder, 
omdat ook immigratiecijfers niet helemaal betrouwbaar zijn en we bovendien 
UHNHQLQJPRHWHQKRXGHQPHWGH¿QLWLHYHUVFKLOOHQWXVVHQODQGHQ
De methode die in hoofdstuk 2 wordt beschreven past de immigratie- en 
emigratiecijfers van 19 Europese landen zo aan dat ze zo veel mogelijk met 
elkaar consistent zijn. Dit gebeurt op een zodanige manier dat de geschatte 
totale emigratie van land A naar de 18 andere landen even hoog is als de 
optelsom van de geschatte immigratiecijfers van die 18 landen vanuit land 
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A. Uit de schattingen blijkt dat de werkelijke emigratieaantallen van deze 19 
landen ongeveer anderhalf keer zo hoog zijn als de gepubliceerde emigratie-
cijfers. De immigratiecijfers worden veel minder onderschat: met zo’n 10 
procent. De onderschatting van de emigratie betekent dat de omvang van het 
migratiesaldo in veel landen wordt overschat.
0LJUDWLHFLMIHUV YHUWRQHQ ÀLQNH ÀXFWXDWLHV GRRU GH MDUHQ KHHQ (pQ YDQ
de oorzaken is dat er verschillende soorten immigranten zijn, zoals 
arbeidsmigranten, huwelijksmigranten, asielzoekers en terugkerende 
Nederlanders. En er zijn ook verschillende soorten emigranten, zoals 
allochtonen die terugkeren naar hun herkomstland en Nederlanders die een 
tijd in het buitenland gaan wonen. De veranderingen in de omvang van deze 
soorten migratie hangt af van verschillende factoren, zoals de arbeidsmarkt, 
relatievorming, toelatingsbeleid en (on)tevredenheid over het leefklimaat 
in Nederland. Daardoor kunnen de verschillende vormen van migratie 
uiteenlopende ontwikkelingen laten zien. Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft hoe voor 
de verschillende soorten migranten prognoses kunnen worden gemaakt 
door rekening te houden met de achterliggende verklaringen. Zo kan een 
prognose van de arbeidsmigratie worden gebaseerd op de veronderstelling 
dat de vergrijzing zal leiden tot krapte op de arbeidsmarkt. De prognose 
van huwelijksmigratie kan worden gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat 
tweede-generatie allochtonen steeds vaker een partner kiezen in het land 
waar ze wonen dan een partner uit het land waar de ouders vandaan komen. 
En de prognose van het aantal asielmigranten kan worden gebaseerd op een 
veronderstelling over de wijze waarop verschillen in het toelatingsbeleid tussen 
Europese landen invloed hebben op de richting van asielzoekersstromen. 
Geboorte
Prognoses van geboorten kunnen worden gebaseerd op analyses van 
verschillen. Zo kunnen verschillen in vruchtbaarheidsniveau naar 
opleidingsniveau worden gebruikt als uitgangspunt van een prognose door 
te veronderstellen dat het percentage hoger opgeleiden zal toenemen of dat 
lager opgeleiden het vruchtbaarheidsgedrag van hoger opgeleiden zullen 
overnemen. Ook regionale en internationale verschillen in vruchtbaarheid 
kunnen nuttige informatie opleveren die gebruikt kan worden voor het 
maken van een prognose. Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert regionale verschillen in 
vruchtbaarheid, terwijl hoofdstuk 5 internationale verschillen onderzoekt.
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt hoe verschillen in vruchtbaarheid tussen grote en 
kleine steden in Nederland kunnen worden verklaard en voorspeld. Vier 
VRRUWHQ YHUNODUHQGH YDULDEHOHQ ZRUGHQ RQGHUVFKHLGHQ GHPRJUD¿VFKH
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VRFLDDOHFRQRPLVFKHFXOWXUHOHHQUHJLRQDOHYDULDEHOHQ%LMGHGHPRJUD¿VFKH
variabelen wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen de huishoudenssamenstelling 
HQGHHWQLVFKHVDPHQVWHOOLQJYDQGHEHYRONLQJ'HGHPRJUD¿VFKHYDULDEHOHQ
laten twee tegengestelde effecten zien. Enerzijds wonen in grote steden 
relatief veel niet-westerse allochtonen en dit heeft een opwaarts effect op het 
vruchtbaarheidscijfer, anderzijds wonen er relatief veel alleenstaanden en dat 
heeft een neerwaarts effect. Voor het maken van een prognose kan worden 
beredeneerd hoe deze factoren in de toekomst de vruchtbaarheidsverschillen 
tussen grote en kleine steden zullen beïnvloeden. Een belangrijke vraag 
daarbij is of verwacht kan worden dat de verschillen in de samenstelling van 
de bevolking tussen grote en kleine steden zullen veranderen. Wanneer wordt 
verondersteld dat ook in de toekomst migranten zich vooral in grote steden 
zullen vestigen, zou het opwaartse effect op de vruchtbaarheid blijvend 
kunnen zijn. Maar wanneer men veronderstelt dat het vruchtbaarheidsniveau 
van allochtonen daalt, kan men verwachten dat dit opwaartse effect kleiner 
zal worden, en dat dus het verschil in vruchtbaarheid tussen grote en kleine 
steden groter zal worden. Op soortgelijke wijze kunnen veronderstellingen 
worden gemaakt over de andere verklarende factoren. Dit model wordt in 
aangepaste vorm gebruikt door het Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving en het 
&%6YRRUGHRI¿FLsOH1HGHUODQGVHUHJLRQDOHEHYRONLQJVSURJQRVH
Hoofdstuk 5 laat zien hoe het toekomstige vruchtbaarheidsniveau in 
verschillende landen kan worden voorspeld op basis van een analyse 
van internationale verschillen in vruchtbaarheidspatronen. Omdat de 
hoogte van vruchtbaarheidscijfers mede afhangt van veranderingen in het 
leeftijdspatroon is het gebruikelijk om prognoses van de vruchtbaarheid te 
EDVHUHQRS]RJHQDDPGHOHHIWLMGVVSHFL¿HNHYUXFKWEDDUKHLGVFLMIHUV+RRIGVWXN
5 beschrijft een nieuwe methode, TOPALS, die op een eenvoudige manier 
verschillen in dit leeftijdspatroon tussen landen beschrijft. Het idee achter 
TOPALS is dat het leeftijdspatroon van de vruchtbaarheid in een land kan 
worden beschreven door voor leeftijdsintervallen te berekenen hoeveel hoger 
of lager de vruchtbaarheid in een bepaald land is dan het gemiddelde in een 
aantal Europese landen. Daaruit blijkt dan dat in Nederland de vruchtbaarheid 
op heel jonge leeftijden erg laag is, dat relatief veel vrouwen in Nederland 
rond dertigjarige leeftijd moeder worden, maar dat op nog hogere leeftijden de 
vruchtbaarheidscijfers in Nederland niet erg hoog zijn. Het op latere leeftijd 
kinderen krijgen betekent in Nederland dus dat wel veel vrouwen wachten tot 
ze eind twintig of begin dertig zijn, maar dat niet heel veel vrouwen wachten 
tot ze tegen de veertig lopen. 
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TOPALS kan worden gebruikt voor het maken van prognoses door 
veronderstellingen te maken over de vraag of de verschillen tussen landen 
en het gemiddelde patroon in de toekomst zullen veranderen. Een andere 
mogelijkheid om met TOPALS prognoses te maken is door het vruchtbaar-
heidspatroon in verschillende landen te vergelijken met het patroon in 
een land waarvan men aanneemt dat het voorloopt op de rest. Vaak wordt 
verondersteld dat het huidige vruchtbaarheidspatroon in Noord-Europese 
landen laat zien waar het in andere Europese landen heen zou kunnen 
gaan. In Noordelijke landen is de arbeidsparticipatie van vrouwen hoog, 
terwijl dit niet ten koste gaat van het kindertal, integendeel het kindertal in 
Noord-Europa ligt hoger dan in de meeste andere Europese landen. Door 
voor verschillende Europese landen te onderzoeken hoe snel het vruchtbaar-
heidspatroon zich in de richting van het Noord-Europese patroon ontwikkelt, 
kan een prognose worden gemaakt van de toekomstige vruchtbaarheidson-
twikkeling in die landen. Hiervoor wordt in combinatie met TOPALS een 
]RJHQDDPGSDUWLsOHDDQSDVVLQJHQPRGHOJHEUXLNW2SGLWPRPHQWEHGUDDJW
het gemiddeld kindertal in Zweden 1,9 kinderen per vrouw, terwijl het in 
landen als Duitsland en Polen op een niveau van 1,4 kinderen per vrouw 
ligt. Met het model kan worden voorspeld dat het gemiddeld kindertal in 
Duitsland en Polen zal toenemen naar 1,6 in 2030. Dit is weliswaar nog 
steeds beduidend lager dan het gemiddeld kindertal in Zweden, maar het 
verschil wordt wel duidelijk kleiner.
Sterfte
In 2002 verscheen in Science een artikel van Oeppen en Vaupel over de 
ontwikkeling van de levensverwachting waarin ze laten zien dat als je een 
plaatje maakt van de hoogste levensverwachting ter wereld in elk jaar in de 
DIJHORSHQ DQGHUKDOYH HHXZ GH JUD¿HN HHQ RSYDOOHQG OLQHDLU YHUORRS ODDW
zien. De hoogste levensverwachting ter wereld blijkt gedurende die gehele 
periode met 2,5 jaar per decennium te stijgen. Omdat deze ontwikkeling al zo 
lang duurt, verwachten Oeppen en Vaupel dat de stijging zich in de toekomst 
voorlopig nog wel zal voortzetten. Al sinds begin jaren tachtig hebben 
Japanse vrouwen de hoogste levensverwachting ter wereld. Op dit moment 
bedraagt de levensverwachting van Japanse vrouwen 86 jaar. Volgens de 
redenering van Oeppen en Vaupel zouden Japanse vrouwen rond 2060 een 
levensverwachting van 100 jaar bereiken. Sommige deskundigen vinden 
deze prognose wel erg optimistisch. Het zou betekenen dat de sterfterisico’s 
op alle leeftijden met ongeveer driekwart zouden moeten dalen ten opzichte 
van het huidige niveau. En als de sterftecijfers op sommige leeftijden minder 
sterk zouden dalen, omdat de sterfte daar al heel laag is, zou de daling op 
andere leeftijden nog groter moeten zijn. 
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Als naar de ontwikkeling van de sterftecijfers op verschillende leeftijden 
in het verleden wordt gekeken, blijkt dat zich op verschillende leeftijden 
uiteenlopende ontwikkelingen hebben voorgedaan. Zo is de sterfte op de 
jongste leeftijden in Noord-, West- en Zuid-Europese landen de afgelopen 
dertig jaar met ongeveer driekwart gedaald. Op middelbare leeftijden zijn 
de sterftecijfers gehalveerd. De Oost-Europese landen hebben sinds de val 
van het communisme overigens een minder gunstige ontwikkeling laten 
zien, daar zijn de sterftecijfers voor mannen op middelbare leeftijd zelfs 
toegenomen. Bij de oudste leeftijdsgroepen was de daling van de sterftecijfers 
in Noord-, West- en Zuid-Europese landen geringer dan op jongere leeftijden. 
De sterftecijfers van negentigers zijn met een derde teruggelopen. Wanneer 
deze ontwikkelingen naar de toekomst worden doorgetrokken stijgt de 
levensverwachting minder sterk dan op basis van een lineaire stijging 
zou worden voorspeld. Bijvoorbeeld voor Nederlandse mannen komt een 
lineaire extrapolatie van de levensverwachting uit op een voorspelling van 
de levensverwachting in 2060 van 89 jaar, terwijl een extrapolatie van de 
uiteenlopende ontwikkelingen van de sterftecijfers op verschillende leeftijden 
leidt tot een voorspelling van de levensverwachting van 84 jaar. 
Hoofdstuk 6 beschrijft voorspellingen van sterftecijfers die rekening houden 
met uiteenlopende ontwikkelingen op verschillende leeftijden. Omdat het 
extrapoleren van de sterftecijfers voor alle afzonderlijke leeftijden apart 
tot een grillig leeftijdspatroon leidt, wordt TOPALS gebruikt om een glad 
leeftijdspatroon te verkrijgen. TOPALS beschrijft de verhouding tussen 
de sterftecijfers in een bepaald land, bijvoorbeeld Nederland, en een glad 





jaar te extrapoleren en voor de tussenliggende leeftijden te interpoleren wordt 
een glad leeftijdspatroon van de sterftecijfers voorspeld. 
In plaats van trends uit het verleden door te trekken kunnen ook scenario’s 
worden gemaakt die er rekening mee houden dat toekomstige ontwikkelingen 
in sterftecijfers kunnen verschillen van ontwikkelingen in het verleden. 
Hoofdstuk 6 beschrijft enkele van dergelijke scenario’s. Voor deze scenario’s 
wordt net als bij de prognose van de geboorte in hoofdstuk 5 gebruik gemaakt 
van een partieel aanpassingenmodel. Terwijl bij de geboorte uitgegaan 
werd van het huidige Zweedse patroon als model voor de toekomstige 
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ontwikkeling in andere Europese landen, wordt bij de sterfte verondersteld 
dat het sterftepatroon van Japanse vrouwen laat zien in welke richting de 
sterftecijfers zich kunnen ontwikkelen. Uitgaande van de voorspelling van 
Oeppen en Vaupel dat de levensverwachting van Japanse vrouwen rond 
2060 een niveau van 100 jaar zal bereiken, kan worden berekend hoe laag 
de sterftecijfers van Japanse vrouwen dan zouden moeten zijn. Vervolgens 
kan met een partieel aanpassingenmodel voor alle Europese landen worden 
geschat in welk tempo de sterftecijfers zich in de richting van dat voorspelde 
Japanse niveau ontwikkelen. Dan blijkt bijvoorbeeld dat de sterftecijfers van 
Franse vrouwen zich in de afgelopen dertig jaar sneller in de richting van het 
Japanse niveau bewegen dan van Nederlandse vrouwen. 
Als de ontwikkeling van de laatste dertig jaar wordt doorgetrokken blijkt de 
levensverwachting van Franse vrouwen toe te nemen van 84 jaar in 2006 naar 
91 jaar in 2060, en die van Nederlandse vrouwen van 82 naar 87 jaar. Dus 
de Franse vrouwen overbruggen een groter deel van het verschil met Japan 
dan de Nederlandse vrouwen. Vergeleken met veel andere Noord-, West- en 
Zuid-Europese landen is de ontwikkeling van de sterftecijfers van Nederlandse 
vrouwen in de afgelopen decennia minder gunstig geweest. Rookgedrag is 
hiervoor een van de verklaringen. In 2006 lag de levensverwachting van 
Nederlandse vrouwen bijna een jaar lager dan in 14 andere Noord-, West- en 
Zuid-Europese landen. Als trends uit het verleden worden doorgetrokken, 
komt ook de voorspelling van de toekomstige levensverwachting voor 
Nederlandse vrouwen lager uit dan voor die andere landen. In 2060 zou 
de levensverwachting van Nederlandse vrouwen zelfs 2,5 jaar onder het 
gemiddelde liggen. Men kan zich afvragen of een dergelijke ontwikkeling 
plausibel is. Zoals gezegd is de ongunstige ontwikkeling in Nederland 
mede veroorzaakt door rookgedrag in het verleden. Doordat Nederlandse 
vrouwen de laatste jaren minder zijn gaan roken, kan worden verwacht dat 
de sterfteontwikkeling zich in de toekomst gunstiger zal ontwikkelen. In 
hoofdstuk 6 worden cijfers tot en met 2006 geanalyseerd, maar het CBS heeft 
recentere cijfers gepubliceerd, en die laten al een gunstigere ontwikkeling 
zien. 
In plaats van het doortrekken van trends voor elk land afzonderlijk kan 
men een scenario maken waarbij men veronderstelt dat op de lange termijn 
Europese landen gemiddeld genomen een zelfde ontwikkeling vertonen. De 
gedachte hierachter is dat in sommige landen de ontwikkeling in de sterfte 
tijdelijk minder gunstig kan zijn dan in andere landen, maar dat op de lange 
termijn door de medische vooruitgang de sterfte in alle Europese landen naar 
een laag niveau zal dalen en dat de verschillen tussen landen kleiner zullen 
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worden. De gemiddelde trend in een aantal Europese landen laat een stabieler 
verloop zien dan de trends in afzonderlijke landen en kan hierdoor een betere 
basis vormen voor prognoses voor de lange termijn. Als bij toepassing van 
KHWSDUWLsOHDDQSDVVLQJHQPRGHOZRUGWYHURQGHUVWHOGGDWGHWHQGHQVYDQGH
sterftecijfers in de richting van het lage niveau van Japanse vrouwen in alle 
Noord-, West- en Zuid-Europese landen hetzelfde is, wordt het verschil in de 
prognose van de levensverwachting van Nederlandse vrouwen ten opzichte 
van het gemiddelde kleiner in plaats van groter. Dan wordt voorspeld dat de 
levensverwachting van Nederlandse vrouwen in 2060 geen 2,5 jaar maar een 
half jaar lager zal zijn dan het gemiddelde. Tot slot laat hoofdstuk 6 zien dat 
723$/6LQFRPELQDWLHPHWHHQSDUWLsOHDDQSDVVLQJHQPRGHORRNNDQZRUGHQ
gebruikt om een scenario te berekenen waarbij wordt verondersteld dat de 
toekomstige daling van de sterftecijfers sterker zal zijn dan in de afgelopen 
jaren. Dit zou zich bijvoorbeeld kunnen voordoen als gevolg van sterke 
medische vooruitgang.
Transparantie van bevolkingsprognoses
Berekeningen van de toekomstige omvang en samenstelling van de 
bevolking zijn gebaseerd op veronderstellingen over veranderingen in 
geboorte, sterfte en migratie. Afhankelijk van de aard van de veronderstel-
lingen kunnen de berekeningen worden bestempeld als projecties, scenario’s 
of prognoses. Projecties laten zien wat er gebeurt als huidige trends worden 
JHs[WUDSROHHUG +LHUYRRU NXQQHQ WLMGUHHNVPRGHOOHQ ZRUGHQ JHEUXLNW
bijvoorbeeld zogenaamde stochastische tijdreeksmodellen. Dit klinkt 
ingewikkelder dan het is. Het zogenaamde random walk model voorspelt dat 
toekomstige cijfers gelijk blijven aan het huidige niveau. Een veel gebruikte 
variant hiervan is het random walk with drift model, dat een lineaire stijging 
of daling voorspelt. Scenario’s beschrijven mogelijke toekomsten uitgaande 
van verschillende veronderstellingen over factoren die invloed hebben op 
veranderingen in geboorte, sterfte en migratie. Hiervoor kunnen verklarende 
modellen worden gebruikt. Prognoses beogen de meest waarschijnlijke 
toekomst te beschrijven. Het verschil met projecties en scenario’s is niet 
de methode, maar de interpretatie van de veronderstellingen. Als wordt 
verwacht dat een voortzetting van trends het meest waarschijnlijk is, kan de 
extrapolatie van trends als een prognose worden beschouwd.  Trends kunnen 
HYHQZHO RS YHUVFKLOOHQGH PDQLHUHQ ZRUGHQ JHs[WUDSROHHUG ELMYRRUEHHOG
afhankelijk van de keuze van de basisperiode of afhankelijk van de keuze van 
het tijdreeksmodel. Als verschillende extrapolaties worden berekend, kunnen 
ze ook als alternatieve scenario’s worden beschouwd. Als verschillende 
scenario’s worden doorgerekend op basis van alternatieve veronderstel-
lingen over toekomstige economische, sociale en culturele veranderingen, en 
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één van die scenario’s wordt als waarschijnlijker dan de andere beschouwd, 
kan dat scenario als een prognose worden gezien. Met andere woorden, een 
prognose onderscheidt zich niet van projecties en scenario’s op basis van de 
toegepaste methode. 
Zowel projecties als scenario’s zijn gebaseerd op keuzes. Zelfs de 
veronderstelling dat trends zich zullen voortzetten resulteert niet zonder 
meer in één extrapolatie. Een langere schattingsperiode kan tot andere 
extrapolaties leiden dan een korte basisperiode, een lineaire extrapolatie leidt 
tot andere uitkomsten dan een niet-lineaire, en zelfs als men kiest voor een 
lineaire extrapolatie kan die op verschillende manieren worden uitgevoerd. 
Belangrijker dan een onderscheid tussen de termen projecties, scenario’s 
en prognoses is daarom dat de prognosemaker de gebruikte methoden en 
gemaakte keuzes expliciteert en beargumenteert, waardoor prognoses 
transparant zijn. Ook is het van belang dat de prognosemaker laat zien wat 
de consequenties van die keuzes zijn en wat het zou uitmaken als een andere 
keuze zou zijn gemaakt. 
Voor de gebruiker is natuurlijk het allerbelangrijkst of een prognose uitkomt. 
Voor prognoses voor de korte termijn, bijvoorbeeld de weersvoorspelling 
voor de komende dagen of de voorspelling van de economische groei voor het 
komende jaar, valt in principe te controleren of een bepaalde prognosemaker 
een goede track record heeft. Maar voor prognoses voor de lange termijn kan 
de gebruiker alleen afgaan op de geloofwaardigheid van de prognosemaker 
en de onderbouwing van de prognose. Als de prognosemaker laat zien dat de 
prognose voor de lange termijn er in grote lijnen niet heel anders uit zou zien 
als er andere keuzes zouden zijn gemaakt, dan geeft dat meer zekerheid dan 
als andere keuzes tot een totaal ander toekomstbeeld zouden leiden. En als 
de prognosemaker overtuigende argumenten heeft voor de gemaakte keuzes 
geeft dat ook meer vertrouwen in de prognose dan wanneer de keuzes een 
arbitrair karakter hebben. Argumenten kunnen inhoudelijk zijn. Zo kan worden 
voorspeld dat de levensverwachting verder stijgt omdat wordt verwacht 
dat de medische zorg verbetert. Dit is een zogenaamde ‘argument-based’ 
voorspelling. Maar argumenten kunnen ook een statistisch karakter hebben: 
zo kan worden voorspeld dat de levensverwachting met 2,5 jaar per 
decennium zal stijgen omdat de levensverwachting al meer dan een eeuw in 
dat tempo stijgt. Naarmate methoden ingewikkelder zijn, valt moeilijker te 
doorzien wat de onderliggende veronderstellingen en de consequenties van 
keuzes zijn. Daarom wordt er hier voor gepleit dat methoden zo eenvoudig 
PRJHOLMN]LMQ:HOLVZDDUVWDDQHULQGLWSURHIVFKULIWHHQÀLQNDDQWDOIRUPXOHV
en lijken de methoden op het eerste gezicht misschien gecompliceerd, maar 
de onderliggende gedachten zijn eenvoudig.
Th e accuracy of a new forecast is unknown. One can only judge 
the methods used and assumptions made by the forecaster. Th us 
transparency of forecasts is important. Th is requires that the fore-
caster argues the choice of methods and assumptions.
Population projections are based on assumptions about future 
changes in fertility, mortality and migration. Th is book describes 
methods that can be used for making these assumptions and dis-
cusses which choices have to be made by the forecaster.
Th is book shows how international comparisons can be helpful 
in making population projections. For international migration 
international comparisons can contribute to improve estimates of 
the size and direction of immigration and emigration fows.
For projecting fertility international comparisons can be used to 
assess in what direction the future level and age pattern of fertil-
ity may move. Projections of future life expectancy can be based 
on a comparison with the highest level of life expectancy in the 
world. Moreover estimating an average trend in life expectancy 
over a group of countries will make projections more stable.
